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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
  
War by Algorithm: Giambattista Vico and Ethics of War in the Techno-Logical Era 
  
By 
  
John Robert Emery 
  
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
  
 University of California, Irvine, 2019 
  
Associate Professor Daniel Brunstetter, Chair 
  
  
  
In an era where humans are increasingly being replaced or augmented by technological innovation, 
how might the humanist tradition offer us guiding questions for ethics of war today? My talk will 
explore the U.S. discourse of how improved battlefield technology is believed to make Western 
war an inherently more ethical space that eases the liberal conscience in killing. Drawing on the 
logics and practices of U.S. war making, my talk will address three phases of the transition from 
an ethics of practical judgment and due care to a computational techno-ethics of war. First, it traces 
the rise of smart bombs alongside collateral damage estimation software. Second, I examine the 
machine-learning processes that constructs ‘legitimate targets’ in US drone strikes via 
heterogeneous correlations of SIM card metadata. Third, I survey the consequences of a quantified 
global battlefield and the improbability of ‘meaningful human control’ over artificially intelligent 
‘killer robots’. War by algorithm ultimately removes us from the act of killing while proffering a 
more ethical ‘science of warfare’. These practices enable decision-makers to tick the ethical box 
of due care with technology that is believed to be objective and neutral, yet in reality, has simply 
buried bias deep within the algorithmic code. Not only do these technologies of war and big data 
shape our capacity to think ethically, but fundamentally call us to reassess how complex ethico-
political dilemmas of war could be replaced by computation. What is at stake is the erosion of 
effective constraints on the use of lethal force because this techno-rationalization of a quantified 
risk assessment has supplanted ethical decision-making, the site of the body, and emotions in 
contemporary conflict. Ultimately, I will argue that the science of humanity of Giambattista Vico, 
allows us to rethink algorithmic epistemologies of war in novel ways that bring the human back to 
the forefront of ethical decision-making in the 21st Century. 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
“Today we glory in science and in cybernetic instruments, entrusting our future to them, forgetting 
that we still have the problem of finding ‘data,’ of ‘inventing them,’ since the cybernetic process 
can only elaborate them and draw consequences from them. The problem of the essence of the 
human genius and of its creativity cannot be reduced to that of rational deduction, which modern 
technology is developing to improbable depths.” 
–Ernesto Grassi, Vico and Humanism (1990) 
  
 
“Vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all perspective gives way to 
infinitely mobile vision, which no longer seems just mythically about the god-trick of seeing 
everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into ordinary practice.” 
–Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1990) 
  
 
“People talk sometimes of bestial cruelty, but that’s a great injustice and insult to the beasts; a 
beast can never be so cruel as a man, so artistically cruel.” 
–Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (1880) 
  
 
“I am purely evil; 
Hear the thrum 
Of my evil engine; 
Evilly I come. 
The stars as thick as flowers 
In the meadows of July; 
A fine night for murder 
Winging through the sky. 
Bombs shall be the bounty 
Of the lovely night; 
Death the desecration 
Of the fields of light. 
I am purely evil, 
Come to destroy 
Beauty and goodness, 
Tenderness and joy. 
  
–Ethel Mannin “Song of the Bomber” (1936) 
 2 
War is an experiment in catastrophe. Indeterminacy, uncertainty, and unpredictability reign 
supreme; yet, soldiers and scholars throughout the ages have attempted to construct a science of 
warfare and tame chance. The rise of computers, game theory, and deterrence theory during the 
Cold War, smart bombs and collateral damage estimation software from the Vietnam War to 9/11, 
as well as drones, big data and artificial intelligence (AI) in the Global War on Terror, all represent 
unique technological innovations that proponents claim will make warfare more predictable, 
scientific, rational, and ethical than the barbarism of past conflicts. The dissertation that follows is 
the commencement of journey along the path of pushing the boundaries of ethics of war and peace, 
constructivist International Relations, and critical military studies. The driving questions that guide 
this dissertation aim to conceptualize warfare and ethics in late modernity in all of its messiness, 
ambiguity, contingency, and contradiction. To understand war in an age of advancing technology, 
algorithmically controlled lives, and AI, we must fundamentally reassess our assumptions about 
ethics, war, and conflict in the international system. How does technological innovation seek to 
bring to fruition the liberal ideal of the ‘ethical war’, resolving the tension that puts at odds liberal 
democratic values and the need for quick and decisive victories at any cost? The belief that wars 
can be waged in a ‘precise manner’ while systematically shifting ethical discourse from protecting 
civilians to protecting our soldiers, presents a unique crisis in ethics of war today. How then are 
debates about how best to understand war shaped by assumptions of modernity, especially the 
contestation over philosophical assumptions of science between the search for universal and 
timeless Truth and science as contingent, contextually bound practices for understanding the social 
world. Additionally, what are the methodological assumptions about the nature of warfare and how 
best to study it, that divides debates within just war thinking today? How might the humanism and 
poetic wisdom of Giambattista Vico aid us in pushing debates in IR, war ethics, and critical 
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security studies forward by looking to past epistemological, ontological, and foundational debates 
about modernity? 
 
 In sum, this dissertation broadly explores questions surrounding technology, war ethics, 
and constructivist IR. First and foremost, the utilization of Vichian humanism is a broad critique 
of positivist IR and analytic philosophy in just war while proffering an alternative vision for both 
by embracing the ambiguity and contingency of inter-subjective human agency in warfare. Second, 
this dissertation draws upon interpretivist methodologies, narrative, and poetry to gain insight into 
the everyday practices and lived experiences of those living through and fighting in conflicts, to 
build an ethics of war from that foundation of human experience as opposed to a view from 
nowhere. Third, it engages with contemporary dilemmas of advancing technology that further 
challenges already blurred binaries between war/peace, universal/particular, human/machine, 
rational/emotional, and positivist/post-positivist methods for studying these phenomena. 
Specifically my research question asks in an era where the human in war and society is increasingly 
being replaced by algorithmic technology and artificial intelligence, how might the humanist 
tradition inform our ethical thinking today? By embracing the tensions as opposed to resolving 
them, my work pushes forward the necessity of a return to language, poetry, and narrative in IR as 
well as a return to an ethics of care and practical judgment in the technological era. Ultimately, 
this dissertation is a first step in a long process of exploring the intersections of humans, 
technology, and warfare that proffers a novel philosophical take on these issues by way of Vichian 
humanism. 
 
 4 
 Tracing the rise of some computational technologies of warfare from 1950 through today, 
this dissertation seeks to answer the questions: How might technologies of violence affect our 
understanding of ethics of war? How does divorcing the mechanisms of war from their human 
consequences enable a false belief that increasing battlefield technology makes war an inherently 
more ethical space? A few examples that will be explored in depth in chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation elucidate how the computational method acts to slowly disengage our moral intuitions 
by abstracting the human consequences of war. War by algorithm traces a shift in moral thinking 
about war from an ethics of practical judgment to computational answers to ethico-political 
dilemmas. Although there has been a proliferation in JAG lawyers in the U.S. military and an 
evolving norm against targeting civilians in war, algorithmic innovation has been constitutive of 
this process and has yet to be explored in depth. In essence, the following examples present a 
unique evolution in conceptualizing computational abstraction and war ethics from the 1950s to 
today.  
 
 During the initial years of the Cold War when a team of RAND Corporation analysts first 
laid down the damage circles of a prospective Hydrogen bomb over maps of the USSR or Europe 
in what was deemed a rather “mechanical task” (Kaplan 1991: 77). Working with the top secret 
data from Los Alamos nuclear laboratory, the RAND analysts knew that the “H-Bomb could 
release the explosive energy of one million or five million or ten or twenty million tons of TNT. 
The Nagasaki bomb, by comparison, had released the equivalent of twenty thousand tons–or 
twenty kilotons” (Kaplan 1991: 77).  These blast circles on various maps (which did not account 
for radiation nor fires sparked from the explosions) revealed that a “mere fifty-five H-Bombs of 
twenty megatons each would completely wipe out the fifty largest cities of the Soviet Union, 
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killing thirty-five million Russians, all in a matter of minutes. And that assumed that the urban 
population would have the protection of World War II-type shelters.” (Kaplan 1991: 77). With the 
rise of game theory, deterrence theory, and mutually assured destruction, this soon became the 
“technostrategic language”, of defense intellectuals that “plays a central role in allowing defense 
intellectuals to think and act as they do”, namely coming to divorce war from its human 
consequences in the nuclear era (Cohn 1987:690). A later generation of defense analysts would 
toss around figures of tens of millions of deaths with “casual aplomb; but in early 1952, nobody 
had ever dreamed of such massive destruction. Nobody had ever killed 35 million people on a 
sheet of paper before. To those who did it for the first time, the experience was shocking, disturbing 
and painful.” (Kaplan 1991: 78). Thus, in Chapter 3 of this dissertation I discuss the process of 
contestation between game theorists, mathematicians, and social scientists at RAND Corporation 
in early 1950s war gaming to contextualize what Cohn (1987) noted decades later about how 
technostrategic discourse of defense intellectuals, which legitimates the absence of ethical 
questions in favor of a “rational” discourse of nuclear annihilation. 
 
 Fast forward to the initial “shock and awe” campaign of the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. 
military ran a statistical program called the collateral damage estimation tool (CDET) or 
“bugsplat,” which estimated the number of civilians that would likely be killed in a given kinetic 
strike. On opening day, the estimations presented to Gen. Tommy Franks “indicated that 22 of the 
[30] projected bombing attacks on Iraq would produce what they defined as heavy bugsplat – that 
is, more than 30 civilian deaths per raid. Franks said, ‘Go ahead, we’re doing all 30’” (Chamayou 
2015: 216). From ‘smart bombs’ coupled with CDET to the CIA generating drone strike targets 
based upon SIM card metadata processed by machine-learning algorithms, and AI, technologies 
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of war are increasingly moving beyond meaningful human control. Although such innovations in 
death and destruction bring to mind the culmination of the idea of an “ethical war” that falls in line 
with Western ideals of warfare (Zehfuss 2018; Carvin and Williams 2014; Mabee 2016), such an 
overreliance on technology enables what it seeks to constrain. Thus, killing, maiming, and 
destruction becomes not only palatable or a tragic consequence of international politics, but 
virtuous and ethical. Yet, as I will explore throughout the dissertation, technology does not 
inherently make war a more ethical space. Instead, algorithmic technologies from smart bombs to 
killer robots function to replace difficult ethico-political decision-making with a fantasy of control 
over the uncertainties of conflict, while simultaneously absolving decision-makers of 
responsibility for killing by removing them one causal step further from the act of killing.  
 
 Perhaps the most compelling example of the central paradox in contemporary U.S. military 
practices, is the individualization of killing via the algorithmic construction of a shadow of 
subjectivity based upon an individual’s metadata. The narrative of progress in the ethical war can 
be stated thusly: we have moved from total war and carpet bombing to calculating “bugsplat” with 
“smart bombs,” to an individualized targeting in drone strikes. While the U.S. has the capability 
to target individuals globally, they are no longer individual subjects, combatants, or criminals 
being targeted. Human beings have become shadows of subjectivity, constructed by their metadata, 
that predicts a probability of “terroristness,” now or at some unknown point in the future. The use 
of U.S. drones in undeclared warzones has launched a generation of research in all fields of study; 
however, the drone itself is not as interesting as the machine-learning process in which targets are 
algorithmically determined. Schwarz (2016: 64) explores in her article on drones and bio-politics, 
“that which might pose a risk is identified and selected as a justified target merely on the basis of 
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identifiable markers, patterns and algorithmic calculations, and in most cases the exact factors that 
contribute to the algorithmic determination of targets remain opaque.” However, subsequent 
revelations about the SKYNET program via a leaked NSA PowerPoint allows us to gaze deeper 
into the practices and logics of U.S. targeting practices.  
 
How then have covert practices in the Global War on Terror constructed a purportedly 
objective, neutral, and calculable probability of terroristness?  SKYNET was the joint NSA and 
CIA operation over Yemen and Pakistan where the NSA swept up a dragnet SIM card metadata 
upon which drone strikes were based. SKYNET works like a typical modern Big Data business 
application. The program collects metadata and stores it on NSA cloud servers, extracts relevant 
information, and then applies machine learning to identify leads for a targeted campaign (Grothoff 
and Porup 2016). Except, instead of trying to sell the targets something like the business 
applications, this campaign executes their “Find-Fix-Finish” strategy using Hellfire missiles to 
take out their target (Scahill and Greenwald 2015).  In addition to processing logged cellular phone 
call data (so-called “DNR” or Dialed Number Recognition data, such as time, duration, who called 
whom, etc.), SKYNET also collects user location, allowing for the creation of detailed travel 
profiles. Turning off a mobile phone gets flagged as an attempt to evade mass surveillance. Users 
who swap SIM cards, naively believing this will prevent tracking, also get flagged (the 
ESN/MEID/IMEI burned into the handset makes the phone trackable across multiple SIM cards). 
Given the complete set of metadata, SKYNET pieces together people's typical daily routines—
who travels together, have shared contacts, stay overnight with friends, visit other countries, or 
move permanently. Overall, the slides indicate, the NSA machine-learning algorithm uses more 
than 80 different properties to rate people on their “terroristiness” (Grothoff and Porup 2016). 
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Hence, the logical end of the automation of targeting procedures in AI enabled lethal autonomous 
weapons systems (LAWS) is that the individualization of targeting in an attempt to cleanse the 
conscience of liberal killing, the individual has been erased and we are now targeting a 
heterogenous calculation of metadata. Thus, the foundations upon which the laws and ethics of 
war have been established are beginning to crumble, i.e. the reciprocal right to kill and be killed 
in warfare on a recognition of the subjectivity of one another.  
 
With these examples in mind, an exploration of the epistemological, methodological, and 
ontological foundations of modernity via Enlightenment critic Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) is 
in order. This dissertation aims to capture the tensions arise from a teleological and techno-logical 
narrative of the science of warfare making war inherently more ethical via a constitutive process 
tracing. Each chapter adopts a unique methodology in order to answer the specific question, yet 
all take an interpretivist epistemological stance consistent with my philosophical assumptions 
explored below. However, the overarching narrative of my project adopts the method of (Fierke 
2013), of a constitutive approach to process-tracing that identifies shifts in meaning as part of a 
process that establishes parameters of a new game (in our present case of war technology and 
ethical discourse). Thus, my focus is on the meaning attached to technology, contested notions of 
“science”, bodily materiality, and psychological experiences of war rather than an exhaustive 
history of military technology per se. I utilize empirical, historical illustrations to explicate the 
relationship between the changing boundaries of how technology shapes our capacity to think 
ethically in war and the meaning that military practitioners and decision-makers attach to 
technological innovation. Such practices located within historical, cultural, and political context; 
therefore, conclusions from specific cases do not represent a claim that the same dynamics would 
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be present when transferred to another time and place i.e. conclusions are not universal and 
timeless. As a result, I adopt a more casuistic approach to ethical theorizing utilizing historical 
cases of technological innovation in U.S. war-making to highlight concrete ethical dilemmas and 
tensions and the enabling discourses and logics that divorce killing in war from its human 
consequences.  
 
Throughout this dissertation, while questioning assumptions of modernity and how to 
conceptualize ethics of war today, I look to the U.S. practices of technological warfare from the 
Cold War to today in order to tackle what a humanistic ethical stance might look like in an 
artificially intelligent world. The three examples above are snapshots of the techno-problem-
solving hubris that permeates the social world beyond its military applications, reducing humans 
to mere amalgams of quantifiable data upon which life and death decisions are based. These 
military applications are symptoms of wider issues of late modernity to quantify the unquantifiable 
and tame chance. Yet such a futile endeavor remains “a grandiose technocratic rationalizing dream 
of absolute control of the accidental understood as the irruption of the unpredictable. In the name 
of this myth of absolute eradication of risk, they construct a mass of new risks which constitute so 
many new targets for preventive intervention” (Castel 1991: 289). Thus, we have a persistent 
illusion in the technological era that algorithms, machine learning, and AI are somehow more 
“scientific” and “objective” much like the Cartesian method of which Vico was critical – yet as 
feminist scholars have argued for decades, attempts to eliminate human emotions from “rational” 
analysis is a “god-trick” that favors certain kinds of knowledge production. 
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The main focus of my dissertation’s interjection into both IR and just war debates rests 
upon a number of philosophical assumptions that privilege my focus of deep contextual 
understanding as opposed to finding generalizable principles. Patrick T. Jackson (2010) argues 
that the real divide in IR is not qualitative vs. qualitative methods, but rather the philosophical 
ontologies of mind-world dualism vs. mind-world monism. The former is the ontological claim 
that there is no “objective world” that is separated from our understanding/interacting with it (think 
of intersubjective knowledge of constructivists), the latter is the ontological claim that there is a 
world “out there” beyond all of our knowledge making-practices that can be “objectively” 
evaluated. Ahistorical thinking that dominates positivist security studies and just war revisionism 
is an ongoing tendency to privilege the universal and abstract aspects of thought at the expense of 
the particular and contingent. I have a particular aversion to the idea that decision-making on moral 
issues in warfare can be reduced to a mechanical process, the application of an algorithm, 
generalizable for all contexts. As Chris Brown notes, a return to Aristotle’s dictum that “sound 
moral judgement always respects the detailed circumstances of specific kinds of cases” represents 
a path forward to contemporary dilemmas of war, (Brown 2010: 101). However, instead of 
returning to Aristotle, I construct an ethics of practical judgment from within a Vichian 
constructivist and humanist understanding of the social world. Hence, in chapter one, I will make 
the case that Vico should be understood as a proto-constructivist, while also providing my 
methodological rationale for turning to poetic wisdom for the most unpredictable of all human 
endeavors: war.  
 
Ultimately for Vico, one cannot exclude one form of knowledge (rational analysis) from 
the other (ethics, rhetoric, jurisprudence) as they are intimately interconnected. Accordingly, one 
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cannot divorce ethics from more “objective”, “empirical”, or “quantitative” forms of knowledge. 
Vico’s utilization of classical political humanism brings with it in my endeavor “openness at once 
to the unity and the self-identity of the idea and to the multiplicity of the variety, indeed, the very 
contradictions of the concrete order of existence and becoming. From this characteristic was born 
its profoundly moral or ethical character, its devotion to the concept of wisdom; for ethics, and 
wisdom, as its fullest expression, is essentially the pursuit of the idea and and through that 
multiplicity, variety and contradictions of human presence, within which it seeks to induce these 
properties of the idea, its unity and self-identity” (Grassi 1990, 60). Moreover, abstract theorizing 
about ethics in particular Vico spends his whole works critiquing: “The fool, who knows truth 
neither in its genus [in it generality] nor in its species [in its particular] bears within himself the 
penalty for his temerity. To the clever illiterate, who grasps contingent truths without arriving at 
general truths, those self same truths that today augment his cleverness will tomorrow become an 
impediment. The imprudent scholar who steers his course through particular truths by some 
general truth will come to grief on the shoals of life. But the wise, who, through the ambiguities 
and incertitudes of practice, hold close to eternal truths, when they are unable to proceed straight 
to their goal circumvent the obstacles and devise strategems that will prove useful for a future that 
will be as long as nature permits.” (Vico quoted in Grimaldi 1958: 68). Ultimately, this dissertation 
utilizes Vichian thought to grapple with how imagination, myth-making, linguistics, rhetoric, and 
the poetic character of humans can be conceptualized and push my scholarship in new directions 
in the techno-logical era.  
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Questions of Modernity and Its Legacy in Contemporary Techno-Warfare 
Although this is not a dissertation whose main focus is a commentary on modernity, it would be 
disingenuous to not address assumptions of ethics in modernity that shape my philosophical stance. 
I am most indebted to the intellectual historian Stephen Toulmin for his work on time and 
temporality, casuistic ethics, and especially his Cosmopolis in shaping my scholarship in 
unexpected ways. Toulmin understands the shift to modernity taking place in two phases around 
1600. It is most marked by the philosophical shift from questions concerned with the particular, 
concrete, and contextual, to thinking about nature and society in a new scientific way that rendered 
all questions timeless and independent of their context. Thus, before 1600 theoretical inquiries 
were balanced against discussions of concrete, practical issues, such as the specific conditions on 
which it is morally acceptable for a sovereign to launch a war, or for a subject to kill a tyrant. From 
1600 on, most philosophers committed to questions of abstract, universal theory, to the exclusion 
of concrete issues. Ultimately the universal and timeless questions took their entitled place on 
agenda of “philosophy” (Toulmin 1992: 24).  
 
 This Cartesian project of a new geometric method applied to all of human actions in society 
swept away the skepticism of Renaissance Humanists like Erasmus and Montaigne. Both of whom 
regarded human affairs in a clear-eyed, non-judgmental light to shed honest practical doubt about 
the value of “theory” for human experience. Thus, the humanist skeptics brought to light what 
Vico would expound in his New Science a roughly a century later, namely, nothing that is human 
is foreign; and understanding “man” within history was the path forward for philosophy (Toulmin 
1992: 25-27). In sum, the Cartesian program for philosophy swept aside the reasonable 
uncertainties of 16th C. skeptics in favor of new, mathematical kinds of “rational” certainty and 
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proof. There was a devaluation of the oral, local, timely, and concrete for the formally “rational 
theory grounded on abstract, universal, and timeless concepts.” Rhetoric became subordinate to 
logic; validity and truth of rational arguments were independent of who presents them to whom, 
or in what context (Toulmin 1992: 75). The project in which I seek to bring forth in this dissertation 
is a recontextualization of the ethics of war against the turn of revisionist just war toward analytic 
philosophy in search of the universal and timeless answers to what constitutes a just war, 
independent of the context. Toulmin believes that an Aristotelian position more generally is a good 
counter to the Cartesian program. Throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance moral issues 
were using case analysis derived from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: “The Good, has no 
universal form, regardless of the subject matter or situation: sound moral judgment always respects 
the detailed circumstances of specific kinds of cases” (Toulmin 1992: 31-32). I argue in the 
chapters that follow that a casuistic understanding of ethics of war is the only path forward to 
counter the universalizing and deductive tendencies of AI; taking to heart Aristotle’s dictum that 
we must ethical reasoning must be understood: Pros ton kairon – as occasion requires. As Vico 
will further elaborate there is an intimate connection between ethics and rhetoric. Every ethical 
position was that of a given kind of person in given circumstances, and in spatial relations with 
other specific people: the concrete particularity of a case was “of the essence.” Thus, “ethics was 
a field not for theoretical analysis, but for practical wisdom, and it was a mistake to treat it as a 
universal or abstract science” (Toulmin 1992: 76). 
 
 One of the few individuals who utilizes the Toulminian method today is Chris Brown with 
his scholarship surrounding practical judgment in international political theory. Brown’s use of 
both Aristotle and Toulmin to articulate critiques of contemporary rule-based moral reasoning in 
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favor of an ethics of practical judgment. The problem with practical judgment is that it does not 
easily lend itself to quantification, and “making a judgement is often more intellectually 
demanding than following a rule” (Brown 2010: 230). What makes rule-based moral reasoning so 
appealing is that it “appears to offer a degree of moral security to individuals in an uncertain age 
such as our own”, a kind of objective assurance that they are doing the right thing (Brown 2010: 
230. But following a rule necessarily involves exercising judgment, as moral dilemmas are often 
ambiguous, contradictory, and must be made quickly. There may possibly be moral rules that “can 
be understood algorithmically, in formal, logical terms, but others, the most important, cannot” 
(Brown 2010: 230). For this dissertation, ethics of war in all its uncertainty and failure to predict 
even the most basic outcomes of warfare throughout the ages should give us caution in thinking 
we can produce a an ethical science of warfare. Ultimately, “attempts to produce some kind of 
algorithm that will give a general answer to the question of what is right and what is wrong” in 
such cases–like the fight against terrorism or U.S. intervention in Syria–are unlikely to succeed. 
Moreover, this Aristotelian position applies more generally: the search for “universal and 
uncompromising” moral rules seems particularly fruitless in the cases that will be discussed 
throughout this dissertation, but as Brown has spent his decades expounding, this is simply 
illustrative of a wider problem with a great deal of contemporary moral reasoning (Brown 2010: 
244). How then can Vico’s critique of the Cartesian logic and the kind of ethics it lends itself to 
inform ethical decision-making in warfare today? 
 
  Specifically, I want to do what Toulmin did in Cosmopolis in asking the question: what if 
we had adopted a Montaigne-like skepticism instead of a Cartesian skepticism, with Giambattista 
Vico; I want to explore the possibilities of a more humanistic account of ethics of war. Hence, 
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Vico’s discussion of his “historical ricorso” and his philosophy of history explored in chapter two 
can be related to the place we have reached in techno-warfare of today where technological hubris 
has “perfected” the means while neglecting the ends of war. Furthermore, I will look to Jacques 
Ellul’s Technological Society (1964) and the destructive legacy of the Cartesian logic where 
warfare dehumanized and emphasizing technical progress at the expense of man’s humanity has 
led to an “efficient ordering” of warfare, which actively undermines the complex ethico-political 
tensions that are present the act of killing. Personally, my interest in warfare is the fact that it is at 
the boundary of the inhuman, intensely human, and almost superhuman (Faust 2011); yet we are 
taking a Cartesian scientific logic beyond its philosophical boundaries by believing that greater 
technology in war always already means that war is inherently a more ethical space. Ultimately 
for Vico, this kind of technological world leaves little for humanistic imagination, which I will 
argue is crucial to understanding the ethics of war in any meaningful sense. 
 
The point is that, in dealing with complex situations, such as deciding whether it is right 
that one state should preventively use force against another, or against “terrorists” operating within 
the space between war and peace, “there is no substitute for a form of moral reasoning that involves 
a judgement that takes into account the totality of circumstances, rather than seeks for a rule to 
apply” (Brown 2010: 245). Rule-based moral logic has been pervasive in contemporary moral 
logic, especially in warfare. Applying the Kantian categorical imperative or making utilitarian 
calculations necessarily involves prudential judgment, especially in the context of the uncertainty 
of war. Applying the “rule” may make decision-makers feel good as they absolve themselves of 
moral responsibility because they followed the rule; yet, I assert this fails to capture the ethico-
political dilemmas of today. Even Brown’s practical judgment leaves something to be desired 
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going forward as virtue ethics may provide some answers to the tensions of contemporary war, 
while there is some work on virtue ethics and reflexivity (Amoureux 2017), few have treated the 
issue systematically. In the end, my interjection into constructivist IR and ethics of war seeks to 
bring forth a more humanistic understanding of language, jurisprudence, contextualized 
knowledge, and an ethics of practical judgment for the techno-logical era. With this endeavor I 
have selected Giambattista Vico as my Virgil: “Practical judgment in human affairs seeks out the 
truth as it is, although the truth may be deeply hidden under imprudence, ignorance, whim, fatality, 
or chance; whereas poetry focuses her gaze on truth as it ought to be by nature and reason” (Vico 
1990: 43). Thus, by turning to Vico’s notion of poetic wisdom and applying it to just war thinking 
today, I seek to rescue ethics from trolley problems on steroids and ground ethics in contextual 
human experiences as opposed to “objective rules” of morality. 
 
Ethics of War and Artificial Intelligence 
The driving logic behind this dissertation is to understand the impact of technology on 
conceptualizing ethics of war. In this, I engage with IR and critical security studies scholarship to 
construct a narrative of evolving military technologies from the early Cold War to the battlefields 
of tomorrow. With such technologies increasingly removing humans from the battlefield and the 
decision-making process, a more humanistic account of ethics, epistemology, and ontology via 
Vico strives to shed a skeptical light on dominant discourses of technological innovation as 
inherently ethical. What follows in this section is a brief outline of each chapter of the dissertation. 
Each individual section adopts a unique methodology within an interpretivist framework to explore 
the specific puzzle of the chapter. For example in chapter three, I adopt the anthropological method 
of (Gusterson 1996) to understand the cultural production of the science of mutually assured 
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destruction via archival work at the RAND Corporation. Thus, I aim to understand the “production 
of ideology rather than the production of policy per se”, and hence utilize Clifford Geertz’s lens 
of cultural analysis of a “continual dialectal tacking between the most local of local details and the 
most global of global structure in such a way as to bring them into simultaneous view” (Gusterson 
1996: 6). In chapter four, I utilizes an historico-genealogical method as it helps us understand that 
a high-tech battlefield does not equate to a teleological avenue toward the “ethical war.” Genealogy 
brings to light buried practices and discourses of violence while historicizing novel techno-
innovations within the wider epistemological trend of the quantification of society more generally 
and specifically in the illusion of taming chance in war. Taking into account historical genealogy 
of drones has brought them out of their sci-fi allure and into broader narrative of US war practices, 
that construct us as ethical because we use “precise” technology in killing them. Ultimately, the 
individual methodological tools of each chapter are exemplary of my broader interpretivist 
methodology of exploring how meaning is constructed, debated, and contested with the 
introduction of new technologies of war. 
 
The dissertation is as follows. Chapter one, “Giambattista Vico: Law, Language, and 
Eloquence in Interpretivist International Relations” is an overview of the philosophy of Vico and 
his contributions to both IR and ethics of war. I argue that Vico is a proto-constructivist, whose 
epistemology puts forth a vision of humans as “makers in the world” with language as the basis of 
societal rules, norms, and ideas. Vico was the first to proffer a “vision of man as historical. With 
him begins the modern sense of history, of man as essentially historical. Prior to Vico, the center 
of Western man’s vision of himself was nature” (Caponigri 1953: X). However, Vico’s conception 
of “man” was of man in society not in abstract individualism of Descartes. He sought to put forth 
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concrete circumstances in which humans began to understand themselves, via the laws, myths, and 
religion that they created by and for themselves. Thus, he did not view earlier civilizations with 
their myths as primitive, but as genuine attempts to understand their place in the world. Since, 
humans best understand themselves, they anthropomorphized notions of the divine in 
gods/goddesses. Hence, the proper study of mankind is, indeed, therefore, man; “not, however, 
man in that abstract individualism which so fascinated the centuries between which Vico’s life 
was divided, but man in society, because here alone, in the social structure, is the reality and 
fullness of man to be discovered” (Caponigri 1953: 55-56). Intersubjective language in its 
historical and cultural context is the foundation of understanding; man in his history is Vico’s 
fulfillment of Italian humanism. This becomes most evident in Vico’s hermeneutic circle: “when 
man creates in history; and above all when he creates language, he creates a structure that 
constitutes an interpretation of his experience. In turn that interpretation organizes the world 
around him. The study of history turns out to be an ongoing understanding and evaluation, in effect 
a constant reinterpretation, of these interpretive structures which men have created. There is no 
such thing as ‘objective’ history…The sheer arrogance of the Cartesian mind-set is exhibited by 
the insistence that it is the only valid ‘objective’ view of what constitutes reality, while other views 
or paradigms can only proceed out of ignorance and have therefore little, if any, intellectual value” 
(Paparella 1992: 33). Thus, following Vico’s hermeneutic circle, chapter one explores Vico’s 
critique of natural law, the ontology of language and eloquence, his Cartesian critique, and his 
philosophy of history and its impact on an ethics of war in the technological era today. 
 
Chapter two, “AI and the Poetic Wisdom of Giambattista Vico: Ethics of War in The 
Techno-logical Era,” is firmly grounded in just war and international political theory debates. First, 
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I will sketch the debates between just war traditionalists and revisionists, arguing that the 
revisionist abstraction in thought experiments divorces ethics from the concrete human 
experiences of war. With a barrage of revisionist attempts to deem themselves arbiters of what 
objectively is the just war, or just conduct during war, they consistently fail to account for the 
essence of war: uncertainty, thrownness, and the concrete circumstances of particular conflicts. 
Second, I elaborate Giambattista Vico’s ideal eternal history, which is a cyclical and highly 
contingent vision of man in history. Recognizing that we are inter-subjective makers-in-the-world, 
yet we do so not with consciousness or omnipotence, but by simply acting in the world and ex post 
facto constructing a cogent teleological narrative of how we arrived at the moral lessons of past 
conflicts which informs just war thinking. Third I apply Vico’s notion of poetic wisdom to ethics 
of war today. For Vico, when the last stage of history is reached, man believes himself to have 
encompassed God’s mind–as in AI today–and worships simply his own cleverness, at which point 
a historical ricorso takes place returning man to an earlier simplicity of poetic wisdom. I argue 
that AI, robotic, and algorithmic warfare of today represents such a moment of ricorso in that those 
of us who study ethics of war must return to the concrete circumstances of human experiences of 
war as opposed to revisionist or technological abstraction away from killing. Here, I utilize war 
poetry in order to capture the uncertainty and thrownness of warfare to push for a concrete ethics 
of war based in human experience in contrast to a revisionist vision of ethics as abstract thought 
experiments so they can find the “deep morality of war” devoid of complexity and nuance. In the 
end, Vico’s poetic wisdom is an avenue for me to embrace the tensions that traditionalists and 
revisionists quibble over as opposed to attempting to resolve it. For Vico, true wisdom was not 
reaching for the whole to understanding the particulars (revisionism) but grasping the essence of 
the divine through the contextual, concrete, and particular. 
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Chapter three explores the ethics of war and the Cold War with a central puzzle: how did 
defense intellectuals come to casually toss around “rational” theories of deterrence that included 
the deaths of tens of millions in nuclear exchanges without finding it morally abhorrent? In a phrase 
borrowed from Carol Cohn’s (1987) classic work, how did “technostrategic language”, which 
“reflects and shapes the nature of the American nuclear strategic project, that it plays a central role 
in allowing defense intellectuals to think and act as they do”, come to divorce war from its human 
consequences in the nuclear ear (Cohn 1987: 690)? Such a casual discussion of the mass slaughter 
of other human beings was not innate in the defense intellectual community, but was gradually 
adopted as it coincided with the rise of game theory and systems analysis at the RAND Corporation 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Through utilization of the RAND archives in Santa Monica, CA, 
I was able to gain an understanding of the contestation between the Social Sciences Division and 
the Mathematics Division over how best to predict a purely theoretical nuclear exchange between 
the U.S. and USSR. The Cold War Game as it was called, was designed and implemented by the 
mathematics and economics division. This played out in the first politico-military war game played 
in order to integrate political and economic dimensions into traditional war games exercises with 
a high degree of “political realism” to avoid simplifying the world as much as possible. The Cold 
War Game, took place in four iterations over the period from November 1954 and April 1956. The 
deep contextual understanding of this process as a space of contestation between defense 
intellectuals at RAND Corporation and the proliferation of similar type games offers a window 
into the psyche of how nuclear exchanges with the possibility of nuclear annihilation could be 
viewed as “rational”. Thus, the technostrategic language itself, accompanied by a belief in a more 
“scientific” way of warfare, in conjunction with advancing computing power, and the utilization 
of economic and game theoretic modeling applied to nuclear war, reshaped the capacity of defense 
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intellectuals to think ethically. Hence, “technostrategic discourse functions more as a gloss, as an 
ideological curtain behind which the actual reasons for these decisions hide. That rather than 
informing and shaping decisions, it far more often functions as a legitimation for political 
outcomes that have occurred for utterly different reason” (Cohn 1987: 716). Ultimately, this 
chapter probes the contestation between a rational analysis which divorces war from its horrific 
consequences, and  in the contextual setting of the RAND, how defense intellectuals shaped a 
policy ideology that persisted into the post-Cold War era. 
 
Chapter four engages in the contemporary literature of critical security studies and 
constructs an historico-genealogy of an evolution of U.S. technologies of war from Vietnam to AI 
today and its impact on ethics of due care. This chapter argues that technology has enabled 
practitioners to tick the box of ethical due care via appeals to technological superiority without 
actually practicing due care. Many view such technological innovations as novel solutions to the 
dilemmas of warfare because they remove human bias, emotion, error, and subjectivity by 
providing a more scientific, objective, and neutral means of waging war (Strawser 2010; Plaw 
2013; Sullins 2010). Others view war technology as more problematic and have begun campaigns 
to “ban killer robots” to keep individuals accountable by giving them “meaningful human control” 
over targeting decisions (Sharkey 2010; Zehfuss 2012; Roff 2014). A more in-depth take on this 
area of contestation can be found in Beier (2017), yet as Mabee (2016) argues, a historical 
sociological approach of understanding U.S. “militarism” as opposed to “war”, “broadens out the 
critical analysis of present-day military practices, by focusing on their long-term 
institutionalization” (256). The for and against debate of war technology indeed misses something 
important about what the historico-genealogical arc of these military algorithmic evolutions tells 
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us about the quest for the “ethical war” – whether for realist (strategically to win hearts/minds) or 
more liberalist (protection of innocents) concerns – that has come to dominate American discourse.  
 
Despite the rhetoric of “just war” that often accompanies praise of technological advances 
in targeting, virtue ethics and practical judgment has been abandoned and replaced by a 
predetermined utilitarian calculation conceived as objective and neutral techno-innovation in the 
eyes of practitioners. Such a (r)evolution in understanding war ethics speaks to a wider 
epistemological drive of quantifying the uncertainties of war into a numerically calculable risk 
assessments that ultimately reshapes the capacity of humans to make ethical decisions (Hagmann 
and Cavelty 2012). What is at stake in these techno-practices of war is the erosion of effective 
constraints on the use of lethal force because this techno-rationalization of risk assessment has 
supplanted genuine ethical deliberation about the consequences of contemporary conflict. While 
International Relations scholars have increasingly turned toward the “body” and “emotions” in the 
study of war, violence, and ethics (see: Gregory 2015; Steele and Solomon 2017; Campbell and 
Steele 2017), the question remains as to what these technologies of war tell us about the desire to 
eliminate the body and emotion from the battlefield. 
 
Connecting Technologies of War and Ethics 
There are a number of reasons to explore computing power, warfare, and the discourses and 
meaning created from these technologies. I recognize the co-constitution of human-technology 
interactions, in that humans create the technologies of war that constitute new conditions of 
possibility, while the technologies alter the strategic and ethical conceptualizations of war-making. 
Although I do not draw a causal line or make materialist arguments of the impact of technology in 
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shaping our ethical discourse on war, I do explore how constitutive meaning-making reshapes our 
capacity to think ethically in the technological era. Technology can be broadly defined and has 
been explored throughout the ages. I am limiting my study to the rise of computing power and 
advancing mathematics from the 1950s to today in order to explore how decision-making has been 
transferred from politicians and military practitioners to the writers of the algorithmic code. The 
philosophy of Giambattista Vico aids us in this exploration by probing our assumptions of 
epistemology and ontology that go into the quantification of the social world into predictive 
analytics that will always fall short in the face of the uncertainty and contingency of war. The ways 
in which history, language, and laws always already shape the rules, norms, and ideas that flow 
into innovation in ways of killing are crucial to examine through a constitutive process tracing. 
Thus, this dissertation does not attempt to produce a holistic account of the variables that led to 
this discourse of technology as making war an inherently more ethical and less bloody realm. 
Nevertheless, the narrative I put forth ought to give a healthy dose of skepticism about the 
possibilities and pitfalls of AI and the future of war.  
 
 This dissertation is an exploration of the assumptions of modernity in the techno-logical 
humanitarian language that has come to dominate contemporary political discourse as primary 
justifications for engaging in conflict on a global scale. Necessarily, some issues will be examined 
at the micro level to see the process of contestation that dominated early Cold War gaming and the 
advent of computing power, while others will be explored at a macro level of the narrative that 
contemporary technologies of war solve ethico-political dilemmas of liberal killing. I believe that 
a return to and a reworking of Vichian political thought will aid us in the contemporary dilemmas 
of lethal autonomous weapons systems and algorithmic warfare. Hence, I deploy his philosophy 
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of history and his Cartesian challenge of the narrowness of deductive logic at the expense of ethics 
and other ways of knowing as a foil to interpret techno-logics of contemporary discourse of ethics 
of war. Furthermore, I depart or invert Vico’s poetic wisdom from the ‘heroic’ poetry of Homer 
to the anti-heroic poetry of civilians and soldiers affected by conflict. By doing this, I am still 
within a Vichian framework of questioning the certainty with which the Cartesian method is 
utilized but am simultaneously updating his notion of poetic wisdom for our contemporary techno-
logical dilemmas. In the end, I believe that a return to humanistic thought to counter algorithmic 
logics, and that is most convincingly conveyed by the anti-hero, the narrative of everyday struggles 
in war where violence is considered to be tamed and chance relegated to past conflicts because of 
scientific knowledge production today. 
 
 The power of poetry and narrative of the horrors and uncertainties of warfare are a 
necessary antidote to the certainty with which we wage warfare. It ought to cause us to question if 
our cause is truly proportionate and in last resort. Taking into account the suffering of civilians, 
soldiers, and the long-term impacts of moral injury, should give us pause on an accelerated 
temporality of the Global War on Terror. Speed, efficiency, and lethality is the current mantra of 
the U.S. military, and yet the ‘move fast and break things’ model is a dangerous precedent for 
lethal autonomous weapons systems that will soon be out of our human control. Thus, the 
rhetorical, emotive, and what it means to be human in the Vichian understanding are being eroded 
for the false promise of ‘perfect rationality’. In reality, however, these algorithmic systems fall 
short of perfectibility in two respects. First, human fallibility is not eliminated, it is outsourced to 
computer programmers not subject to democratic debate or accountability; judgment is not 
eliminated but is buried in the algorithmic code. Secondly, in the quest to quantify all of life, that 
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which is unquantifiable, is excluded, and homogeneity is constructed where there is heterogeneity; 
difference in kind is reduced to difference of degree. Thus, the Vichian humanism informs my 
analysis today in that it captures the unquantifiable elements of meaning-making and centers on 
human knowledge production that delimit the conditions of possibility for the future of 
constructivist IR and the ethics of war. 
 
In the end, this dissertation tackles an array of questions of knowledge construction, 
epistemology, ontology, and methodology through the lens of humanism, technology, and the 
ethics of war. Such an ambitious project that tackles assumptions of modernity, ethics, and 
methods in International Relations, may indeed be too broad. Nevertheless, by focusing on specific 
in depth cases I wish to highlight broader trends in ethics, society, and security studies more 
generally. Military applications of technological innovation to make war a more ethical space are 
symptomatic of late modernity more generally to quantify the unquantifiable and tame chance. Yet 
such a futile endeavor remains “a grandiose technocratic rationalizing dream of absolute control 
of the accidental understood as the irruption of the unpredictable. In the name of this myth of 
absolute eradication of risk, they construct a mass of new risks which constitute so many new 
targets for preventive intervention” (Castel 1991: 289). Drew Gilpin Faust has noted that those of 
us who study war are fascinated by the collision between the superhuman, inhuman, and 
immensely human experiences that are brought forth in warfare. For every case of inhumanity, 
one often finds a case of selflessness and ethical behavior to be emulated. In the end, AI cannot 
answer these essential questions of ethics, humanity, and the human condition. We have forgotten 
in modernity that rule-based moral reasoning or coded morality that can be quantified is a relatively 
recent way of understanding ethics, and one that should ultimately be challenged. These techno-
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practices of war-making program an optimistic ideal future of war that fit the predetermined 
hopeful outcome, that cannot be tweaked with software updates based on the nature of how AI 
functions. Ultimately, this dissertation provides a narrative of the technological pursuit of the 
“ethical war” and demonstrates how a probable future of killer robots, is a symptom of a data-
driven world that transforms complex social interactions into quantifiable terminology, erasing the 
essence of humanity in the process. 
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Chapter 1: Giambattista Vico: Law, Language, and Eloquence  
in an Intersubjective World 
 
 
 
 
 
“Nothing is more fraught with philosophical danger and difficulty than historical explanation, 
and nothing is more difficult to justify than the status of ‘truth’ which we can ascribe to the 
historical hypotheses and explanatory concepts with which we systematize historical events after 
the fact. How are such hypotheses and concepts, which always emerge on the level of full 
cognitive awareness long after the events that they ‘explain’ are dead and gone, to be justified as 
universally objective and valid truths?” 
  
–J.M. Edie “Vico and Existential Philosophy” 
 
“Men first feel necessity, then look for utility, next attend to comfort, still later amuse themselves 
with pleasure, thence grow dissolute in luxury, and finally go mad and waste their substance.” 
 
–Giambattista Vico Scienza Nuova  
 
“Practical judgment in human affairs seeks out the truth as it is, although the truth may be deeply 
hidden under imprudence, ignorance, whim, fatality, or chance; whereas poetry focuses her gaze 
on truth as it ought to be by nature and reason” 
 
–Giambattista Vico On The Study of Methods of Our Time 
 
“Common sense is judgment without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire nation, or the 
entire human race.” 
 
–Giambattista Vico Scienza Nuova 
 
“L'uomo per l'indiffinita natura della mente umana, ove questa si rovesci nell'ignoranza, egli fa 
sé regola dell'universo” [Because of the indefinite nature of the human mind, wherever it is lost 
in ignorance, man makes himself the measure of all things] 
 
–Giambattista Vico Scienza Nuova  
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Introduction 
 
Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) was a relatively unknown philosopher and professor of 
jurisprudence in Naples, Italy who had little impact outside of his Neapolitan circles during his 
lifetime. However, Vico’s views influenced the works of many that followed including J.G. von 
Herder and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Beyond these, Vico’s vision of man as historical paved 
the way for Hegel and Marx both of whom have been integral to IR scholarship. Twentieth 
century scholarship has established illuminating comparisons with the tradition of Hegelian 
idealism and taken up the relationship between Vico’s thought and that of philosophers in the 
Western tradition and beyond, including Plato, Aristotle, Ibn Khaldun, Thomas Hobbes, Benedict 
de Spinoza, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Comparisons and connections 
have also been drawn between Vichian themes and the work of various modern and contemporary 
thinkers, inter alia W.B. Yeats, Friedrich Froebel, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Martin 
Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and 
Alasdair MacIntyre.1 Hannah Arendt interpreted Vico as the father of the modern historical 
consciousness and the forerunner of a concept of history as human “fabrication” and construction 
(cited in Lollini 2011: 388). Beyond this influence of Vichian scholarship, few have explored the 
work of Vico in depth either in just war scholarship or in constructivist International Relations. 
Early constructivists like Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf nod to Vico for his emphasis on 
law and language, yet practical applications Vichian scholarship has mostly been relegated to 
anthropology, and Italian or literary studies. However, Vico regained some life in recent decades, 
being one of the preferred philosophers of Isaiah Berlin and with the publications of Vico’s works 
                                               
1 “Giambattista Vico,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. August 2, 2018. Available at: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vico/#VicoLifeInfl 
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in English in the early 1990s. Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield (1965) note that Vico is where 
one can pinpoint the shift in the understanding of human history. This is because Vico was the first 
to proffer a “vision of man as historical. With him begins the modern sense of history, of man as 
essentially historical. Prior to Vico, the center of Western man’s vision of himself was nature” 
(Caponigri 1953: X).  
 
This vision of humans as historical as opposed to a part of nature, led to the concept of 
historical development that many of the authors above took on in their own philosophies, such as 
Marx and Hegel. The most significant starting point in this shift in intellectual history occurred 
around 1725 in the Kingdom of Naples, where Giambattista Vico, “a professor of jurisprudence 
and one of the most curious and isolated visionaries of our whole intellectual tradition, conceived 
for himself a novel approach to all aspects of human society. Vico referred to this method as his 
Scienza Nuova; and though little was immediately done to follow up his intellectual programme, 
his books were the vehicle by which the concept of historical development at last entered the 
thought of Western Europe.” (Toulmin and Goodfield 1965: 125). What appears to us as forward-
looking in Vico’s work must have appeared reactionary for his contemporaries, which is why he 
had such little influence before the nineteenth century. “For his fundamental ambition, which he 
did nothing to disguise, was to undo the intellectual damage done by Descartes, and to reinstate–
though on a new and more profound basis–the older picture of human history as the continuous 
creative action of a divine Providence”, through concrete and contextual historical circumstances 
(Toulmin and Goodfield 1965: 126). Nevertheless, as we will see below, the notion of divine 
Providence was only one side of the coin in Vico’s understanding of human history; the other was 
the concrete historical laws, customs, and myths from contextually bound societies.  
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For Vico, humans in history and divine providence were co-constitutive: “Far from being 
arbitrary or purely contingent, historical custom is the vehicle through which divine providence 
operates. Nature and convention are inextricably yoked...” (Miner 2002: 38). In essence, Vichian 
thought can be best understood as a blending of the universal and particular, to account for the 
concrete customs within nations, while reconciling his religious worldview with some form of 
divine providence. This blending which may appear contradictory at first glance, is most 
exemplified by his synthesis of time and idea–explored in the temporality and philosophy of 
history section below– “the idea is no timeless essence; it is the eternal law of the appearance of 
concrete forms of time” (Caponigri 1953: 71). Thus, Vico’s study of contextually bound 
intersubjective human experience in unique cultural and linguistic circumstances, was viewed in 
relation to the divine, that the idea of law (is timeless) and necessarily existed before the creation 
of laws. Ultimately, Vico strove to place historical fact and universal truth in closer proximity. 
 
Vico’s ideal eternal history in his New Science offers a cyclical, yet highly contingent, 
vision of humanity. There are three phases of Vico’s history: the poetic age, the age of heroes, and 
the age of man. Vico’s philosophical anthropology is based on the idea that humans are essentially 
‘‘makers’’ (homo faber), that is they construct and reconstruct their own social world in order to 
master the uncertainty of life concerning birth, death and the unpredictable forces of nature (Tateo 
2015; Tateo 2017). Vico’s contingency offers an uncertain future that cannot be determined by 
some teleological “law” of progress. It is cyclic in the sense that there is a recurrence of periods 
across time and nations of progression and regression. Vico does not try to do what many 
contemporary IR theorists do–predict the future based on our subjective ordering of the past–but 
to understand how humans have made and understood their history not with some concrete vision 
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of the future but by their own interpretations of the timeless essence of the idea. Vico “neither 
invests man with omnipotence, nor makes him provident: for him ‘men make their history, 
yet...not...with will and consciousness’” (Luft 2003: 6). In his cyclic understanding of history there 
is this tendency toward the universal or progress, but it is crucial that he recognizes this is an 
epistemological construction of his making on the idea of the eternal or providence. Therefore, 
Vico does not believe that humans could ever come to truly encapsulate God’s mind or the idea of 
the eternal, but one can understand how Man has taken the concrete appearance of the idea toward 
something timeless in the synthesis of time and idea. Ultimately, for Vico, art, poetry, and literature 
tend toward this ideal more so than the philosopher or historian, as they can more aptly capture the 
uncertainty of the human condition.   
 
         Vico believes that there are three stages to history: the era of the poetic, the heroic, and the 
era of man. And it is this cyclical structure of his New Science which was emulated by James 
Joyce’s Finnegans Wake. In its simplest form, “Men first feel necessity, then look for utility, next 
attend to comfort, still later amuse themselves with pleasure, thence grow dissolute in luxury, and 
finally go mad and waste their substance” (Vico SN 241). First, man attempts to understand his 
place in the world though that which he knows best–himself. Thus, early gods are simply humans 
with some sort of higher power that rules over them; the unknown was “explained” by 
anthropomorphized gods. Understanding early history in this mythical character, Vico attempts to 
embody the language and thought process of early Latins and Greeks rather than viewing them as 
‘primitive’. For Vico,  
 
“The essential poetic activity is the generation of myth; the first forms of human history 
are, therefore, pervasively and substantively mythical. But the myth is for Vico no idle 
evocation of the dreaming spirit of man; it is the spontaneous, imaginative form under 
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which man symbolizes to himself the historical processes of his culture in their universally 
relevant features. Every existential form of the spontaneous human consciousness is, 
consequently, myth; and the interpretation of myth is the primary methodological principle 
of the ‘New Science’...Language, in its turn, is for Vico the system of signs generated for 
communication and preservation of myth” (Caponigri 1953: 8).  
 
 
As humans are naturally ‘‘makers’’ (poets, from the ancient Greek poiein, to make), they tailored 
on themselves a model of explanation for overwhelming natural phenomena – i.e. they invented 
divinity. This was the first real cultural product, as it started to organize and regulate individual 
and collective conducts (e.g. we behave in a certain way to please or not disappoint some being 
‘up there’). Vico maintains that sublime, imagination, and meaning-making are the foundations of 
humanity (Tateo, 2017: 343). However, I would add to Tateo’s point in that language is the 
primary foundation upon which meaning-making and tending toward the divine or sublime can 
then be understood. Hence, “the mark of Vico’s new uncanny poetic humanism is the ontological 
or onto-genetic implications of that principle as realized in the New Science: the claim that verum 
is the made, a factum; that facta are, at one and the same time, the true words, deeds, things is their 
maker, whose ‘knowing’ is the hermeneutic understanding of himself as maker. In Vico’s alien 
humanism humans are not essentially subjects of knowledge but ‘poets,’ creators, ‘divine’ because, 
like God, they make a real human world with language” (Luft 2003: 4). 
 
“Vico’s new historical method demanded an acute sensitivity to the nuances of language 
and the inner significance of myths. He stripped the picturesque surface off the older mythologies, 
to uncover the living thought that gave them birth. Originally, myths were neither poetic fancies, 
nor fictions of the priests, nor heroic legends magnified through the lens of the past. They 
represented rather Man’s first crude but honest efforts to understand the world of nature and live 
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in harmony with it” (Toulmin and Goodfield, 1965: 127). In their fables the nations have, in a 
rough way and in the language of the senses, described the beginning of the world of the sciences, 
where the specialized studies of the scholars have since clarified for us by reasoning and 
generalization. Vico had a twenty-year struggle to grasp the “poetic” or creative nature of the first 
men of the human race, which he called the “master key” of the New Science. “He characterized 
that struggle as an effort to understand the strangeness of the historical origins they depict, which 
modern readers cannot grasp” (Luft 2003: X). Here is where Vico is the culmination of 
Renaissance humanism. The salient characteristic of classical political humanism is its “openness 
at once to the unity and the self-identity of the idea and to the multiplicity of the variety, indeed, 
the very contradictions of the concrete order of existence and becoming.” From this characteristic 
was born its “profoundly moral or ethical character, its devotion to the concept of wisdom; for 
ethics, and wisdom, as its fullest expression, is essentially the pursuit of the idea and through that 
multiplicity, variety and contradictions of human presence, within which it seeks to induce these 
properties of the idea, its unity and self-identity” (Caponigri 1953: 60). 
 
 Beyond bringing forth the relevant philosophy, and interpretations of Vichian texts, this 
chapter strives to bring Vico’s epistemological principles, into both interpretivist IR and just war 
thinking. As I hope will become clear by the conclusion of this chapter, I believe Vico can be 
considered as proffering the first interpretivist position in early modernity, by placing inter-
subjective human experience, imagination, law, and poetry at the center of his philosophical 
endeavor. Interpretivism in IR today “focuses on the meaning of human experience––the variations 
in possible meanings for given events, how meaning is made throughout knowledge construction, 
how power and ethics constitute meaning, the implications of meaning for political and social 
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phenomena” (Lynch 2014: 2). Thus, the Vichian project, which attempted to rid the world of the 
false certainty that Descartes that his deductive method purported to offer, sought to understand 
the meaning-making process of humans in society. As Lynch insists, interpretivist research today 
aims to “analyze the meaning and the variety of human experience...and to do so in contexts that 
are relevant for such meaning” (Lynch 2014: 13, emphasis original). Thus, in line with Toulmin’s 
discussion from the introduction, modernity and positivist IR social science aimed at rendering all 
matters independent of their contexts, in search of “necessary and sufficient” causal chains or the 
answers to ethical questions in just war revisionism. Nevertheless, interpretivist IR seeks to re-
contextualize the social world to understand how meaning is inter-subjectively constructed in 
relation to issues of war and peace. Thus, interpretive methods “denaturalize dominant 
explanations, exposing them not as truth but as narratives that are discursively constructed, 
assigned particular meanings, and reproduced from partial or limited evidence and with particular 
stakes and purposes in mind” (Lynch 2014: 14). According to Luft (2003: XV), Vichian texts share 
“a notion of humans as embodied, finite, temporal beings, who exist in a world governed by 
material necessity, and who are dependent on the constitutive power of language to fabricate their 
human existence.” Vico’s “diverse expressions of poiesis, the interpretive sense-making of beings-
in-the-world that takes place in language, a hermeneutic process ontologically creative of a real, 
though artificial, human world.” 
  
This chapter is broken down into the following sections to address relevant aspects of 
Vichian philosophy for interpretivist International Relations and the ethics of war (to be explored 
specifically in chapter two). First, I will introduce how I define the humanism of Giambattista 
Vico, and why it is relevant to contextualize a techno-logical world of AI and techno-problem 
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solving. Second, I discuss Vico’s critique of natural law jurists such as Grotius, Vattel and 
Pufendorf, the foundations of contemporary international law and the laws of war. Although Vico 
did not specifically write upon the subjects of jus ad bellum or jus in bello, his commentary on the 
jurists and the useful fictions they create to build their foundations on natural law, is of use as these 
foundations are beginning to crumble today in the face of killer robots. Third, I examine Vico’s 
critique against Descartes, abstract rationalism, and deductive logic more generally that sought 
decontextualized universal ‘Truth’ at the expense of the local, oral, rhetorical, and poetic that 
ultimately stripped philosophy of its ethical character. This general critique of Cartesianism and 
its legacy bears a family resemblance to contemporary debates within the positivist and post-
positivist divide in IR. Fourth, I examine Vico’s primacy of language and social construction to 
demonstrate what Vichian thought may offer social constructivists today. Fifth, in the science of 
humanity in an intersubjective world, I stake Vico’s epistemological principles as an essential 
interrogation into contemporary IR debates about science and knowledge production.  Finally, I 
end with a brief exploration of why I believe that Vichian philosophy is relevant for understanding 
ethics of war in any meaningful sense today as a segway to chapter two on AI, just war, and Vico’s 
poetic wisdom. 
 
Vichian Humanism 
What constitutes Vichian humanism as the culmination of Renaissance humanism and why might 
we care about humanism in the techno-logical era? Edward Said has noted Vico as the origin of 
the radical humanist idea that the “human mind creates the divine, not the other way around” (Said 
2004: 109). Such an understanding of the primacy of language, human cognition, and 
cultural/temporal/geographic context in Vichian philosophy represents the first articulation of the 
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constructivist notion that we are makers in the world. However, what separates Vico from many 
who followed him is that he is not limited to a phenomenology of the mind of an individual subject. 
By understanding that humans are the makers of their history, both in the past and how meaning 
is created from this history–real or imagined–is an intersubjective recognition of historical 
construction which actualizes humanity. So what then was the renaissance humanism that Vico 
closed the bracket on? Humanism is defined by Ernesto Grassi as the philosophical movement that 
characterized thought in Italy from the second half of the fourteenth century to the final third of 
the fifteenth century. Ficino’s translation of Plato at the end of the fifteenth century and the 
speculative metaphysical Platonism and Neo-Platonism which it triggered led to a break with the 
Humanist approach to philosophy, which was taken up later only by isolated thinkers such as 
Nizolius or, outside Italy, by Vives and later Gracian in his theory of ingenium. Finally “the 
Humanist controversy reached its height in the thought of Giambattista Vico, whose work provides 
an outline of the whole range of Humanism’s implications” (Grassi 1990: 95). More than 
advocating for a classical education in the development of human virtue, it was a breaking apart 
of the academic disciplines that Vico was adamantly arguing against in his Six Inaugural Orations 
on Humanistic Education delivered at the University of Napes 1699-1707. The separation of 
disciplines for Vico was a loss to the understanding of humanity and human nature. Each discipline 
became so narrowly focused that it often neglects important topic such as ethics and eloquence at 
the expense of analytical rigor and soundness of argumentation that falls upon deaf ears as logic 
in the narrow sense often fails to move the soul to action. “In the past, all arts and disciplines were 
interconnected and rested in the lap of philosophy; subsequently, they were sundered apart. Those 
responsible for this separation can be compared to a tyrannical ruler who, having seized mastery 
of a great, populous, and opulent city, should, in order to secure his own safety, destroy the city 
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and scatter its inhabitants into a number of widely strewn villages. As a consequence, it is 
impossible for the townsmen to feel inspired, through the bold pride awakened by the sight of the 
splendor and wealth of their city and by the awareness of their number, to band together and 
conspire against him, lending one another help in their fight against the common oppressor” (Vico 
1990: 47). 
 
First and foremost, Vico’s humanism is an intersubjective philosophy of human agency. 
Traditional Italian humanism “identifies the source of agency, whether human or divine, as 
conscious and intentional, the creativity Vico attributes to his first men derives from the potency 
of a subjectively unconditioned ordinary language. That language is itself  ontologically creative 
is not a notion Vico could find in his philosophical or theological traditions, given their 
assumptions of an orderly world and of the rational subjectivity of God and humans (Luft 2003: 
xiv). This emphasis on ordinary language will be explored below, however, it is essential to the 
whole endeavor of this dissertation to emphasize being makers in the world often without 
consciousness or intentionality. It is easy to look back and construct a cogent historical narrative 
toward a future teleology; nevertheless, Vico’s humanism buffed against this tendency on his 
emphasis of language in constituting the social world in all its uncertainty, contradiction, and 
strangeness. In the end, “Vico is certainly a humanist in the sense that he never loses his belief that 
meaning is made by humans for the sake of humane social existence” (Luft 2003: xvi). Yet, his 
transcendence of subject-centered humanism makes him especially interesting to interpretivist 
social science today. What slowly emerges in Vico’s New Science “is an uncanny poetic humanism 
affirming both the role of humans in the making of the social world, and the value of communal 
existence...But Vico’s humanism affirms human creativity and communal existence outside 
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assumptions of traditional humanism and modernism, without the problematic belief that agency 
is the privilege of subjectivity” (Luft 2003: xvi). 
  
 Not only did the Cartesian legacy devalue the Italian humanistic tradition, it led to 
persistent misunderstandings of humanism that last to today. Vico’s philosophy of science and his 
science of humanity pushed back against “the anonymity, the placelessness, and timelessness of a 
priori thought, instead of the unemotive, unrhetorical character of scientific, philosophical 
speculation, instead of the rejection of imagination and common sense on behalf of rationalism”  
(Grassi 1990: 55). The depreciation of the rhetorical, imaginative, and the intersubjective 
contextually bound knowledge has led to the rhetorical being a negative connotation rather than 
an area of study necessary as a part of conveying knowledge with eloquence. Emanuel Paparella 
firmly places Vico within the Italian humanistic tradition even as he makes important breaks from 
a subject-centered humanism of the past. In his New Science, Vico anticipated by two centuries 
“contemporary man’s most profound discovery concerning himself; the fact that he has a history, 
because by creating history man discovers and actualizes his own humanity.” This places Vico 
“well within the Italian humanistic tradition. He is, in fact, nothing short of the fulfillment of that 
tradition. A tradition interrupted by Descartes’ anti-humanistic stance and waiting, like embers 
under the ashes of a technocratic rationalistic society, for a new birth” (Paparella 1993: 27). In the 
end, Vico is the culmination of Italian humanism, whose foresight has vast implications for 
understanding the contemporary technological world. 
  
Having established what I view as the Vichian contribution to humanism, I want to briefly 
explore how I view this applying to interpretivist IR today. In essence, Vico understands that 
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“objectivity” is conditioned first and foremost by language, in addition to historical, temporal, and 
social context; yet, he is primarily concerned with the meaning created from this understanding. 
Isaiah Berlin summarizes Vico’s thought as such: “But, ultimately, there is something we don’t 
know about the universe merely through observation; namely what are they for, whether they have 
a purpose, or if they have a purpose, what it is” (Berlin 2000, 465). Furthermore, MacIntyre 
cautions: “The notion of ‘fact’ with respect to human beings is thus transformed in the transition 
from the Aristotelian to the mechanist view….‘Fact’ became value-free, ‘is’ becomes a stranger 
to ‘ought’ and explanation, as well as evaluation, changes its character as a result of this divorce 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’” (MacIntyre 2007: 84). The fact/value distinction in IR has long been a 
place of contention (See: Frost 1996; Walker 1992; Onuf 2002; Wight 2006; Lynch 2014; 
Kratochwil 1991; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2015; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013), and Vico 
was one of the first humanist critics of the separation of fact and value in the Cartesian program. 
Ultimately, looking toward these early epistemological critiques, I aim to shed light on the legacy 
of Descartes in late modern social science, while proffering alternative direction for the field away 
from post-modern projects by emphasizing the pre-modern contestation of today’s issues. 
 
Natural Law 
The foundations of contemporary international law and the ethics of war are being dismantled by 
emerging algorithmic technologies. Ultimately, if one builds the structure of say the international 
laws of armed conflict upon such foundations, they are liable to crumble in an era of AI and 
human/machine integration. These “secular foundations” of the laws of war are an abstraction 
upon which was built an ideal (though logically sound) theory of the laws of nations. Vico argues 
that natural law fails in three fundamental ways. First modern natural law engages in a false 
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separation of ius gentium and the ius naturale, without noticing that “this law arose with the 
customs of nations.” Second, it relies on evidence from philology, itself uncertain and beset by 
anachronism. Third, it assumes the truth of diffusion theories, overlooking the more likely 
possibility that law evolves from the demands of the sensus communis, without presupposing 
actual contact among nations, which “pass their early days in savagery and seclusion” (Miner, 
2002: 78). Hence, Vico’s critique of the foundations of natural law are especially relevant to 
understanding early debates of taken-for-granted concepts of the right to resort to force and the 
limitations within fighting wars. 
          
The new edited volume Just War Thinkers: From Cicero to the 21st Century (Brunstetter 
and O’Driscoll 2017) highlights a number of aspects about the natural law theorists and their 
impact on international law and ethics of war that are worth addressing here, given Vico’s critique 
of natural law jurisprudence. In chapter six, Alex Bellamy discusses Vitoria’s fundamental 
assumptions and starting point for his theory. Hence, Vitoria believed that human sociability was 
derived from nature (as opposed to social contracts as argued by later Enlightenment thinkers) and 
that nature divided the human community into what he described as “perfect communities.” Tony 
Lang in chapter ten offers a fascinating look at Hugo Grotius, complicating the often simplistic 
notions of his legacy as “secularizing” law. Lang defines Grotius’ notion of natural law: “the idea 
of law that exists prior to any formal law-making process. It is meant to be the source or foundation 
of laws that are made by people. It is an immutable moral code that is universal for all peoples 
across all times and places.” Furthermore, Cicero’s influence can be seen in the text of De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis, especially on matters of political community and war. Grotius argued in the 
Prolegomena that natural law was not the same as the law of nations, but together they reinforced 
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the idea there are rules and laws that govern the conduct of communities when they wage war; 
thus, as Vico challenged, the two were distinct and separate for Grotius. 
 
         The volume continues with Luke Glanville’s chapter 11 on Pufendorf who took a more 
positivist take on law than Grotius and was on a mission to secularize natural law. His response to 
the religious wars of his time was to seek to articulate grounds for morality that did not depend on 
divine revelation or the doctrines of any particular confession and thus could command the consent 
of all people. Pufendorf conceived of his religiously neutral theory of natural law as a contribution 
to a new science of morality that had been inaugurated by Grotius and developed by Hobbes. Then 
in chapter 12, Theodor Christov has some profound insight on Vattel. Cicero and Grotius heavily 
influenced Vattel’s thought but Vattel marks an important point in the secularization of just war in 
so far as he derives his principles from nature as opposed to grace. What is key for Vico’s critique 
is that Vattel does not really explore who defines the natural law in the first place, perhaps 
assuming that humanity’s laws are automatically in line with broader European values. All of the 
important just war thinkers highlighted in this volume turn to Cicero, but Vico instead turns to 
Tacitus the Roman historian. Vico’s preference for Tacitus offered Vico the opportunity to 
“examine, in detail, the power of chance and evil in history. Given his interest in early Roman 
history, we might expect Vico to prefer Livy [like Machiavelli]...But Vico felt an intimate affinity 
for Tacitus, and not the more cheerful Livy” (Hösle 2016, 16). Beginning with the particular in 
order to understand the universal, Vico wanted to explore universal ideals such as law, justice etc. 
from the vivid literary style that utilized the rhythm, prose, and poetic use of the Latin language in 
Tacitus. This clearly fits within Vico’s worldview that these ideals can only be understood in their 
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linguistic context and ideas of justice divorced from their rhetorical forms are vacuous; “Tacitus 
says, eloquence and liberty are on a par” (Vico 1990: 88). 
 
 Vico’s largest contention with natural law is that it does not account for all of the particular 
legal structures of diverse nations and practical jurisprudence or interpretation of a law. Here we 
see his articulation of the universality of law stemming from particular circumstances: “The 
intention of the law, however, is universal; this intention embraces a class of instances which fall 
under actual adjudication, even though these instances, in all their particularity, irreducible novelty 
and uniqueness, could not have been foreseen or specifically intended in the law” (Caponigri 1953: 
37). Indeed, the strangeness of particular laws and customs are the vehicle through which divine 
providence operates. Laws are not arbitrary or purely contingent because for Vico: “Nature and 
convention are inextricably yoked; a proper grasp of this nexus enables one to discern the ground 
of justice in something more than expediency” (Miner 2002: 38). This position insulated him from 
both the “rationalist approach of modern natural law as represented by Grotius and the skepticism 
that he finds in Epicurus, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Bayle” (Miner 2002: 38). 
 
As Vico understands him, Grotius treats the law of nations (ius gentium) and the natural 
law (ius naturale) as if they were not only distinct but also separate and autonomous. This 
separation lies at the heart of Vichian critique of natural law. Thus, he argues quite compellingly 
that this separation errs in that it neglects how any understanding of natural law must be born out 
of our concrete experiences of history, which is an amalgamation of various laws of various 
nations. Against this dichotomy, Vico will attempt to exhibit the ius naturale as present within the 
ius gentium, which over time becomes the ius civile. Therefore, “Vico will reject the notion that 
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natural law is profitably treated as if it were detached from the historical development of  customs 
and the laws that grow out of those customs. He will argue that natural law has both a metaphysical 
origin in eternal truth and an historical origin in the customs of human society.” (Miner 2002: 37-
38). As Vico stated concerning the natural law of nations: “The three princes of this doctrine, Hugo 
Grotius, John Selden and Samuel Pufendorf, should have taken their start...from the beginnings of 
the nations, where their subject matter begins. But all three of them err together in this respect, by 
beginning in the middle; that is, with the latest times of the civilized nations (and thus of men 
enlightened by fully developed natural reason) from which the philosophers emerged and rose to 
meditation of a perfect idea of justice.” (SN 394). Historical development of the laws of nations is 
where one must begin if one were to have a conceptualization of justice. Let us see how Vico 
addresses each of these authors and how they fail in sacrificing the particular for the universal, or 
neglecting the universal in favor of the particular. 
 
 In his cogent and concise takedown of Grotius, Selden, and Pufendorf, Vico states: “First 
Grotius, just because of the great love he bears the truth, sets aside divine providence and professes 
that his system will stand even if all knowledge of God be left out of account. Thus all the reproofs 
which in a great number of matters he brings against the Roman jurists, do not touch them at all, 
since they took divine providence for their first principle and proposed to treat of the natural law 
of nations, not that of the philosophers and moral theologians” (SN 395). “Then Selden assumes 
providence, but without paying any attention to the inhospitableness of the first peoples, or to the 
division the people of God made of the whole world of nations at that time into Hebrews and 
gentiles. Or to the fact that, since the Hebrews had lost sight of their natural law during their slavery 
in Egypt, God himself must have reestablished it for them by the law he gave Moses on Sinai. Or 
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to the further fact that God in his law forbids even thoughts that are less than just, with which no 
mortal lawgiver has ever troubled himself.” (SN396). “And finally Pufendorf begins with an 
Epicurean hypothesis, supposing man to have been cast into this world without any help or care 
from God. Reproved for this, he defends himself in a special dissertation, but, because he does not 
admit providence as his first principle, he cannot even begin to speak of law, as we have heard 
Cicero tell Atticus the Epicurean in his dialogue De legibus” (SN 397).  
 
While this tells us a lot about Vico’s critique of natural law in these passages, yet we have 
lost the larger picture of Vico’s commentary on Grotius et al. throughout the ages. Indeed, Cardinal 
Corsini was supposed to fund Vico’s New Science, but pulled his funding leaving Vico to pay for 
the publication himself; a costly undertaking. Thus, Vico was forced to both substantially cut 
sections from the New Science, in addition to selling his family diamond ring to pay for its printing. 
What we are left with today, is a Vico who holds Grotius in a very high regard but believes he 
failed to incorporate an understanding of divine providence into his jurisprudence. Whereas Selden 
and Pufendorf fail in that they stray too far toward Stoic fate or Epicurean chance respectively, 
leaving little room for human agency. 
 
 Robert Caponigri gives us perhaps the best summation of the Vichian critique addressed 
above. The root fallacy which vitiates the argument (of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Bacon, Grotius, 
Selden and Pufendorf) from its inception is the same: “an abstract normative idea is apodictically 
intruded into the context of social process, into the order of the ‘certum’ of humanity. Instead of 
genuine history there is generated a pseudo-myth, which in its turn, like the poetry against which 
Plato directed his classical arguments, is at two removes from the truth. Such myths are productive 
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of false principles of every science;” (Caponigri 1953: 62-63). Thus, discussion of natural law, 
justice, or the law of nations, the most treasured philosophers fail in that they generate a useful 
myth upon which to base their theories instead of focusing, like Vico, on the concrete formation 
of societies in all their contradictions and varieties. In essence, Grotius fails because he does not 
bring his “profound learning about particular laws and customs to bear in his attempt to counter 
the skeptical reduction of justice to expediency. He relies not upon his philological and historical 
knowledge, but upon abstract and rationalistic arguments that do not persuade against the 
objections of the skeptics. His ‘system of universal law,’ however fertile a source of insights, need 
to be replaced by an alternative conception of diritto universale that places historical facts and 
universal truths in closer relationship” (Miner 2002: 37). Hence, natural law in its various 
formulations has fallen into abstraction as opposed to the concrete formations of social structures. 
Although divine providence may be the ultimate guidance, it is not teleological, or the law of 
nations was not created with foresight or intention of historical progress.  
 
 In the end, Vico is wary of straying too far toward resigning oneself to Stoic fate or 
Epicurean chance, and frames the failures of philosophers up to his point into one of these camps. 
Vico stated as such: “Hence Epicurus, who believes in chance, is refuted by the facts, along with 
his followers Hobbes and Machiavelli; and so are Zeno and Spinoza, who believe in fate. The 
evidence is clearly in favor of the contrary position of the political philosophers, whose prince is 
the divine Plato, who affirms that providence rules the affairs of men. It was therefore with good 
reason that Cicero refused to discuss laws with Atticus unless the latter would give up his 
Epicureanism and first concede that providence governed human affairs. Pufendorf ignored it in 
his hypothesis, Selden assumed it, and Grotius excluded it; but the Roman jurisconsults established 
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it as the first principle of the natural law of nations” (SN 1109). Hence, Grotius ignores providence 
and human freedom in order to ground his theory on a quasi-mathematical certitude of secular 
reason. Vico praises Grotius for his learning and his “synthetic aspirations, but does not hesitate 
to imply that he combines the worst elements of Stoicism and Epicureanism. Pufendorf is similar 
to Grotius. He commits the fundamental error of ignoring providence and ‘employs a hypothesis 
completely Epicurean or Hobbesian (which in this matter come to the same thing)’” (Miner 2002: 
77). Thus, Vico has carved out his critique of opposing positions to build his New Science as a 
blending of the universal and particular; divine providence and human agency.  
 
 The foundations upon which contemporary laws and ethics of war are based are beginning 
to crumble with the rise of technologies of warfare. The fulfillment of the humanist tradition 
proffered by Vico offers one set of questions through which one may illuminate current and future 
dilemmas of the laws and ethics of war. The story which is told by the just war tradition usually 
begins with Augustine and continues to the secularized jurists like Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf et 
al., which led to the rise of positive modern international laws of war. However, what such 
narratives of the canon and authority of the tradition miss are the vibrant debates taking place at 
the tail end of the Italian Renaissance and the birth of modernity in response to the French 
enlightenment and the philosophy of Descartes. With the secularization of the laws of war, one 
could no longer turn to God, so they put nature and ideas about natural law in its place. What this 
misses however is what humanist critiques of the enlightenment sought to highlight, namely: by 
focusing on scientific logic alone, the practical judgment, contingency, chance, fortune, the 
devaluation of the local, timely, and contextually bound understanding of the social world, took a 
backseat to abstract theorizing rendering universal “truths” independent of their contexts. What 
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Vico offers in his critique of Grotius, Spinoza, and Pufendorf boils down to the basis of their 
natural laws of nations begins from a useful pseudo-mythical account as opposed to an historical 
account of how humans constructed law in their societal context. Furthermore, such abstraction 
exacerbates the separation of philosophy into geometric proofs and historical accounts, i.e. a 
devaluation of the rhetorical elements of the formation of the laws of nations. Ultimately, this fits 
within his broader critique of Cartesianism and abstract rationalism, which at every point of his 
life’s work he attempted to dismantle the damage done by Descartes. 
 
Against Descartes and Abstract Rationalism 
The legacy of the Cartesian program for philosophy swept aside the reasonable uncertainties of 
16th C. skeptics (like Montaigne) in favor of new, mathematical kinds of “rational” certainty and 
proof. Devaluation of the oral, local, timely, and concrete for the formally “rational theory 
grounded on abstract, universal, and timeless concepts. Rhetoric became subordinate to logic; 
validity/truth of rational arguments independent of who presents them to whom, or in what 
context” (Toulmin 1990: 75). Vico’s reply to the proliferation of the Cartesian method in 
Neopolitan circles is as scathing as Descartes’ contempt for history. There are four main critiques 
of Descartes that Vico addresses: 1) treating the social world as mathematical and mechanistic 
terms 2) abstract analytical reasoning as opposed to concrete and contextual understanding 3) an 
inability to ‘turn within’ for a pure cogito without being limited by language and society 4) the 
absence looking to the concrete artifacts of history as relevant to understand language, ethics, and 
the interconnectedness of the disciplines. 
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The Mathematical and Mechanistic World of Cartesianism 
 
Isaiah Berlin famously included Vico as one of his three Enlightenment critics, and discussed 
Vico’s understanding of mathematics as such: 
  
[Vico] said in effect: Yes, it is true, mathematics is a wonderful achievement. It is a body 
of irrefutable truths. But is a body of such truths not because it constitutes a kind of skeleton 
or representation of eternal verities about nature and the world….The rules of mathematics 
are made by us, by human beings. The symbols of mathematics are invented by us. It is 
like (he did not use the analogy, but this is, I think, what he meant) a game which somebody 
makes up. Of course mathematical reasoning is valid. But that is because we have made it 
so  (Berlin 2013: 463). 
  
  
  
While of course mathematical achievements are fantastic, it is a product of logically controlled 
human reason, we are able to use it as a device for the purpose of integrating and generalizing a 
great body of knowledge that rests upon observation and experiment to answer specific questions–
though later we shall see how the age of “big data” the idea of specific questions becomes 
irrelevant. As Toulmin and Goodfield summarize Vico’s critique of scientism: 
 
 
Granted, the axioms and theorems of a well-formed mathematical system do present 
themselves to our minds with a unique clarity and certainty. But this is not–as Descartes 
had claimed–because God obligingly formed us with ideas which harmonize with the true 
realities of Nature. Mathematics is completely transparent to our minds, simply because it 
is our arbitrary creation. One can achieve a complete intellectual grasp only of things one 
has created oneself (Toulmin and Goodfield 1965: 126). 
 
  
         A recurring theme throughout Vico’s collected works is pushing back against the 
Cartesians who believe they are rescuing philosophy from the skeptics by basing their philosophy 
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on the timeless certitudes of geometry. For Vico, the intersubjective world mediated by language, 
which structures our reality, cannot be escaped in favor of a ‘pure’ rationality divorced of society, 
other beings-in-the-word, and primarily language. Vico utterly rejects the Cartesian notion of the 
subject as a pure cogito that can be fully clarified and elucidated by a “‘turning within’ to a realm 
of truth untarnished by bodily sensations or unaffected by worldly and mundane projects. [For 
Vico,] truth is to be found through an examination of its incarnation in the works, artifacts, 
institutions, myths, and religious practices that man has created in order to understand himself” 
(Edie 1969: 486). Vico’s quarrel with Descartes’ cogito is that it “pretends to be a science of being 
when it is only a sign of being. ‘Cogito is an indubitable sign of my being, it does not give me 
science (knowledge) of my being.’ it is the consciousness of self, the statement of an existing fact, 
a given, like the atom of Descartes’ physics” (Grimaldi 1958: 29). Thus, Descartes mistakes a sign 
of being for a complete science of being; the analytical method of Descartes reduces human 
thought one of its rare functions, namely, “the manipulation of perfectly defined categorical 
concepts in fully reflexive judgments. Thinking, as it is experienced in individual life as it is traced 
in the history of the human race, is vastly more complex than this and follows laws of meaning-
contexture and relevance which have a pre-logical, affective, pragmatic morphology that is 
completely missed by rationalism” (Edie 1969: 485). “The human mind,” Vico writes, “is naturally 
inclined by the senses to see itself externally to the body, and only with great difficulty does it 
come to understand itself by means of reflection.” (Edie 1969: 488 emphasis original). Ultimately, 
Descartes’ method reduces the foundation of knowing to a sign of being, rejecting the 
intersubjective and historical foundations of human societies, which for Vico is the only fruitful 
path toward a science of humanity. As an historical being, I am constantly included in my 
understanding of history based on my positionality and socio-cultural and linguistic contexts. In 
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the end, “We experience ourselves only by the detour of encounter with history; actually the 
opposite is also true: we experience history only by the detour of our self-understanding. This is 
the Vichian hermeneutical circle. The understanding of history can never be presuppositionless” 
(Paparella 1993: 51). 
 
Against Abstraction: Philosophy of Language and Descartes 
 
I argue that Vico correctly intuited that abstract theorizing was rightly one of the rare functions of 
the human mind and that we best understand the world and act in it based upon our human 
experiences, constructing wisdom from a world of uncertainty and chance. It is precisely because 
of the abstract intellectual training of the Cartesian method that learned members of society fail to 
conduct themselves with sufficient wisdom or prudence. Since “human events are dominated by 
Chance and Choice...those whose only concern is abstract truth experience great difficulty in 
achieving their means and greater difficulties in attaining their ends” (Vico 1990: 34). 
Mathematical or geometric certainty cannot be achieved in the social world, because society does 
not work in scientifically predictable ways. Thus, Vico’s study of past societies is first and 
foremost a study of how language structures our social reality. Where Descartes fails ultimately is 
that he has no philosophy of language; he produced only a philosophy of ideas independent of 
language. Hence, Descartes neglects the ways in which the social world is always already 
structured by language, assuming that ideas in our mind are somehow pure and not impacted by 
time or social context. In the end, “Vico takes the more modern route and establishes the ‘New 
Science’ at least in large part to show that there are no ideas apart from natural languages and that 
men neither can nor do think except through a gestural and verbal extension of their perceptual 
and existential embodiment in a cultural world” (Edie 1969: 485). 
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Vico’s more general critique of the Cartesian method is that “we pay an excessive amount 
of attention to the natural sciences and not enough to ethics. Our chief fault is that we disregard 
that part of ethics which treats of human character, of its dispositions, its passions, and of the 
manner of adjusting these factors to public life and eloquence” (Vico 1990: 33). In his time, the 
legacy of Descartes was such that, if the “only target of our intellectual endeavors is truth, we 
devote all our efforts to the investigation of physical phenomena, because their nature seems 
unambiguous; but we fail to inquire into human nature which, because of the freedom of man’s 
will, is difficult to determine” (Vico 1990: 33). Therefore, the “abstract ‘analytical’ method of 
Descartes and his followers, says Vico, reduces thinking to only one of its rare functions, namely, 
the manipulation of perfectly defined categorial concepts in fully reflexive judgments.” Cognition 
in everyday life is vastly more complex than this and “follows laws of meaning-contexture and 
relevance which have a prelogical, affective, pragmatic morphology that is completely missed by 
rationalism” (Edie 1969: 485). 
 
 The Cartesians, by transferring the rigid deductive method employed in the formal sciences 
to the practice of social life, commit the error of the imprudent scholar. They judge things by 
preconceived principles, blind to the reality surrounding them. This not only neglects how humans 
best intuit the world and the linguistic context but the contingency of life. “That chance and choice, 
which are very unstable, dominate human affairs and that simulation and dissimulation, those very 
fallacious factors lead them. It follows, therefore, that they who attend only to the truth [being the 
pre-conceived truth of the Cartesians] rarely succeed in finding the suitable means, and even more 
rarely, in achieving the [satisfactory] end in human affairs; and, disillusioned with their own 
counsel, deceived by others, they very often abandon the field. When, instead, one can cope with 
the contingencies of life, and their attending variety of circumstances [many of which are contrary 
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to the straight rigid rule of reason] then one can really evaluate the facts of men” (Grimaldi 1958: 
65-66). In the end, “it is impossible to assess human affairs by the inflexible standard of abstract 
right...The difference, therefore between abstract knowledge and prudence is this: in science, the 
outstanding intellect is that which succeeds in reducing a large multitude of physical effects to a 
single cause; in the domain of prudence, excellence is accorded to those who ferret out the greatest 
possible number of causes which may have produced a single event, and who are able to conjecture 
which of all these causes is the true one” (Vico 1990: 34). Ultimately, science and prudence are 
put into contrast as the latter is an attempt at deep contextual understanding for action-guiding 
principles, while the former is a theory-centered ideal of an abstract science of human affairs. 
 
In one of his earlier works On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, Vico’s anti-
Cartesianism is most completely stated: “The rule and criterion of truth is to have made it. Hence 
the clear and distinct idea of the mind not only cannot be the criterion of other truths, but it cannot 
be the criterion of that of the mind itself; for while the mind apprehends itself, it does not make 
itself, and because it does not make itself it is ignorant of the form or mody by which it apprehends 
itself.” The ramifications of Descartes in contemporary social science cannot be overstated. The 
deductive method of Descartes is proffered as objective fact in positivist IR. The idea of a view 
from nowhere by which we can establish causal patterns in the social world with predictive 
capabilities is the core of the U.S. IR discipline. Nevertheless, the world is mediated by our 
language, context, positionality, and biases; the idea of turning within to discover a contextually 
independent mind neglects the world dependent contextualization of mind-world monism.  
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 In conclusion, Vico’s anti-Cartesian stance is a staunch rejection of a tabula rasa of the 
human mind. Humans are dependent on their social, linguistic, geographic and temporal contexts. 
We are dominated by chance and choice in human affairs and do not act in a mathematically 
predictable universe of cause and effect. Instead looking to the concrete practices of humans in 
their myths, practices, art, and language, one can begin to see how Man has understood himself 
throughout the ages in different contexts. For this, Vico develops a philosophy of language and 
social construction, that resonates with the work of linguistic constructivists in contemporary 
International Relations scholarship. 
 
 
Language and Social Construction 
 
As evidenced by Vico’s Cartesian critique above, it is clear that Vico viewed language as 
fundamental in our construction of the world. Not only for the ‘modifications of the human’ which 
is Vico’s conception of the synthesis of the the universal and particular, but eloquence and rhetoric 
itself were essential for inter-subjective wisdom. “What is eloquence, in effect, but wisdom, 
ornately and copiously delivered in words appropriate to the common opinion of mankind” (Vico 
1990: 78). Vico views humans as intersubjective beings in the world who learn by trial and error 
in a social context and subsequently look back and impose logical order on chance and social 
norms. Hence, “We think primarily by ‘examples’ and ‘likeness’ and only later are we able to 
examine the exact nature of the logical validity which justifies our using, for example, an 
agricultural vocabulary for sowing (disserere), gleaning (intelligere), gathering up (recolligere), 
and storing away (observare) to designate the psychological processes of cognition.” (Edie 1969: 
489). As Edward Said notes, Vico’s “etymological habits are a form of ‘retro-signification’ that 
drives meanings back to the bodies from whence originally they came. This is anti-Cartesian 
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atavism with a vengeance” (Said 1976: 819). In essence, for Vico the “world of men is like a text, 
and vice versa. Both come from the body in an act of inspired divination by which inert objects, 
random marks, become sign systems; as sensuous immediacy is lost intellectual and aesthetic 
powers are gained” (Said 1976: 826). In this section, I briefly explore Vico’s understanding of 
language as social construction in order to explore the possibilities for contemporary IR 
constructivists to adopt some Vichian foundations in their studies. 
 
The ‘vulgar wisdom’ of Giambattista Vico’s New Science is rooted in man’s perspective-
perceptual insertion in nature. Man, as always, having a bodily place within being and among 
being to whom he is related through common interests and projects. The works of this ‘wisdom’ 
are the “historical institutions which man adds to nature and which he attempts to understand by 
singing ‘the world according to man’ in poetic gesticulation and ejaculation” (Edie 1969: 489). 
Vico has not provided us with a complete theory of language, but his importance lies in “discerning 
one of the inescapable existential structures of human expression and thus of establishing a 
methodological principle which must be taken into account by any theory of language that would 
claim to give an adequate account of either the phenomena of speech or the experience of meaning” 
(Edie 1969: 489). Therefore, in order to understand the nature of language, one does not try to 
penetrate to the thought which Descartes assumed standing behind language. Rather, as Martin 
Buber puts it: one “takes a stand in speech and talks from there.” The encounter with any of man’s 
works especially those done through language, remains intrinsically historical. The link of 
language to history is “poetic wisdom” proper, which transcends the dichotomy between subject 
and object. The Cartesian objectivity, on the other hand “reduces a ‘work’ to a mere ‘object’ when 
such an operation is performed, the language event cannot possible seize and transform the 
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reader...Consequently the encounter with the being of a work of art or a text cannot be Cartesian” 
i.e., static and ideational, outside of time (Paparella 1993, 73). Hence, speech acts are the 
foundation from which any philosophy must originate. But this is more in line with Wittgenstein’s 
use-theory of language than a phenomenology of mind. As transcendence of the subject/object, 
universal/particular dichotomies are bound to humans who act in society. This is the basis of Vico’s 
historicism where eloquence and wisdom are constitutively linked. 
 
In a resounding rebuke of the Cartesian method and analytic philosophy more generally 
Vico stated: “those branches of philosophical theory are taught by such a method as to dry up every 
fount of convincing expression, of copious, penetrating, embellished, lucid, developed, 
psychologically effective, and impassionate utterance. The listeners’ minds undergo a process of 
constriction...” (Vico 1990: 37). Moreover, in the case of eloquence: 
 
the same men assert that the modern study of methods, far from being detrimental, are most 
useful to it. ‘How much preferable it is,’ they say, ‘to induce persuasion by solid arguments 
based on truth, to produce such an effect on the mind that, once that truth coalesces with 
reason it can never be separated from it, rather than to coerce the listener’s soul by 
meretriciously eloquent allurements, by blazes of oratorical fire which, as soon as they are 
extinguished cause him to revert to his original disposition!’” Yet, the “role of eloquence 
is to persuade; an orator is persuasive when he calls forth his hearers the mood which he 
desires...Therefore, the soul must be enticed by corporeal images and impelled to love; for 
once it loves, it is easily taught to believe; once it believes and loves, the fire of passion 
must be infused into it so as to break its inertia and force it to will. Unless the speaker can 
compass these three things, he has not achieved the effect of persuasion; he has been 
powerless to convince (Vico 1990: 37).  
 
 
 
Thus, eloquence is wisdom speaking to move the soul. Mathematical formulae of the logical 
structures of argumentation advocated by Descartes and his followers cannot touch the soul nor 
produce wisdom in Vico’s more humanistic understanding of the term. 
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Vico here looks to past civilizations in order to contextualize the tragedy of the loss of 
eloquence from the ancients. “I hold the opinion that if eloquence does not regain the luster of the 
Latins and Greeks in our time, when our sciences have made progress equal to and perhaps even 
greater than theirs, it will be because the sciences are taught completely stripped of every badge 
of eloquence. And, for all that Cartesian philosophy would claim to have corrected of the erroneous 
order of thought of which the Scholastics were guilty, placing the total force of its proofs in the 
geometric method, such a method is so subtle and drawn out that if by chance attention to one 
proposition is broken, it is completely lost to whoever is listening to comprehend anything of the 
whole of what is being said” (Vico 1990: 87). Vico is not alone in this understanding as he draws 
this understanding of eloquence from Tacitus: “Tacitus says, eloquence and liberty are on a par” 
(Vico 1990: 88). In order for one to have liberty, ethics, politics, logically valid argumentation like 
that of geometry cannot be independent of the rhetoric with which they are conveyed to an 
audience in social context. This intersubjective essence of eloquence links all forms of knowledge 
within Vichian linguistic philosophy which is overall key to his New Science of humanity.  
 
Such a holistic view of Vico demands an understanding of the constitutive power of 
language for his philosophy. Sandra Luft argues that taken as a whole, Vichian texts share “a 
notion of humans as embodied, finite, temporal beings who exist in a world governed by material 
necessity, and who are dependent on the constitutive power of language to fabricate their human 
existence.” She presents them as “diverse expressions of poiesis, the interpretive sense-making of 
beings-in-the-world that takes place in language, a hermeneutic process ontologically creative of 
a real, though artificial, human world” (Luft 2003: XV).2 Vico is very concerned with how 
                                               
2 Luft believes the term “ontological” is inappropriate outside the context of Greek metaphysics. She uses 
it in a nontechnical sense, as Heidegger does, to emphasize a conception of humans whose sense-
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language structures our reality and lends itself to one type of epistemological standpoint or another. 
In his On the Study Methods of Our Time, Vico attacks Cartesian abstraction that posits truth with 
a mathematical kind of certainty, that which divorces language and argumentation from eloquence, 
rhetoric, and even of its ethical character i.e. reason divorced from emotion loses something 
inherently human in its argumentation. In a somewhat comical rant against the French language 
and Descartes, it becomes evident the ways in which Vico believes that language structures our 
intersubjective reality: 
 
 “The French language is abundantly endowed with words designating abstract ideas.  
Now, abstraction is in itself but a dull and inert thing, and does not allow the comparative  
degree. This makes it impossible for the French to impart an ardently emotional tone to 
their ideas, inasmuch as such an effect can only be achieved by setting thought in motion, 
and a vehement motion at that; nor can they amplify or elevate their discourse. Nor can 
they invert the order of words: the conceptual abstraction being the most general category, 
it does not supply us with that ‘middle term’ where the extreme points of a metaphor are 
able to meet and unite. It is therefore impossible in French for a single noun to be the 
vehicle of a metaphor; and metaphors composed of two nouns are, as a rule, somewhat 
stifled….French words have only two kinds of stress; they are accented on the ultima and 
on the penult, whereas Italian stresses the antepenult. In French the accent shifts to the 
penult, which results in a somewhat tenuous and thin sound. For these reasons, French is 
not fit for stately prose, nor for sublime verse. But though the French language cannot rise 
to any great sublimity or splendor, it is admirably suited to the subtle style. Rich in 
substantives, especially those denoting what the Scholastics call abstract essences, the 
French language can always condense into a small compass the essentials of things. Since 
arts and sciences are mostly concerned with general notions, French is therefore splendidly 
suited to the didactic genre. While we Italians praise our orators for fluency, lucidity, and 
eloquence, the French praise theirs for reasoning truly….We Italians, instead, are endowed 
with a language which constantly evokes images. We stand far above other nations by our 
achievements in the fields of painting, sculpture, architecture, and music. Our language, 
thanks to its perpetual dynamism, forces the attention of the listeners by means of 
metaphorical expressions, and prompts it to move back and forth between ideas which are 
far apart” (Vico 1990: 39-41). 
                                               
making is not epistemic, nor even subjective, but the interpretive activity, linguistic and practical, of 
beings-in-the-world. 
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Therefore, in order to understand the nature of language, one does not try to penetrate to the 
thought which Descartes assumed standing behind language. The encounter with any of man’s 
works especially those done through language, remains intrinsically historical. This context and 
temporal specific emphasis by Vico, bears a family resemblance to contemporary debates in just 
war thinking today explored in chapter two of this dissertation. 
 
Although Vico’s philosophy of history will be discussed in the following chapter, it is 
important to examine the interconnectedness between history and language for Vico. Rather than 
viewing ‘primitive’ civilizations as backwards or progressing toward some teleological future, he 
views the language, myths, and laws of particular societies as genuine attempts to understand the 
world around them. Thus, when men are ignorant of natural causes producing things, and cannot 
even explain them by analogy with similar things, they attribute their own nature to them. So the 
vulgar, for instance, say that the “magnet loves iron” (Toulmin and Goodfield 1965: 128). Thus, 
the Latin expression of the magnet loves iron, is a genuine attempt to linguistically construct 
meaning in a particular context whereby magnetism was not yet scientifically understood. For 
Vico, there is insight to be gained from vulgar wisdom, not to dismiss it as backwards or primitive 
thinking. “Vico’s new historical method demanded an acute sensitivity to the nuances of language 
and the inner significance of myths. He stripped the picturesque surface off the older mythologies, 
to uncover the living thought that gave them birth. Originally, myths were neither poetic fancies, 
nor fictions of the priests, nor heroic legends magnified through the lens of the past. They 
represented rather Man’s first crude but honest efforts to understand the world of nature and live 
in harmony with it...In their fables the nations have, in a rough way and in the language of the 
senses, described the beginning of the world of the sciences, where the specialized studies of the 
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scholars have since clarified for us by reasoning and generalization” (Toulmin and Goodfield 
1965: 127). 
 
 Early civilizations utilized a substantively mythical language to discuss science, religion, 
and art. Mythical thought was anthropomorphic and animistic, because it was only natural to make 
oneself the metaphor through which one understood the uncertainties of nature. Mythology was 
the thought of men living primitive lives and they sought to measure the world of Nature by that 
which they already knew–namely, themselves: 
 
“The essential poetic activity is the generation of myth; the first forms of human history 
are, therefore, pervasively and substantively mythical. But the myth is for Vico no idle 
evocation of the dreaming spirit of man; it is the spontaneous, imaginative form under 
which man symbolizes to himself the historical processes of his culture in their universally 
relevant features. Every existential form of the spontaneous human consciousness is, 
consequently, myth; and the interpretation of myth is the primary methodological principle 
of the ‘New Science’...Language, in its turn, is for Vico the system of signs generated for 
communication and preservation of myth” (Caponigri 1953: 8). 
 
 
  
Vico instructs us to “endeavor to employ in practice that precept of Horace which, condensed in 
three lines, contains all the art of using language well in prose as in verse. ‘Right thinking is the 
first principle and source of writing,’ because there is no eloquence without truth and dignity; of 
these two parts, wisdom is composed. ‘Socratic writings will direct you in the choice of subjects,’ 
that is, the study of morals, which principally informs the wisdom of man, to which more than in 
the other parts of philosophy Socrates divinely applied himself, whence of him it was said: 
‘Socrates recalled moral philosophy from the heavens.’ And ‘when the subject is well conceived, 
words will follow on spontaneously,’ because of the natural bond by which we claim language and 
heart to be held fast together, for every idea its proper voice stands naturally attached. Thus, 
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eloquence is none other than wisdom speaking” (Vico 1990: 89). Ultimately, Vico intuits that 
language is much more powerful than Descartes or his contemporaries give it credit; any method 
that abandons linguistic context misses an essential element of understanding the social world. 
 
 In the end, the primacy of language for Vico’s entire philosophy is a key link between 
constructivist IR today and ethics of war. Eloquence, wisdom, liberty, and ethics are all linked in 
Vico’s humanistic imagination of an intersubjective world; whereby humans construct a world of 
our making, yet without will or consciousness. Indeed, we may look back upon the past and see 
what we may later describe as progress; but that ascribes to past individuals a consciousness that 
they may not have had in the contingency and contestation of their time. Thus, “Man acts in the 
world, makes it ‘human’ and in so doing ‘humanizes’ himself; it is only after the fact that he can 
understand what he has done” (Edie 1969: 492, emphasis added). Ultimately, Vichian social 
construction means that humans in their context are the ultimate makers in the world in what some 
have deemed his science of imagination. “If the senses are faculties, by seeing we make the color 
of things, by tasting, we make flavors, by hearing, sounds, by touching, cold and heat… 
Imagination is, without a doubt, a faculty, because while we employ it, we form the images of 
things…According to these examples, the true intellect is a faculty since through it, when we 
understand a thing, we make it true. Consequently, arithmetic, geometry, and mechanics, the child 
of both, are founded in this faculty of man, since, by it, we demonstrate truth because we make it” 
(Grimaldi 1958: 113). It is through these modifications of our human and that we make the social 
world; since for Vico, we can only understand that which we have made, history is intimately 
human understanding humans in their historical context sheds light on broader philosophical 
principles in the world. 
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Science of Imagination in an Intersubjective World 
 
The symbiotic nature of “fact” and “value”, the inescapability of the hermeneutic circle – that 
language only approximates reality as it is “socially mediated and temporally and geographically 
conditioned” – represent an interpretivist IR endeavor, yet the Vichian roots of these concepts have 
as of yet been overlooked (Lynch 2014: 16). As Paparella (1993: 33) noted, Vico’s hermeneutical 
circle is: “when man creates in history; and above all when he creates language, he creates a 
structure that constitutes an interpretation of his experience. In turn that interpretation organizes 
the world around him. The study of history turns out to be an ongoing understanding and 
evaluation, in effect a constant reinterpretation, of these interpretive structures which men have 
created. There is no such thing as ‘objective’ history…The sheer arrogance of the Cartesian mind-
set is exhibited by the insistence that it is the only valid ‘objective’ view of what constitutes reality, 
while other views or paradigms can only proceed out of ignorance and have therefore little, if any, 
intellectual value.” As I hope it has already been demonstrated and will be expounded upon in this 
chapter, Vichian philosophy is worthy of exploration in both the fields of the ethics of war and in 
constructivist IR, for his contextualization of history, his emphasis on language, and his critique 
of narrow abstract knowledge production that claims to be universally applicable.  In sum, Vico’s 
understanding and articulation of humans as historical aids in the contextualization endeavor of 
Toulmin: “As an historical being I am constantly included in my understanding of history. We 
experience ourselves only by the detour of encounter with history; actually the opposite is also 
true: we experience history only by the detour of our self-understanding. This is the Vichian 
hermeneutical circle. The understanding of history can never be presuppositionless” (Paparella 
1993: 51). 
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Although Vico did not explicitly draw this distinction between deduction and induction – 
what we might today term abduction – he distinguished a kind of knowing that is founded upon 
personal experience together with imaginative insight into the experience of other men and 
circumstances. For instance, when one understands their milieu and social relationships–i.e. 
something that he does not understand by deduction, nor by induction, nor by hypothetical 
deduction, nor by arranging experiments, testing hypotheses; one understands men, societies, 
situations and outlooks in an immediate fashion (Berlin 2000: 474). Although one may be 
mistaken, one may misunderstand, it is a kind of knowing that is distinguishable from the other 
kinds of knowledge (though Vico wants to argue though they are distinguishable, they are not 
completely separable). Then, in looking to the science of history, Vico’s seminal theses that there 
are “two great doors into the past which people have not sufficiently” explored; one is the nature 
of language and the other is the nature of ritual and myth (Berlin 2000: 467). But one must not fall 
into the trap of importing modern ideas and conceptions into the past that they are studying, For 
Vico, art is one of the natural forms of human expression; however in his time, there was a belief 
that there were certain rules for making works of art that were unalterable, universal and eternal 
(Berlin 2000: 472-473). Concerning art, Vico viewed the doctrine of immutable principles of art 
to be a huge fallacy. Rules of his time (as I would argue today) were seen to be universal and not 
contextual. Similarly, then to Aristotle discussed by Toulmin and Brown, Vico believed that one 
had to understand the specific concrete circumstances (Vico was a forbearer to the ideas of 
“culture”) of how individuals interpret their societies via their language, rituals and myths–not 
simply viewing them as “primitive”. 
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 Perhaps the most important philosophical principle in Vico’s thought is truth and 
knowledge are convertible. The important epistemological principle of the verum-factum can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
“certain truth can be attained only when the knowing subject has himself produced his 
object. Accordingly, God can only know the world perfectly because he is its creator. 
Human beings, on the contrary, cannot have knowledge of nature, but only of mathematical 
entities–insofar as we create them: beginning with the abstractions of one and the point, 
the human mind generates its own world. According to Vico, this theory of knowledge is 
equally useful in rebuffing both the excessive epistemological pretensions of dogmatists 
and skepticism; only epistemology befits the human condition. The principle of verum-
factum has a long tradition. But Vico was the first to energetically articulate it as an 
independent criterion for truth, and in direct contraposition above all to the Cartesian 
criterion of evidence. The ‘cogito ergo sum,” which the humanist Vico had already 
observed in Plautus’s Amphitruo, is certainly true–and metaphysics should definitely 
attend to the ‘indubitable truth’, but Vico reasons, first, that knowledge of God comes 
before self-knowledge since God is that which thinks in me...Moreover, for Vico the cogito 
is purely ‘conscientia’ (consciousness) and certainly not ‘scientia’ (science) of the causes 
either of thought or being itself. Vico thus insists that the cogito is completely incapable of 
explaining the material relations of cause and effect: it is formal, empty, and incapable of 
deriving anything concrete. The principle of verum-factum, on the contrary, is most directly 
connected to the knowledge of causes: ‘Probare per caussas, idem est ac efficere’ (To 
prove something from causes is the same as to make it)” (Hösle 2016: 25). 
 
 
Ultimately Vico views science as an intersubjective human project whose principles are to be 
found not in the things themselves independent of human experience but rather “within the 
modifications of our own human mind” (Edie 1969: 491). This is the ultimate foundation from 
which Vico would lead scholars such as Marx and Hegel down the path man as historical as 
opposed to part of nature. 
 
Indeed, Vico proffers, we must understand Man in his concrete historical circumstances 
and not project his/her own biases onto the past. Man as historical means that we are the collective 
authors of our own historical past and an therefore have an utterly open future. How then does 
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Vico attempt to bind the rationality in the irrational foundations of man? Vico argues that if we 
look to the laws, myths, poems, and myths early man made to understand himself, they were made 
in the image and likeness of human beings. They were not primitive ideas, but genuine attempts 
to understand the place of humans in nature, and by understanding the poetry, laws, myths etc. of 
past civilizations one can gain insight into their conceptualizations of that. Instead of projecting 
our own ideas backwards and attempting to create a linear-progressive notion of history, Vico 
wants to view each historical attempt at understanding as a concrete and distinct, contextually 
bound inter-subjective process of man in society as opposed to pure cogito. “Nothing is more 
fraught with philosophical danger and difficulty than historical explanation, and nothing is more 
difficult to justify than the status of ‘truth’ which we can ascribe to the historical hypotheses and 
explanatory concepts with which we systematize historical events after the fact. How are such 
hypotheses and concepts, which always emerge on the level of full cognitive awareness long after 
the events that they ‘explain’ are dead and gone, to be justified as universally objective and valid 
truths?” (Edie 1969: 490). 
 
         Introducing human subjectivity or inter-subjectivity of man in society into a temporal 
historical vision of humankind, presents what seems to be a pure contradiction: a finite principle 
(the contextually bound content of individual nations and their histories) with the infinite divine 
providence (or universal history whereby all individual histories of nations/groups tend towards). 
Hence, the introduction of the human subject as the principle of the synthesis of time and idea and 
the exploration of its dynamic structure is the intent and purpose of the Vichian doctrine of the 
‘Modification of the Human Mind’. In this doctrine Vico identifies history unambiguously as the 
presence of the “human subject to itself and describes its pure phenomenology. The historicity of 
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the human subject involves that subject, in Vico’s view, in radical contradiction; this view leads 
to his elaboration of the concept of ‘providence’, which is, in essence, the rectifying principle of 
human history” (Caponigri 1957: 6-7). Ultimately, “The idea is no timeless essence; it is the eternal 
law of the appearance of concrete forms of time” (Caponigri 1953: 71). As a professor of rhetoric 
in Naples, Vico sought to understand time and universal history through concrete interpretations 
natural law throughout the ages, Caponigri put Vico’s philosophy thusly: 
  
The philosophical problem of history as it arises in the dual context of the natural law and 
of the project of a science of humanity...is the problem of the synthesis of time and idea. 
In this formulation time is the general formal principle of the positive structures of society 
and culture; that is, time defines the most general order, which pervades the realm of these 
structures. They appear in temporal succession, manifesting in this medium that variety 
and diversity, those transformations and dynamisms, which are the characteristics of their 
positivity. Idea, by contrast, in this formulation, defines that plenitude or perfection which 
would seem to be the implication of that positive movement and over against which the 
process of the formations of the concrete structures of sociality and of humanity are to be 
measured. The error of classical political humanism has appeared to Vico as the attempt to 
fix this ideality apodictically, that is, independently of that temporal order in which 
concrete forms of society appear” (Caponigri 1953: 71). 
  
 
However, far from being arbitrary or purely contingent, historical custom is the vehicle through 
which divine providence operates (Miner 2002: 38). “In a single sentence, Vico condenses the 
view of philosophy scattered throughout his previous writings. Then he declares that ‘this Axiom 
dismisses from the school of our Science the Stoics, who seek to mortify the senses, and the 
Epicureans, who make them the criterion’” (SN 130). In the Scienza Nuova, Vico holds that both 
culminate in the same error, but takes pains to emphasize the flaws proper of each sect. Now he 
only says that, “both deny providence, the former chaining themselves to fate, the latter 
abandoning themselves to chance” (SN 130). One difference is noted: The Epicureans “affirm that 
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human souls die with their bodies.” But the parallel is more important: “both should be called 
monastic, or solitary, philosophers. This is all Vico needs to say about the Stoics and Epicureans” 
(Miner, 2002: 79). 
  
Vico’s Modifications of the Human Mind as the Synthesis of Time and Idea 
Vico’s theory of history is a positive theory, which seeks to combine the radically particular 
historical laws of nations, with the ideas of the universal providence of mankind. This synthesis is 
not something that objectively occurs, but inter-subjectively is interpreted by Man throughout the 
ages within what Vico terms, “modifications of the human mind.” Vichian thought on this topic 
should not be confused with a metaphysics of the human mind–“such a formal and abstract 
dialectic of human consciousness would be an eternism and atemporalism which Vico’s purpose 
at every point is to oppose” (Caponigri 1953: 74). Vico is instead concerned with phenomenology. 
The doctrine modification of the human mind is the synthesis emergence of concrete forms of 
sociality and culture in time. It is the work of man’s thought through all of its diversity, will, 
determination and freedom, which sustain those forms of existence. Hence, Vico’s intent is 
indisputable: “he is concerned, by this determination of the modifications of the human mind, to 
fix the law of the temporal appearance of the idea, or of the temporal movement toward the idea 
in the concrete process of the formations of human society” (Caponigri 1953: 74). Hence, one is 
left with an understanding of the historical structure of the human mind itself–not an imposition 
of the present on the past–but understanding the synthesis of time and idea within an inter-
subjective and diverse world. Ultimately, “the human mind does not produce history as something 
extraneous and contingent to itself; it produces itself in history and its modifications are the 
concrete principles of its temporal-ideal actuality” (Caponigri 1953: 74-75). 
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         The synthesis of time and idea for Vico is crucial for understanding his subsequent cyclical 
history and historical ricorso (elaborated below) as it relates to the ethics of war in the 
contemporary era. The appearance of the idea in diverse contexts interpreted via language in law, 
myth, ritual, poetry, and religion lends itself to a hermeneutic interpretation of a Vichian theory of 
history. Luft argues that taken as a whole, Vichian texts share “a notion of humans as embodied, 
finite, temporal beings, who exist in a world governed by material necessity, and who are 
dependent on the constitutive power of language to fabricate their human existence.” She presents 
them as “diverse expressions of poiesis, the interpretive sense-making of beings-in-the-world that 
takes place in language, a hermeneutic process ontologically creative of a real, though artificial, 
human world” (Luft 2003: XV). In the conclusion, I argue that taking Vico’s humanism seriously 
is essential to maintaining human agency in an era of accelerated techno-warfare. Vico’s 
humanism is “a philosophy of human agency…where traditional humanism identifies the source 
of agency, whether human or divine, as conscious and intentional, the creativity Vico attributes to 
his first men derives from the potency of a subjectively unconditioned ordinary language. That 
language is itself ontologically creative is not a notion Vico could find in his philosophical or 
theological traditions, given their assumptions of an orderly world and of the rational subjectivity 
of God and humans (Luft 2003: XIV). In sum, man as historical is not some teleological or linear-
progression toward some ultimate utopia (that is simply imposing order and contextually bound 
values on the past), it is instead an intersubjective process of beings-in-the-world interacting via 
language and creating their own rules, laws, myths, rituals, art, and poetry to make sense of a 
complex nature social interactions. Ultimately, synthesis of time and idea for Vico is the synthesis 
of the eternal with the concrete and particular; such that the internal time-structure of the nation 
can be understood in relation to the plurality of nations (or mankind) toward a universal history. 
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Conclusion: Vico’s Impact on Ethics of War Today 
 
As will be fully addressed in chapter two, I believe that Vico has a lot to offer ethics of war today 
which has turned to analytic philosophy to decontextualize complex ethico-political dilemmas and 
search for the answers to Justice in warfare. However, Vico warns us against neglecting chance 
and uncertainty of human endeavors for some logically sound argument devoid of wisdom or 
eloquence. Hence, Vico utilized the roman historian Tacitus to understand how humanity actually 
was. “Tacitus offered Vico the opportunity to examine, in detail, the power of chance and evil in 
history (Hösle 2016), 16. Any theory of ethics and warfare that ignores language and favors 
abstraction as opposed to the concrete circumstances of the soldier commits a grave error. Vico 
tells us: “it is an error to apply to the prudent conduct of life the abstract criterion of reasoning that 
obtains in the domain of science. A correct judgment deems that men–who are, for the most part, 
but fools–are ruled, not by forethought, but by whim or chance. The doctrinaires judge human 
actions as they ought to be, not as they actually are (i.e., performed more or less at random).” (Vico 
1990: 35). As the following chapter addresses key aspects of war ethics and Vichian thought, I 
think it best to briefly conclude as to why I came to integrate Vico into my studies and apply him 
to diverse arguments from constructivism to AI and quantum computing in warfare today. 
 
After being introduced to Giambattista Vico, in the little I have delved into his philosophy 
it has been insightful on a number of levels. First and foremost, I believe Vico to be one of the first 
social constructivists, who developed a theory of abduction in response to the Cartesian deductive 
logic. Furthermore, he offers a cyclical view of history that is highly contingent and not 
deterministic like the majority of philosophy of his time. Indeed, Vico was a man ahead of his time 
that was not discovered until the mid-1950’s. He was a lowly professor from Naples, Italy who 
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had written an immense volume with commentary on all of the contemporary legal scholars like 
Grotius and others for his New Science. Only after its completion his funding was pulled before 
publication, whereby his masterpiece was cut to ¼ the original length and the rest of his work was 
lost forever. Beyond the sad life, he captured the imagination of great historicists like Isaiah Berlin, 
who wrote extensively on Vico, yet Vico has yet to be seen for his humanistic merit by IR 
constructivists or just war thinkers. In the end, I believe that Vico can offer both a useful 
philosophy of history to ask the right questions about the ethics of war today, he has something to 
offer constructivist IR, and provide the humanistic imagination through art and poetry what is 
erased from contemporary ethical logic. 
 
  Vico intuited that in that kind of technological world little room is left for works of 
humanistic imagination (e.g., literature, the arts, history, philosophy, ethics); i.e. the very modes 
of thought and sentiment through which Man may attempt to understand himself. It is this inability 
to associate humanistic thought with truth that lies at the root of contemporary technocratic 
mentality and its sheer inability to provide a unifying vision of the whole of human knowledge. 
The worth of an individual will not be conceived as intrinsic to his humanity any longer but as 
related to his contribution to an effective, efficient part of a social scheme. Any sort of 
transcendence over the social system, any inwardness and creativity are not only not appreciated 
but more often than not they are discouraged. The individual is seen as a mere cog in the system: 
a producing and consuming machine devoid of any inwardness. 
 
Cartesian technocratic man on one hand, and Nietzschean charismatic man on the other; as 
we have seen, Vico’s truth—while aiming for the transcendent—remains at all times open to 
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existence and its contradictions. His historicism may be evolutionary but it is never deterministic 
as a Fontanelle’s or a Nietzsche’s. Vico insists throughout his speculation that the historian must 
not anticipate but rather interpret reality. He must always begin with the certum in order to 
understand the verum. Vico’s signal contribution and importance, according to Paparella, consists 
in the fact that he is still today the most valid alternative between Cartesian rationalism ushering 
in technocratic man ready to efficiently order the world, and Nietzschean anti-rationalism ushering 
in charismatic overman devoid of transcendence and ready to transvaluate values and impose them 
on a world locked in a deterministic eternal return (Paparella 2008). Based upon my previous work 
concerning temporality in IR, I am highly skeptical of any type of deterministic theories, thus 
Vico’s contingent and humanistic imagination offers a possible solution to the false dichotomies 
of IR scholarship today–i.e. positivist/post-positivist, method trumping the types of normative 
questions one ought to be asking. 
 
         Vico’s merit lies in the fact that “he begins with the particular without ever sacrificing the 
universal and ideal, and most importantly, without ever sacrificing the will to truth or the will to 
power….Vico whose concept of providence is left as the most valuable part of his thought, remains 
nowadays the most valid alternative between the two dehumanizing extremes of Cartesian 
rationalism ushering technocratic man ready to ‘efficiently order’ the world, and Nietzschean anti-
rationalism ushering charismatic man ready to ‘transvalue values’ and impose his ‘superior’ values 
on the world.” (Paparella 1993: 144). For me, Vico offers an insight into war and language in ways 
that other philosophers have not given me. I spent the first few years of my PhD attempting to 
resolve the tensions of complex ethical dilemmas when it came to warfare, but Vico’s blending of 
universal and particular opened doors for me to operate within these tensions with an 
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understanding of concreteness and eloquence was more powerful than logically sound modes of 
argumentation devoid of moral context. Ultimately, this chapter has been an exploration of the 
many facets of the thought of Giambattista Vico, which will be a lifelong endeavor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
Works Cited 
Berlin, Isaiah. 2013. Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder - Second 
Edition. Princeton University Press. 
Brunstetter, Daniel R., and Cian O’Driscoll. 2017. Just War Thinkers: From Cicero to the 
21st Century. Routledge. 
Caponigri, A. Robert. 1953. Time and Idea: The Theory of History of Giambattista Vico. 
London: Routledge. 
Edie, James M. 1969. “Vico and Existential Philosophy.” In Giambattista Vico: An 
International Symposium, edited by Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden V. White, 483–95. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press. 
Frost, Mervyn. 1996. Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Grassi, Ernesto. 1990. Vico and Humanism: Essays on Vico, Heidegger, and Rhetoric. New 
York: P. Lang. 
Grimaldi, Alfonsina Albini. 1958. The Universal Humanity of Giambattista Vico. S. F. 
Vanni. 
Hösle, Vittorio. 2016. Vico’s New Science of the Intersubjective World. University of Notre 
Dame Press. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich V. 1991. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of 
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lollini, Massimo. 2011. “Vico’s More than Human Humanism.” Annali d’Italianistica 29: 
381–99. 
Luft, Sandra Rudnick. 2003. Vico’s Uncanny Humanism: Reading the New Science Between 
Modern and Postmodern. Cornell University Press. 
Lynch, Cecelia. 2014. Interpreting International Politics. Routledge. 
Miner, Robert C. 2002. Vico, Genealogist of Modernity. University of Notre Dame Press. 
Onuf, Nicholas. 2002. “‘Tainted Contingency’: Retelling the Story of International Law.” In 
Reframing the International: Law, Culture, Politics, edited by Richard Falk, Lester Edwin 
J. Ruiz, and R. B. J. Walker, 26–45. New York: Routledge. 
Paparella, Emanuel L. 1993. Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico: Vico’s 
Paradox Revolutionary Humanistic Vision for the New Age. EmText. 
Paparella, Emanuel L. 2008. “Some Concluding Reflections at the End of the Journey into 
Vico’s Mind—Part 2.” Metanexus. 12 March 2008. Available at: https://www.metanexus. 
         net/some-concluding-reflections-end-journey-vicos-mind-part-2/. 
Said, Edward W. 1976. “Vico on the Discipline of Bodies and Texts.” MLN Bulletin 91 (5): 
817–26. 
———. 2004. Humanism and Democratic Criticism. Columbia University Press. 
Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, and Dvora Yanow. 2013. Interpretive Research Design: 
Concepts and Processes. Routledge. 
Tateo, Luca. 2015. “Giambattista Vico and the Psychological Imagination.” Culture & 
Psychology 21 (2): 145–61. 
———. 2017. “Poetic Destroyers. Vico, Emerson and the Aesthetic Dimension of 
Experiencing.” Culture & Psychology 23 (3): 337–55. 
 
 75 
Toulmin, Stephen. 1990. “Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity.” New York: 
Macmillan. 
Toulmin, Stephen, and June Goodfield. 1965. The Discovery of Time. University of Chicago 
Press. 
Vico, Giambattista. 1990. On the Study Methods of Our Time. Cornell University Press. 
Walker, R. B. J. 1992. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wight, Colin. 2006. Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Yanow, Dvora, and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea. 2015. Interpretation and Method: Empirical 
Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn. Routledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
Chapter Two 
  
AI and the Poetic Wisdom of Giambattista Vico:  
Ethics of War in The Technological Era 
  
 
Crippled for life at seventeen, 
  His great eyes seem to question why; 
With both legs smashed it might have been 
  Better in that grim trench to die 
  Than drag maimed years out helplessly. 
  
A child – so wasted and so white, 
  He told a lie to get his way, 
To march, a man with men, and fight 
  While other boys are still at play. 
  A gallant lie your heart will say. 
  
So broke with pain, he shrinks in dread 
  To see the ‘dresser’ drawing near; 
And winds the clothes about his head 
  That none may see his heart-sick fear. 
  His shaking, strangled sobs you hear. 
  
But when the dressed moment’s there 
  He’ll face us all, a soldier yet, 
Watch his bared wounds with unmoved air, 
  (Though tell-tale lashes are wet), 
  And smoke his woodbine cigarette. 
 
–Eva Dobell, “Pluck” 
 
 
 
(During a Great Battle, 1916) 
The floors are slippery with blood: 
The world gyrates too. God is good 
That while His wind blows out the light 
For those who hourly die for us – 
We still can dance, each night. 
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The music has grown numb with death – 
But we will suck their dying breath, 
The whispered name they breathed to chance, 
To swell our music, make it loud 
That we may dance, – may dance. 
  
We are the dull blind carrion-fly 
That dance and batten. Though God die 
Mad from the horror of the light – 
The light is mad, too, fled with blood, – 
We dance, we dance, each night. 
 
–Edith Sitwell, “The Dancers” 
 
 
“Hindsight makes it difficult to imagine that the people under study are moving toward a yet 
incalculable and hidden future; that as a rule people have to venture a diagnosis of their existential 
situation in fear and hope…Indeed poets seem to be more capable of this difficult imaginative 
operation than historians.”  
 
–Emanuel Paparella, Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico 
 
“Too many people learn about war with no inconvenience to themselves. They read about Verdun 
or Stalingrad without comprehension, sitting in a comfortable armchair, with their feet beside the 
fire, preparing to go about their business the next day, as usual. One should really read such 
accounts under compulsion, in discomfort, considering oneself fortunate not to be describing the 
events in a letter home, writing from a hole in the mud. One should read about war in the worst 
circumstances, when everything is going badly, remembering that the torments of peace are trivial, 
and not worth any white hairs. Nothing is really serious in the tranquility of peace; only an idiot 
could be really disturbed by a question of salary. One should read about war standing up, late at 
night, when one is tired, as I am writing about it now, at dawn, while my asthma attack wears off. 
And even now, in my sleepless exhaustion, how gentle and easy peace seems!” 
 
― Guy Sajer, The Forgotten Soldier 
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Introduction 
 
Technological innovation strives to create a science of warfare to tame chance and uncertainty all 
while easing the liberal conscience for killing innocents in the name of saving strangers. It is 
claimed that soldiers are fallible, emotional, and biased, whereas artificial intelligence (AI), 
machine learning algorithms, and lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) enable a more 
precise, ethical war. Just war theorizing today has attempted to grapple with the dilemmas of 
technological innovation on ethics of war (e.g. see Morkevicius 2014; Leveringhaus 2016; Roff 
2014; Brunstetter and Braun 2011; Allenby 2013; Renic 2018). But how might the humanism of 
Giambattista Vico help us conceptualize human/computer interactions in moral decision-making 
on the battlefields of tomorrow?  Just war debates today are framed in terms of the Walzerian 
casuists against his revisionist critics. While there is nuance and debate within each camp, (Braun 
2018 :350) correctly identifies the heart of the debate as an incommensurable methodological 
divide between the analytic camps’ “search for moral truth which requires abstraction and thus has 
little to no place for the messy circumstances of real-world employments of force”, i.e. the 
traditionalist camp. As Braun sketches the nature of the divide, he focuses on the ‘moral equality 
of combatants thesis’ and rightly identifies a ‘third way’ approach of James Turner Johnson’s 
historical method that doesn’t rely on analytical abstraction. This chapter will address divide 
between just war thinkers that utilize historical examples and the revisionists that rely on 
abstraction to tackle the ontological disagreement of war as a collective endeavor and reductive 
individualism respectively. Linking internal just war debates to technological innovation in 
warfare, (Schwarz 2018 :281) argues that, “advanced technologies of violence influence moral 
decision-making in ways that are significant to just war thinking but often remain neglected. This, 
in turn, risks producing vacuums for moral decision-making about inflicting harm in war.” This 
 79 
chapter strives to interject the humanistic philosophy of Giambattista Vico into contemporary 
discussions of the ethics of war in an era of AI and the potential utilization of LAWS. Vico’s 
philosophy of history is a cyclical but contingent understanding whereby when the last stage of 
history is reached, man believes himself to have encompassed God’s mind–analogous to AI today–
and simply worships his own cleverness, at which point a historical ricorso takes place returning 
man to an earlier simplicity of poetic wisdom. In its simplest form, Vico’s ideal eternal history is: 
“Men first feel necessity, then look for utility, next attend to comfort, still later amuse themselves 
with pleasure, thence grow dissolute in luxury, and finally go mad and waste their substance” 
(Vico SN 241). I argue that AI, algorithmic warfare, and LAWS are analogous to a Vichian ricorso 
in that those of us who study ethics of war must return to the concrete circumstances of human 
experiences of war. This madness is epitomized by the techno-optimism that humans will be 
absolved of difficult ethico-political decision-making in warfare by utilizing advanced technology 
and revisionist theorizing “paying more attention to the logical structure of the argument than the 
moral content of its object.” (Schwarz 2018: 295).  
 
The philosophy of Giambattista Vico is useful in three concrete ways for present crises 
within just war thinking and technologies of killing. First and foremost, it highlights the 
traditionalist notion of the political, social, and contextual nature of conflict the ontological divide 
between was as a collective endeavor and reductive individualism. Second, it calls to question the 
search for the answers to what constitutes a just war as opposed to just war as a practical language 
of a set of questions for decision-makers that takes into account the uncertainty, contingency, and 
messiness of warfare instead of abstract hermetically sealed logics of revisionism. Finally, it calls 
upon historical traditionalists who utilize casuistry to not only account for the jus in bello soldier 
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experience, but if war is truly a collective endeavor we should also include the jus in bello 
experiences on the homefront of the impacts of war, remembering, and memorialization. In the 
end, by introducing Vichian concept of poetic wisdom into the just war tradition, this chapter 
strives to address the concrete dilemmas of the techno-ethics of war today by a return to the 
concrete human experiences of war for civilians and soldiers alike.. Ultimately, Vichian thought 
in just war thinking ought to call on ethics of war scholars to recognize the contingency and 
unpredictability of the social world, to temper the hubristic search for the answers of what 
constitutes ‘Just’ war.  
 
This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, I will sketch the debates between just war 
traditionalists and revisionists, arguing that the revisionist abstraction in thought experiments 
divorces ethics from the concrete human experiences of war. Hence, since revisionists have 
attempted to deem themselves arbiters of what objectively is the just war, or just conduct during 
war, I argue that this fails to account for the essence of war: uncertainty, thrownness, and the 
concrete circumstances of particular conflicts. Second, I elaborate Giambattista Vico’s ideal 
eternal history, which is a cyclical and highly contingent vision of man in history. Recognizing 
that we are inter-subjective makers-in-the-world, yet we do so not with consciousness or 
omnipotence, but by simply acting in the world and ex post facto constructing a cogent teleological 
narrative of how we arrived at the now. Third I apply Vico’s notion of poetic wisdom to ethics of 
war today. I argue that AI, robotic, and algorithmic warfare of today represents such a moment of 
ricorso in that those of us who study ethics of war must return to the concrete circumstances of 
human experiences of war as opposed to revisionist or technological abstraction away from killing. 
Here, I utilize war poetry on the battlefront and homefront in order to capture the uncertainty of 
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warfare to push for a concrete ethics of war based in human experience in contrast to a revisionist 
vision of ethics as abstract thought experiments so they can find the “deep morality of war” devoid 
of complexity and nuance. In Part four, I proffer Vico’s poetic wisdom as an avenue for just war 
scholars to embrace the tensions that traditionalists and revisionists quibble over as opposed to 
attempting to resolve it. For Vico, true wisdom was not descending from the universal to generalize 
about particulars– just war revisionism–but grasping the essence of the universal through the 
contextual, specific, and particular circumstances–just war traditionalism. Thus, war poetry will 
provide ethicists of war today with poetic wisdom of war as a collective endeavor. 
 
Ethics of War Today 
The revitalization of just war thinking during the Cold War (Ramsey) and the Vietnam War 
(Walzer) has invigorated an expansion of just war scholarship at the end of the Cold War through 
the Global War on Terror of today. Many argue that the just war is simply an antiquated and 
uniquely Western way of simply making something morally abhorrent (war in all of its brutality) 
something morally palpable to liberal Western values. Indeed, the use and abuse of just war 
language in U.S. justifications for conflicts such as George W. Bush with the Iraq war and Barack 
Obama with his expansive global drone war, once again call those of us who study the ethics of 
war to reassess the relevance of just war today (Brunstetter and O’Driscoll 2017). The notion that 
just war is simply a Western construct that simply universalizes Christian values of war neglects 
the serious scholarship that links the just war tradition to the Islamic, Indian, Greek, Roman and 
Chinese ethics of war noting some common principles throughout the various traditions (see: 
Kelsay 2009 ;Johnson 1997 ; Morkevičius 2018; O’Driscoll 2018). Today, there remain robust 
debates in the ethics of war broadly divided between traditionalists and revisionist camps. Should 
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the morality by which one abides by in London or Los Angeles be continuous and unchanging on 
the streets of Fallujah or Ghanzi? Or are the conditions of open armed conflict unique and subjected 
to a separate understanding of the morality in times of peace? What about the in-between space 
between war/non-war binary? Does this under-theorized area of conflict that defines our 
contemporary era need a new distinct moral category such as jus ad vim, or do the jus ad bellum 
and in bello categories suffice? Recognizing that under international law and the Laws of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC) makes this distinction between war/peace, what risk is there to expanding the 
temporal and geographic areas of war to “wherever terrorists may operate” as the U.S. did in the 
post-9/11 era? The tension is that the essence of conflict today and the technology available in 
which to undertake more discrete military operations has brought this dilemma to the fore, and is 
something that although may be analytically reconcilable, is practically speaking, a plight that may 
have no resolution. Hence, what guiding questions might allow us to reside within, rather than 
attempt to resolve this tension as a condition of war ethics today? 
 
         The main dividing lines between revisionists and traditionalists are not easily reconciled. 
There are five main points of contention between the two camps, of which (Braun 2018) has 
already fantastically tackled the second and touched upon the fifth. First, the bifurcation of war 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Traditionalists believe that the two should be separated in 
that a just war could be fought unjustly and vice versa, while revisionists believe the two to be 
linked. Second, the moral equality of combatants thesis of Walzer that once war is waged, soldiers 
have an equal right to kill and be killed in accordance with jus in bello irrespective of the justness 
of jus ad bellum. Such a view recognizes that low-level soldiers are not privy to such information 
on the justness of a particular war given domestic propaganda, economic pressures, etc. Third, 
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revisionists proffer an individualist ontology for war and place the moral burden on individual 
soldiers both ad bellum and in bello. In contrast, traditionalists believe that war is a collective 
endeavor ad bellum and thus individual soldiers can only be held to account for their conduct in 
bello, while political leaders are responsible for the collective decisions ad bellum. Fourth, 
traditionalists argue that war is a special moral context separate from everyday morality in society, 
whereas revisionists believe that war does not require a separate morality; there are a set of 
conditions for individual who is liable to be killed in the domestic context which holds constant in 
times of war. Fifth, traditionalists broadly conceived tend to argue from real-world historical or 
contemporary situations to illustrate the questions that just war criteria offer as a guide to soldiers 
and policymakers, revisionists tend to view just war as a space of analytic philosophy and the 
criteria are boxes to be ticked to determine the “deep morality” of war. In the end, the search for 
the right questions for a practical guiding morality (traditionalists) and the answers for what is an 
objective just war (revisionists) that divide the camps remains incommensurable. Yet, in this piece 
I attempt to tackle the third and fifth divergences and ultimately call for an ethics of practical 
judgment whose foundation is the concrete collective human experience of war via the philosopher 
Giambattista Vico, who currently stands outside the just war tradition, but has much to contribute 
to the ethics of war and peace. 
         
In reading one of the most recent edited volumes by a number of revisionists entitled: Who 
Should Die: The Ethics of Killing in War, I was struck by the notion of the ought in their title. They 
clarify in the opening pages that the book is primarily concerned with the concept of liability–“to 
investigat[e] seriously which individuals can be justly harmed in war and which individuals cannot 
be” (Jenkins, Robillard, Strawser 2018: 1). I believe that the role of just war in the contemporary 
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era should be an ethics of practical judgment and guiding principles to limit the horrors of war, 
hence, framing it terms of who ought to die, strikes me as an immoral starting point of the first 
order. The editors note that Jeff McMahan, Cécil Fabre and David Rodin have “brought to bear 
the instruments of analytic philosophy, sharpened and refined through the increasingly technical 
skirmishes of twentieth-century philosophy, and applied insights from more recent debates over 
moral epistemology and normative uncertainty in an attempt to articulate and specify moral 
demands on soldiers in warfare” (Jenkins, Robillard, Strawser, 2018, 2). One can already see the 
tensions between the use of real world complex dilemmas of technology and warfare and the goal 
of revisionists in thinking hard and debating vigorously which advanced trolley problem formula 
best encapsulates what they need to demand of soldiers. These debates seem particularly fruitless 
as they apodictically apply thought experiments from the abstract domestic context of whether a 
child is justified pinching another child on the playground (Frowe 2016) to the context of CIA 
assassinations via drones and machine learning algorithms in non-declared war zones. The 
domestic analogies of police and criminals are proudly touted as a common resort of revisionists, 
yet it seems obvious why these would seem ludicrous to the traditionalists who believe that war is 
a separate moral context, and the fog of war does not offer clear cut moral decisions of hermetically 
sealed and logically sound trolley problems. 
  
There are a number of contentions that arise between the two camps. First and foremost, 
the “tradition” as such is not a stable entity, but has been debated, evolved, challenged, and re-
interpreted based on who was writing and in what context.  Divorcing the principles from the 
context in which they were introduced creates a notion that these principles are universally 
applicable and timeless, and having this as a philosophical starting point places revisionists in a 
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predicament as to why these principles and not others are their foundations. Furthermore, the 
“traditionalists” argue that “the principles of the just war tradition should not be mistaken for 
empty shells to be filled however one chooses, without any regard for their provenance and 
development over time, nor are they entirely determined by their past usage. It is possible to tweak 
or re-fashion them to meet new demands” as many thinkers did throughout the tradition 
(Brunstetter and O’Driscoll, 2018, 4). Because thinking of the tradition as such “involves 
conceiving of it as a multiplicity of closely related but competing voices, that when combined 
constitutes a unified field of inquiry and practical judgment.” (Brunstetter and O’Driscoll, 2018, 
3). The adaptability of the tradition to the circumstances of the times such as the discussions of 
Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomé de las Casas contesting over the rights of Indians in the era of 
European colonization in the new world. Even if the principles were “timeless”, their interpretation 
and application has been deeply influenced by the context in which they were defined, and the 
attempt to settle the definitions once and for all is a hubristic endeavor by the revisionists. Thus, 
in the post 9/11-era there has been a trend in elevating the just cause criterion above the more 
prudential category of last resort (Aloyo 2015); while there is an historical precedent for this, it is 
not the rationale revisionists give. Indeed, Jeff McMahan has previously argued for the 
proportionality requirement in bello to be subsumed by the ad bellum requirement of just cause 
(McMahan 2005, 3). Nevertheless, Mark Rigstad would be critical of the just cause argument. He 
cites the example that although George W. Bush may have had a just cause for preventive self-
defense against al-Qaeda and its supporters, he questions whether or not warfare was the necessary 
and proportional means of prosecuting this cause (Rigstad 2007, 18). Ultimately, divorcing just 
war from its historical context, picking and choosing criterion and assuming that to be universal is 
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a major methodological problem that revisionists that all the “technical skirmishes” of analytic 
philosophy can never solve. 
  
Perhaps my greatest point of contention with the revisionists is their false characterization 
of Michael Walzer as representing the traditionalist position. The tradition is not static, for the 
reasons stated above, but revisionists must hold one account as definitive of the traditionalist 
position they seek to attack. Revisionists argue that they are “set apart from the ‘traditionalist’ just 
war theory put forth by Walzer” through their investigation into who is liable to be killed (Jenkins, 
Robillard, Strawser, 2018, 1). Although Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars is indeed the quintessential 
ethics of war text, he breaks substantially with the just war tradition and actually stands outside of 
it. As (Braun 2018: 352) notes, while Walzer reasons from “historical illustrations”, he does 
engage with the historical just war tradition only in a limited way. Furthermore, Chris Brown 
(2018: 205) argues compellingly that the problem with holding Walzer as the epitome of the 
tradition lies in the fact that “set in the context of the tradition, he is not, in any considered sense 
of the term, a just war thinker at all…[he] has few points of contact with Augustine, Aquinas and 
their successors and, as a result, whose account of the just war ignore, or sometimes actually rejects 
many features of the tradition. His approach to the tradition is à la carte – he takes form it what he 
needs, what makes sense to him, and leaves the rest: historical examples for their moral 
exemplarity.” Walzer is indeed more exemplary of the “legalist paradigm” which boils down to 
his own communitarian version of a theory of rights as opposed to the individualist starting point 
of revisionists. While he ultimately carves out a space for “supreme emergency” contra the legalist 
paradigm, “Walzer’s position can be seen as a defense of the current legal framework governing 
the use of force – but it departs radically form what had previously been understood to be the just 
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war tradition” (Brown 2018: 210). Both Brown and I agree with Walzer’s critique of revisionism 
that “relies on high levels of abstraction and fanciful hypothetical examples” (Brown 2018: 214), 
but the revisionist touting of Walzer as the exemplar of the “traditionalist” position is expedient at 
best, and fallacious at worst. 
  
         The divisions between traditionalists and revisionists have a number of points of contention 
some of which are commensurable some of which are not. On the issue of the bifurcation of war 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello that divides the two camps, I believe a middle ground can 
be reached. The traditionalist position holds that individual soldiers in war are only responsible for 
their conduct in bello and are not responsible for the ad bellum decision to go to war. This is an 
indefensible position for understanding soldier experiences from all sides of WWI, who have 
similar experiences, nationalist sentiments, and a true lack of information due to sophisticated 
domestic propaganda. However, in an era where civil wars, irregular conflict, asymmetric war, and 
terrorism reigns supreme, the notion of states calling up soldiers to fight does become more of an 
individualized decision to take up arms than drafts of major global conflicts of the past. The 
Revisionist position eases some of the tensions that irregular wars and civil wars present by holding 
the individual accountable for the ad bellum decision as well as in bello conduct. Simply put the 
revisionist view is: “an unjust combatant acts wrongly even if he or she manages to act within the 
principles of jus in bello when attacking a just combatant” (Kahn, 2018, 20). Personally, I go back 
and forth on the issue when I had to teach ethics and the Vietnam War. Even if U.S. troops who 
were drafted were fighting justly in an unjust war, are the Viet Cong engaging them in firefights 
not liable to be killed? Thus, according to the revisionist case, those engaged in an unjust war act 
immorally by taking a life even in self-defense on the open battlefield. Even by standards where a 
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just and unjust side are more easily determined ex post facto, who determines which side is 
objectively just and which is unjust? Within the just war tradition, that power ultimately was only 
God’s; yet, for the revisionists, Jeff McMahan, Helen Frowe, and Cecil Fabre are the ultimate 
determinants of Justice. In the end, I believe there is some middle ground in that specific cases 
may be more clear-cut generally to link the two, but linking the two for the logical soundness of 
the argument misses the practical judgment aspect inherent in the tradition. 
  
The second point of contention arises directly from the first, which is the moral equality of 
combatants. The moral equality of combatants holds that all soldiers share a similar moral status 
across both sides of a conflict. This to say that even soldiers on the unjust side of the conflict do 
not wrong enemy soldiers when they kill them within the confines of jus in bello. This is a point 
that I believe is incommensurable between the two sides as the revisionists take an absolutist view 
of justice and engage in linguistic jiu jitsu in order to maintain the logical soundness of their 
hermetically sealed arguments impervious to real-world dilemmas and tensions. Here is where 
revisionism shines in its linguistic absolutism that stems from its basis in analytic philosophy, as 
they want to make a distinction between excuse and justification. “To say that an act is justified is 
to say that it is morally permissible, that it is impervious to moral criticism, or that no one is 
wronged by it. We may think some acts, however, are unjustified and yet still blameless” (Jenkins, 
Robillard, and Strawser, 2018, 4). This type of moral absolutism where the revisionist foundational 
claim is that unjust wars can never be fought justly and calls on soldiers on the unjust side not to 
fight, may consider them unjust, but still blameless. This is exactly what Walzer and other casuistic 
moral theorists were getting at in recognizing that all those sent to fight are just “poor 
sods…trapped in a war they did not make” (Walzer, 2006, 36). Taking an absolutist view of Justice 
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with revisionists as the arbiters of Justice, gives them the power to ascribe moral wrongs to poor 
soldiers who fought justly in a war they were blameless for. 
 
On the issue of the moral equality of combatants, Braun (2018) and I meet halfway through 
his elevation of the historical just war method of James Turner Johnson. Braun concludes: 
“Reflecting on the moral symmetry thesis by using Johnson’s method, it turns out that, while 
revisionists are correct that there cannot be a moral equality between just and unjust combatants, 
in order to arrive at this judgement, it is not necessary to rely on artificial thought experiments” 
(350). While this author vociferously agrees with the latter point, as a traditionalist I disagree with 
the former. If ethics of war today is to remain an ethics of practical judgment, an evolving tradition 
adaptable to times and circumstances (especially technology to be explored below), then it must 
abandon the revisionist vision of eliminating the moral equality of combatants. 
  
The third and fourth points of contention are the revisionists’ individualist ontology and 
the traditionalists’ notion that war is a collective endeavor and is separate moral space from 
everyday life. While an individualist ontology has a certain appeal today with the rise of irregular, 
civil, drone, and asymmetric wars, revisionists go too far in asserting an individualist ontology for 
all wars at all times. Furthermore, as warfare is increasingly blurred and the war/non-war binary 
is broken down the separation of morality between war and peace seems increasingly difficult to 
maintain. The use of U.S. drones in areas of non-declared war zones such as Pakistan and Niger 
presented a unique dilemma for traditionalist just war thinkers. On the one hand a point of 
contestation was over whether or not geographic boundaries applied to the War on Terror, hence 
whether IHL or IHRL ought to apply to civilian casualties in these in-between zones. On the other 
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hand, although it is a worthwhile debate it seems increasingly difficult to force irregular conflicts 
into boxes of war and peace to determine which type of morality ought to apply. Hence, in times 
of peace, one cannot take out civilians to kill the bad guy even if it is proportional to the evil 
committed, whereas in times of war, some civilian casualties can be acceptable as long as they 
meet the requirements of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality. Taking an individualist 
ontology is often easier in cases of civil war or other irregular and non-governmental conflict. 
Additionally, eliminating the bifurcation of moral space between war and peace, one has a 
consistent morality across time and space that is universally applicable to any type of conflict. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of dangerous consequences that arise from such a view of 
morality. First and foremost, it holds the positionality of the revisionist researchers ideas about 
ethics to be universal and timeless, rather than contextually influenced by their subjectivities and 
experiences. Secondly, from an individualist ontology, Helen Frowe has argued that those that 
participate in the war effort outside of combat can be liable to be killed. To what extent this extends 
is unclear, though I am sure the case can be made to attack the cooks of an ‘unjust side’ to starve 
the unjust enemy under such logic. Thus, although there can be some agreement that revisionism 
aids in solving some of the contemporary dilemmas, it also puts forth dangerous precedents as to 
“who should die”. While some revisionists like McPherson (2018: 222) take a more pragmatic 
approach to contemporary dilemmas arguing that legalist jus in bello guidelines are far too 
permissive in the technological era of the War on Terror, many remain caught up in abstract 
thought experiments caught up in hypothetical calculations of probabilities of liability.  
 
My largest and most pertinent point of contention with much of revisionism is its reliance 
on abstract thought experiments to find the “deep morality” of war. War is an experiment in 
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catastrophe where uncertainty, chance, and unpredictability reign supreme. Attempting to fit the 
dilemmas of war into neat formulae to find the answers to moral questions. For example, Michael 
Robillard (2018: 102) poses the thought experiment: “Country A is currently mired in a vicious 
and bloody civil war between an unjustified, morally oppressive regime and a small group of 
morally justified insurgents. Seeing what is occurring in country A, several members of the 
international community decide to offer military aid to the insurgent group, who are significantly 
outgunned and outnumbered. Despite this offer, the insurgent group, as well as the vast majority 
of the oppressed political community for whom they fight, refuse external assistance since they 
want to win the war by themselves on their own terms.” The question is then posed: “What is the 
moral significance of allowing justified persons and/or communities to fight for themselves, even 
in cases where doing so will predictably result in greater overall harm and a lower likelihood of 
success” (Ibid). There is a lot to unpack here, Robillard is trying to tease out which is the higher 
moral obligation, consent or necessity in preventing the least overall harm. However, back here on 
planet earth, it is absolutely asinine to assume that this neat and tidy thought experiment could tell 
us anything about the messiness of war. Take for example the Nincic and Nincic (2004) article on 
paradoxes of moral authority in the case of Kosovo in the late 1990s. The first dilemma stems from 
a perceived need to protect a weak party against a stronger party in a context in which they both 
have predatory intentions toward each other, but cannot be otherwise distinguished by ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ qualities. The dilemma is rooted in the fact that the intervention may alter the balance of 
power between the two, thus simply reversing their roles – with little gain in terms of the basic 
ethical predicament the intervention was designed to address. The second dilemma is associated 
with the fact that military intervention often results in considerable damage to the life and security 
of innocent civilians, thus maring its ethical content. What Robillard misses is that first there are 
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often not clearly objectively just and unjust sides. Second, the assumption that supplying weapons 
to the smaller just side will result in less loss of life–completely unknowable until ex post facto 
rationalizations. Third, that we are morally obligated to aid the smaller side via lethal means as 
opposed to non-lethal mediation or sanctions etc. thereby framing every question in terms of war 
as opposed to peaceful means; thus, Robillard is symptomatic of the perils of just war revisionism 
and its abstraction more generally. 
          
         Revisionists set up tidy arguments from which to make logically sound and valid 
conclusions that bear no resemblance to the actual dilemmas of warfare. Second, they assume that 
one can know the outcome of their actions in the world. As the above example demonstrates, there 
are rarely clear-cut objectively moral sides of a conflict especially in insurgencies. Moreover, 
military intervention often results in substantially more loss of life as opposed to stopping the 
killing, which is Robillard’s core assumption in the thought experiment above. Take the case of 
Syria for example. The idea that there was a clearly just side to the conflict was early marred by 
the co-opting of the revolution by al Nusra and other regional interests who supplied arms and 
weapons. Even when the US decided to arm the rebels it was not enough to tip the scales of the 
conflict and exacerbated the killing. Moreover, Obama is often criticized for failing to intervene 
after a major chemical attack, which is now cited as the reason for continued killing. Yet, if our 
experiences in the past two decades in the Middle East have taught us anything is that intervention 
often leads to more death and destruction than would have occurred otherwise. We are morally 
obligated to learn from history as much as we are to ‘save strangers.’ Moreover, the notion that 
action and/or inaction in war can have predictable outcomes is a delusion of scientism that has 
infected the ethics of war via the revisionist turn to analytic philosophy. In the section that follows, 
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I put forth the Poetic Wisdom of Giambattista Vico as an antidote to the abstract moral theorizing 
of revisionism, and offer Vico to the just war tradition as an important figure worthy of our 
discussion. Although he does not engage directly in issues of war, he has important critiques of 
natural law jurists such as Vattel, Grotius, and Pufendorf that will aid us in understanding the 
epistemological and philosophical underpinnings of the modern origins of the just war tradition 
that we utilize today to limit the horrors of war.  
  
Giambattista Vico and Just War 
I now turn to the philosophy of Giambattista Vico in order to appeal to those that study ethics of 
war today, to take his notion of poetic wisdom seriously in our ethical analyses. Giambattista Vico 
was an early 18th C. Neapolitan philosopher who is known for his vociferous critique of the 
Cartesian method and constructing his New Science of humanity. He was the first to articulate 
humans as historical as opposed to part of nature paving the way for Hegel and Marx. In addition 
his philosophy sought to understand early civilizations not as ‘primitive’ but in their own linguistic, 
mythical, and poetic context as genuine attempts to understand the universe. For Vico, poetic 
wisdom is a “movement of the divine (the transcendent) descending into the human and 
conversely, of the human (the immanent) reaching for the divine. These two complementary poles, 
human free will and divine providential order, appear contradictory and mutually exclusive to 
reflective mind. They are however paradoxically related and inseparable. The particular of 
primitive mytho-poetic mind and the universal of abstracting ‘pure’ mind capable of reflecting 
upon itself may be distinguished but may not be separated” (Paparella 1993: 83). Vico shares 
Aristotle’s views that the objects of art, the characters of poetry are the individual realization of 
the universal. But there is a wide gap between the Vichian and the Aristotelian concept of 
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‘Universals’. For Aristotle the “Universal” is the fixed model, the entelechy–or soul– in whose 
image the particular thing is fashioned and toward which it tends. Vico’s “Universals” have 
nothing of this entelechical rigidity. As he repeatedly tells us, they are akin rather to the Platonic 
‘eternal ideas’ interpreted in the Neo-Platonic sense as infinite perfections, serving not as the cause 
of things but as the reason for the continued ascendance of life toward the absolute perfection of 
the Divine Intellect. In his metaphysics, Vico will describe the ‘Platonic universals’ as formless 
entities imposing no mold or patter upon a variegated, ever mobile and ever mutable nature. 
“Concrete realities, therefore, are not the pallid reflections of absolute models. They occur, instead, 
in numberless, unpredictable guises, determined by an equally numberless and unpredictable series 
of circumstances. The arts, then, whose materials consist of this very same dynamic, mutable 
matter, should avoid restricting and hampering it unduly by channeling it into rigidly fixed forms” 
(Grimaldi 1958: 70-71). Thus, although I do not believe that I can find the answers to the just war 
as the revisionists claim, I believe that by an appeal to poetic wisdom in the concrete realities of 
warfare, one can get closer to the essence of war, which is thrownness, uncertainty, and immense 
complexity. 
 
Vico’s Ideal Eternal History 
Vico’s ideal eternal history in his New Science offers a cyclical, yet highly contingent, vision of 
humanity. There are three phases of Vico’s history: the poetic age, the age of heroes, and the age 
of man. Vico’s philosophical anthropology is based on the idea that humans are essentially 
‘‘makers’’ (homo faber), that is they construct and reconstruct their own social world in order to 
master the uncertainty of life concerning birth, death and the unpredictable forces of nature (Tateo 
2015). Vico’s historical contingency has an uncertain future that cannot be determined by some 
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teleological “law” of progress. It is cyclic in the sense that there is a recurrence of periods across 
time and nations of progression and regression. Vico does not try to do what many contemporary 
just war revisionists do–predict the future based on our subjective ordering of the past–but to 
understand how men have made their history not with some concrete vision of the future but by 
their own interpretations of the timeless essence of the idea. Vico “neither invests man with 
omnipotence, nor makes him provident: for him ‘men make their history, yet...not...with will and 
consciousness’” (Luft 2003: 6). In his cyclic understanding of history there is this tendency toward 
the universal or progress, but it is crucial that he recognizes this is an epistemological construction 
of his making on the idea of the eternal or Providence. Vico does not believe that humans could 
ever come to truly encapsulate God’s mind or the idea of the eternal, but one can understand how 
Man has taken the concrete appearance of the idea toward something timeless in the synthesis of 
time and idea. Ultimately, for Vico, art, poetry, and literature tend toward this ideal more so than 
the philosopher or historian, as they capture the uncertainty of the human condition. Vico believes 
that there are three stages to history: the era of the poetic, the heroic, and the era of man. 
  
         In its simplest form, “Men first feel necessity, then look for utility, next attend to comfort, 
still later amuse themselves with pleasure, thence grow dissolute in luxury, and finally go mad and 
waste their substance” (Vico SN 241). First, man attempts to understand his place in the world 
though that which he knows best–himself. Thus, early gods are simply humans with some sort of 
higher power that rules over them. “The essential poetic activity is the generation of myth; the first 
forms of human history are, therefore, pervasively and substantively mythical. But the myth is for 
Vico no idle evocation of the dreaming spirit of man; it is the spontaneous, imaginative form under 
which man symbolizes to himself the historical processes of his culture in their universally relevant 
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features. Every existential form of the spontaneous human consciousness is, consequently, myth; 
and the interpretation of myth is the primary methodological principle of the ‘New 
Science’...Language, in its turn, is for Vico the system of signs generated for communication and 
preservation of myth” (Caponigri 1953: 8). As humans are naturally ‘‘makers’’ (poets, from the 
ancient Greek poiein, to make), they tailored on themselves a model of explanation for 
overwhelming natural phenomena: they invented the divinity. This was the first real cultural 
product, as it started to organize and regulate individual and collective conducts (e.g. we behave 
in a certain way to please or not disappoint some being up there). Vico maintains that sublime, 
imagination, and meaning-making are the foundations of humanity (Tateo, 2017, 343). However, 
I would add to Tateo’s point in that language is the primary foundation upon which meaning-
making and tending toward the divine or sublime can then be understood. Hence, “he mark of 
Vico’s new uncanny poetic humanism is the ontological or onto-genetic implications of that 
principle as realized in the New Science: the claim that verum is the made, a factum; that facta are, 
at one and the same time, the true words, deeds, things is their maker, whose ‘knowing’ is the 
hermeneutic understanding of himself as maker. In Vico’s alien humanism humans are not 
essentially subjects of knowledge but ‘poets,’ creators, ‘divine’ because, like God, they make a 
real human world with language” (Luft 2003: 4). 
  
Vico had a twenty-year struggle to grasp the “poetic” or creative nature of the first men of 
the human race, which he called the “master key” of the new science. “He characterized that 
struggle as an effort to understand the strangeness of the historical origins they depict, which 
modern readers cannot grasp” (Luft 2003, X). The strangeness and uncertainties of warfare I 
believe are applicable here. Grasping warfare and ethics within that horrific context cannot be 
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accomplished through abstract thought experiments. Instead, one path toward grappling with 
ethical ambiguity and uncertainty could be Vichian poetic wisdom. The early poetic activities of 
civilization then led to those myths to be institutionalized in the constructivist sense in the heroic 
age. The poetic wisdom of gods was brought down to the level of men, most importantly for Vico 
through Homer. From the heroic age we moved into the age of man. What is unique about Vichian 
historical ricorso or the return is that the historical truths of progress are later met with regress. 
This is not deterministic, but it comes at a time when the human mind believes it has come to 
encompass god’s mind. According to Paparella, for Vico the historical course of civilizations 
within a providential order is that reaches a point when men simply worship their own cleverness 
at which point a historical ricorso occurs. Thus, when a society at the last stage of development in 
its “barbarism of reflection” fails to heal itself by taking responsibility for its history, the Vichian 
ricorso takes place, i.e., the return to primitivism and barbarism, which restores simplicity, religion 
and poetic wisdom (SN, 1106). It is that ricorso which saves Man by preserving his humanity. 
And here lies the root of contemporary Man’s cultural malaise: in the presumptuous conviction 
that the human mind can and in fact will in the future encompass God’s mind. At that point Man 
will be a god of sorts. Vico describes the last stage of deterioration of a whole civilization: “And 
finally they go mad.” What brings about the madness is the delusion of being a god, which is 
nothing else, but the worshipping of one’s cleverness and its derivations (Paparella 2008). I assert 
that this could be a useful interpretation for understanding the god-like techno-warfare discussed 
in the next chapter, and the ethics it produces. 
  
         The third stage of history is the barbarism of intellect where “pure reason” reigns supreme 
devoid of poetic wisdom. Such a scientific rationality returns man to their true understanding of 
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itself through its more primitive knowledge of poetic wisdom. The loss of imagination and the 
over-reliance on technological innovation to solve the ethico-political dilemmas is simply an 
attempt to escape from our human condition. The technological world that we are living in has 
forgotten its connection with the imagination of the whole, a loss of the human image of itself; the 
inability of the thinker to reflect its own wholeness into the products of his own thought. This 
barbarism of thought is a kind of human experience deprived of a cultural guide or center, without 
a perspective on the human mind. As Elio Gianturco used to comment in his magisterial lectures 
on Vico at New York University (1970): we live in a Cartesian world dominated by procedures, 
efficient ordering and technological know-how as fix-all for whatever ails us. Vico tried to 
demonstrate how the poetic logic was the cornerstone for the elaboration of whole systems of 
collective knowledge (poetic economy, science, geography, history, law, etc.) that were 
crystallized in myths. He claimed that poetic logic, based on imaginative function, was a proper 
epistemological stance that was overcome by rationality at a later stage of civilization, but wasn’t 
disappearing and plays an important function in keeping alive the ethical dimensions of collective 
life against the ‘‘barbarism of reflection’’ (Tateo 2017: 338). Vico’s philosophical anthropology 
is based on the idea that humans are essentially ‘‘makers’’ (homo faber), that is they construct and 
reconstruct their own social world in order to master the uncertainty of life concerning birth, death 
and the unpredictable forces of nature (Tateo 2015a; 2017). ‘‘Human beings are not mechanically 
obeying to the laws of nature, they are rather likely to violate them, for the good or for the bad’’ 
(Tateo 2015a: 31). (Tateo 2017: 343). Tateo’s discussion of Vico therefore is “to discuss a general 
aspect of psychological experience: meaning-making is characterized by an aesthetic dimension, 
in which the cognitive, affective and ethical aspects are experienced as a totality (2017: 352). 
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Poetic Wisdom 
Let us not mistake what the purpose of poetic wisdom is. It is not a question of siding with the 
poetic wisdom of Homer against the rational wisdom of Plato, but of interpreting wisdom (and 
therefore reason too) in a new way as “sapienza poetica,” (poetical wisdom). It is a sort of 
synthesis, a novantiqua; a blending of the two to arrive at a new understanding of both image and 
idea. That is what Vico shows the reader: he works his way back to the world of original thought 
(the myth) since for him “verum factum convertuntur,” the true and the made are convertible and 
Man can return to origins via what he himself has made: history, institutions, languages, artifacts, 
etc., in fact he can do that more surely than with science observing a nature that he has not made. 
Through his discovery of the imaginative universal, of fantasia as a way of thinking and acting, 
Vico finds a new origin for philosophical thought. Heidegger calls it “originative thinking,” 
without however giving much credit to Vico for this insight, but then he did the same disservice 
to Kierkegaard’s powerful critique of Hegel’s philosophy of history. No matter if human beings 
are acting to build a work of art, to kill or to pollute nature, there is always a po(i)etic aspect, as 
far as humans are producers of meaningful actions oriented towards a future condition (Tateo, 
2017) yet to be realized. Nothing consolatory or ethic, nothing inherently good or bad in poetry, 
as it is a necessary condition of experiencing of the homo imaginatas (352). 
  
Returning to the ethics of war and what Vico’s philosophy of history and humanistic stance 
brings us. It is paradoxically the poet that may have a more accurate account of the human 
condition in warfare than the historian. Take for example Julius Caesar in his Gallic Wars; Vico 
would say that Caesar is killing history. At the time of his writing Caesar already knows too much, 
i.e. the outcome of the war. Thus, to reveal that hope and fear of not attaining victory, the 
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uncertainties of war, would have meant to present himself as less than a god. Very rarely in the 
Gallic Wars is the reader confronted by open possibilities, or the confusion and uncertainty of not 
knowing what forms the historical facts will eventually take (Paparella 1993: 59). Thus, although 
we are offered a first-hand historical account, such ex post facto accounts of history fail to capture 
the essence of war the way that poets do. Vico much admired the work of Dante, crucial to the 
formulation of the Italian vulgare language Paradoxically, Dante’s subjective mytho-poetic 
account of the human condition turns out to be more ‘historical’ than Caesar’s purportedly 
objective account of real events. The future toward which they tend, determines to a large extent 
the significance of the past. The evaluation and meaning of what is remembered gives us standards 
for the present and the future (Paparella 1993: 62). Here is where I link Vico’s thought to 
Heidegger’s thrownness, to capture what revisionism misses in holding individual soldiers to such 
a high bar. Dante unlike Caesar is far from giving a retrospective falsification in hindsight. On the 
contrary, he is masterfully recreating, as only a poet can, the very conditions of fear and anxiety 
he felt in the moment he became painfully aware of being lost on the road to perdition: 
  
Midway upon the journey of our life 
  I found myself within a forest dark, 
  For the straightforward pathway had been lost. 
  
Ah me! how hard a thing it is to say 
  What was this forest savage, rough, and stern, 
  Which in the very thought renews the fear. 
  
So bitter is it, death is little more; 
  But of the good to treat, which there I found, 
  Speak will I of the other things I saw there. 
  
I cannot well repeat how there I entered, 
  So full was I of slumber at the moment 
  In which I had abandoned the true way. 
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But after I had reached a mountain’s foot, 
  At that point where the valley terminated, 
  Which had with consternation pierced my heart, 
  
Upward I looked, and I beheld its shoulders, 
  Vested already with that planet’s rays 
  Which leadeth others right by every road. 
  
Then was the fear a little quieted 
  That in my heart’s lake had endured throughout 
  The night, which I had passed so piteously. 
  
And even as he, who, with distressful breath, 
  Forth issued from the sea upon the shore, 
  Turns to the water perilous and gazes; 
  
So did my soul, that still was fleeing onward, 
  Turn itself back to re-behold the pass 
  Which never yet a living person left. 
  
–Dante Alighieri Inferno Canto I 
  
Dante is well aware that unless he can conjure up the terror and confusion he felt at the beginning 
of his journey he will end with a fossilized historical account, which will not yield self-knowledge. 
In the end, deep contextual understanding for Vico, captured by the artist or poet can often offer a 
more fruitful historical account than historians that attempt to ‘kill history’. 
  
Let us now take that notion of uncertainty, thrownness, and paradoxes of warfare through the eyes 
of a WWII German soldier Guy Sajer fighting on the Eastern Front from his infamous memoir The 
Forgotten Soldier: 
  
“What happened next? I retain nothing from those terrible minutes except indistinct 
memories which flash into my mind with sudden brutality, like apparitions, among bursts 
and scenes and visions that are scarcely imaginable. It is difficult even to even to try to 
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remember moments during which nothing is considered, foreseen, or understood, when 
there is nothing under a steel helmet but an astonishingly empty head and a pair of eyes 
which translate nothing more than would the eyes of an animal facing mortal danger. There 
is nothing but the rhythm of explosions, more or less distant, more or less violent, and the 
cries of madmen, to be classified later, according to the outcome of the battle, as the cries 
of heroes or of murderers. And there are the cries of the wounded, of the agonizingly dying, 
shrieking as they stare at a part of their body reduced to pulp, the cries of men touched by 
the shock of battle before everybody else, who run in any and every direction, howling like 
banshees. There are the tragic, unbelievable visions, which carry from one moment of 
nausea to another: guts splattered across the rubble and sprayed from one dying man to 
another; tightly riveted machines ripped like the belly of a cow which has just been sliced 
open, flaming and groaning; trees broken into tiny fragments; gaping windows pouring out 
torrents of billowing dust, dispersing into oblivion all that remains of a comfortable 
parlor...” 
 
 
Not only does the poet-soldier more accurately capture the paradox of war and the terror in which 
“nothing is considered”, complied of “indistinct memories”, of the “agonizingly dying.” Moreover, 
Sajer directly targets the notion of objectivity of the “just warrior” of the revisionists: “the cries of 
madmen, to be classified later, according to the outcome of the battle, as the cries of heroes or of 
murderers.” Additionally, Sajer recognizes the malleability of history in that all the bloodletting 
and terror is later classified as just and unjust warriors–heroes or murderers–when in the end it is 
simply guts, death, and industrial slaughter. This poetic wisdom of the poet-soldier does what the 
revisionists cannot with abstract theorizing and their god-like stance as the ultimate arbiters of 
Justice.   
 
 The revisionist individualist ontology necessitates that individual soldiers ought to lay 
down their arms if they are fighting in an unjust war, failing to recognize that such a high bar for 
‘poor sods’ stuck in the mud in complex situations is too much to ask. Because of their abstract 
theorizing and consistent moral demands whether in times or war or times of peace, individuals 
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must be privy to who is liable to be killed in what situation through advanced trolley problems. 
What this misses and poetic wisdom offers is that the stories we tell ourselves about war mislead 
us about who is doing the fighting. Out of their normal everyday lives, soldiers are thrown into 
these horrific situations and think that they will act like the heroes in the movies, but are really just 
frightened children in many cases. Kurt Vonnegut in Slaughterhouse Five is able to capture this in 
an exchange between the main character Billy Pilgrim and Mary in a discussion of how Billy will 
write his WWII memoir: 
  
“You were just babies then!”, she said. 
"What?" I said. 
"You were just babies in the war - like the ones upstairs!" 
I nodded that this was true. We had been foolish virgins in the war, right at the end of childhood. 
"But you're not going to write it that way, are you." This wasn't a question. It was an accusation. 
"I-I don't know", I said. 
"Well, I know," she said. "You'll pretend you were men instead of babies, and you'll be played in 
the movies by Frank Sinatra and John Wayne or some of those other glamorous, war-loving, dirty 
old men. And war will look just wonderful, so we'll have a lot more of them. And they'll be fought 
by babies like the babies upstairs." 
  
So then I understood. It was war that made her so angry. She didn't want her babies or anybody 
else's babies killed in wars. And she thought wars were partly encouraged by books and movies. 
  
So I held up my right hand and I made her a promise: "Mary," I said, "I don't think this book of 
mine will ever be finished. I must have written five thousand pages by now, and thrown them all 
away. If I ever do finish it, though, I give you my word of honor: there won't be a part for Frank 
Sinatra or John Wayne. 
"I tell you what," I said, "I'll call it 'The Children's Crusade.'" 
She was my friend after that.” 
  
Not only does this quote exemplify that abstract morality obfuscates who we are asking to make 
these complex moral decisions, about whether a particular war is just, let alone whether they are 
fighting it justly. Perhaps most importantly, it highlights the point of contention of war as a 
collective endeavor of traditionalists, which they often assert but rarely defend. 
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 The poetic wisdom of Giambattista Vico can aid traditionalists in making the claim that 
war is indeed a collective endeavor that must take political, social, and cultural context into 
account, instead of revisionist hermetically sealed method of logic. The poem below captures a 
paradox of being human in warfare and how the home front and warfront are intimately connected. 
 
The Deserter 
By: Winifred M. Letts 
  
There was a man, – don't mind his name, 
Whom Fear had dogged by night and day. 
He could not face the German guns 
And so he turned and ran away. 
Just that – he turned and ran away, 
But who can judge him, you or I? 
God makes a man of flesh and blood 
Who yearns to live and not to die. 
And this man when he feared to die 
Was scared as any frightened child, 
His knees were shaking under him, 
His breath came fast, his eyes were wild. 
I’ve seen a hare with eyes as wild, 
With throbbing heart and sobbing breath. 
But oh! it shames one’s soul to see 
A man in abject fear of death. 
But fear had gripped him, so had death; 
His number had gone up that day, 
They might not heed his frightened eyes, 
They shot him when the dawn was grey. 
Blindfolded, when the dawn was grey, 
He stood there in a place apart, 
The shots rang out and down he fell, 
An English bullet in his heart. 
An English bullet in his heart! 
But here’s the irony of life, – 
His mother thinks he fought and fell 
A hero, foremost in strife. 
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So she goes proudly; to the strife 
Her best, her hero son she gave 
O well for her she does not know 
He lies in a deserter’s grave. 
 
The poet on the home front captures an essence of the collective nature of warfare that many just 
war thinkers have neglected. How we construct stories about war of heroism to make losing loved 
ones palatable, neglecting that whether one died by a British or German bullet in WWI, the end 
result was death. Fear, anguish, anxiety, horror and death. If the goal for all just war scholars (be 
they revisionist or traditionalist) is to reduce the horrors of warfare, one must think of what is more 
apt to move the ethical needle in the right direction; sound logic, or poetic wisdom. 
 
Vico is primarily concerned in his early works that the arts of eloquence, rhetoric, and 
humanistic education more generally under attack from an abstract individualism, that reduces the 
incertitudes of “nature and life” to Truth principles with mathematical certitude (Vico 1990): 15. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to the horrors of warfare and all that it unleashes in contemporary 
times as well as in the 20th Century, appeals to law, justice, and right are drowned out by a patriotic 
fervor. In WWI the language of the anti-war movement was more often poetry, whereas today it it 
is appeals to international or domestic law to try to constrain the dogs of war. However, general 
appeals to law may be successful in academic circles, may fall upon deaf ears in the general public, 
thus poetry may capture the essence of the argument that moves the soul more so than legalistic 
appeals. As Vico noted, “it often happens that people unmoved by forceful and compelling reasons 
can be jolted from their apathy, and made to change their minds by means of some trifling line of 
argument” the orator must recognize the relationship between speaker and listeners to touch “all 
the soul-strings of his listeners” in argumentation. (Vico 1990: 15).  
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  Scholars claim that Vico has constructed a science of humanity, a science of imagination, 
and an uncanny poetic humanism. “The mark of Vico’s new uncanny poetic humanism is the 
ontological or onto-genetic implications of that principle as realized in the New Science: the claim 
that verum is the made, a factum; that facta are, at one and the same time, the true words, deeds, 
things is their maker, whose ‘knowing’ is the hermeneutic understanding of himself as maker. In 
Vico’s alien humanism humans are not essentially subjects of knowledge but ‘poets,’ creators, 
‘divine’ because, like God, they make a real human world with language” (Luft 2003: 4). Vico’s 
lifelong concern is with “poetic wisdom” and with establishing a “science of language”. His 
cardinal principle is similar to Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s: ‘minds’ are formed by language, 
not language by ‘mind.’ ‘The human mind,’ [Vico] writes ‘is naturally inclined by the senses to 
see itself externally to the body, and only with great difficulty does it come to understand itself by 
means of reflection. (Edie 1969: 488). Therefore in order to understand the nature of language, 
one does not try to penetrate to the thought which Descartes assumed standing behind language. 
Rather, as Buber puts it: one “takes a stand in speech and talks from there.” the encounter with any 
of man’s works especially those done through language, remains intrinsically historical. The link 
of language to history is ‘poetic wisdom’ proper, transcending the dichotomy subject/object. The 
Cartesian objectivity, on the other hand reduces a ‘work’ to a mere ‘object’ when such an operation 
is performed, the language event cannot possible seize and transform the reader...Consequently 
the encounter with the being of a work of art or a text cannot be Cartesian i.e., static and ideational, 
outside of time (Paparella 1993: 73). 
   
  In the end, argue that the philosophy of Giambattista Vico elaborates the position taken by 
those such as Chris Brown in understanding practical judgment in contrast to abstract, universal 
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and timeless answers. The point is that, in dealing with complex situations, such as deciding 
whether it is right that one state should preventively use force against another, or against 
“terrorists” operating within the space between war and peace, “there is no substitute for a form of 
moral reasoning that involves a judgement that takes into account the totality of circumstances, 
rather than seeks for a rule to apply” (Brown 2010: 245). Rule-based moral logic has been 
pervasive in contemporary moral logic, especially in warfare. Applying the Kantian categorical 
imperative or making utilitarian calculations necessarily involves prudential judgment, especially 
in the context of the uncertainty of war. Applying the “rule” may make decision-makers feel good 
as they absolve themselves of moral responsibility because they followed the rule; yet, I assert this 
fails to capture the ethico-political dilemmas of today.  
 
Artificial Intelligence and Just War Tomorrow 
How must war ethics evolve and adapt to the technological changes of an illusory ‘clean war’ of 
precision in lethal autonomous weapons systems? There is indeed a space of moral vacuums that 
opens up as technology reshapes our capacity to think ethically. As (Schwarz 2018: 293) notes, 
“A moral vacuum opens when certain parameters of harm are no one’s responsibility; when the 
decision that harm is permissible has been determined through technological means. This moment 
is, paradoxically, also the very moment of moral responsibility. In other words, the moral vacuum 
exists exactly in the moment when neither law nor existing moral guides have adequate reach. It 
is in this moment where responsibility resides.” What I believe the poetic wisdom of Vico brings 
to this, is a pause. A time and space for eloquent reflection of the human consequences of war 
away from abstractions. The Silicon Valley model of move fast and break things, risks embedding 
problematic algorithmic technologies that ‘objectively’ calculate the weight and balance of human 
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life. Practical judgment requires concrete circumstances of specific cases in order to tease out the 
moralities of war, while not attempting to escape the tragedy of the human condition. As (Schwarz 
2018: 294) aptly argues, the “idea of ethics-as-science is highly contested”, yet there is a race to 
program the laws of war and their rule based moral logics into killer robots. 
 
Of course, there is no question that compared to the barbarism of past conflicts; 
proportionality is not comparable across historical eras (Brunstetter & Braun 2013: 309). In an 
incisive criticism of the technology argument, Henry Shue (2008: 187) notes the danger of pegging 
proportionality to casualty levels observed during the Second World War, when, it should be 
remembered, the Allies intentionally targeted civilian populations in the hopes of weakening 
German morale. Such an arbitrary benchmark is an unconscionably low bar based on what may 
well be a historic nadir for warfare. Thus, the appeals to technological superiority by those doing 
the killing seeks to relegate questions of ethics to the level of technology used to kill as opposed 
to confronting the just war dilemmas of war in the technological era. Giambattista Vico intuited 
that in the kind of technological world we are living in little room is left for works of humanistic 
imagination (e.g., literature, the arts, history, philosophy, and ethics); i.e. the very modes of 
thought and sentiment through which Man may attempt to understand himself. It is this inability 
to associate humanistic thought with truth that lies at the root of contemporary technocratic 
mentality and its sheer failure to provide a unifying vision of the whole of human knowledge. The 
worth of an individual will not be conceived as intrinsic to his humanity any longer but as related 
to his contribution to an effective, efficient part of a social scheme. Any sort of transcendence over 
the social system, any inwardness and creativity are not only not appreciated but more often than 
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not they are discouraged. The individual is seen as a mere cog in the system: a producing and 
consuming machine devoid of any inwardness (Paparella 2008). 
 
What we risk in just war revisionism and technologically innovative ways of killing is that 
we lose sight of human suffering in abstraction. The science of warfare is illusory and the only 
truism of war is that uncertainty and unpredictability reigns supreme. While this can be minimized 
it can never be eliminated; nor can it be pre-programmed. Poetic wisdom highlights this 
uncertainty in our moral theorizing and stands against hubristic algorithms to solve complex 
ethico-political dilemmas. It calls upon just war traditionalists to creatively integrate dilemmas of 
the homefront if war is truly a collective endeavor and not simply reductive individualism. The 
simplification of the ethics of war may lead to logical answers, but those will not survive the wars 
of tomorrow in all their complexity. In the end, Dostoyevsky cautions us all that technology cannot 
resolve the tragedy of killing in war. We are playing God in our moral theorizing and technological 
innovation of more efficient ways of killing, while deeming ourselves the moral arbiters of “who 
should die”.  Ultimately, “I think if the devil doesn't exist, but man has created him, he has created 
him in his own image and likeness.”  
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Chapter 3 
 
The Cold War Game: Certainty, Ethics, and 
 Technostrategic Discourse in the Nuclear Era 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I begin this chapter on ethics of war and the Cold War with a central puzzle: how did defense 
intellectuals come to casually toss around “rational” theories of deterrence that included the deaths 
of tens of millions in nuclear exchanges without finding it morally abhorrent? In a phrase borrowed 
from Carol Cohn’s (1987) classic work, how did “technostrategic language”, which “reflects and 
shapes the nature of the American nuclear strategic project, [such] that it plays a central role in 
allowing defense intellectuals to think and act as they do”, come to divorce war from its human 
consequences in the nuclear ear (Cohn 1987: 690)? Such a casual discussion of the mass slaughter 
of other human beings was not innate in the defense intellectual community, but was gradually 
adopted as it coincided with the rise of game theory and systems analysis at the RAND Corporation 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Through utilization of the RAND archives in Santa Monica, CA, 
I was able to gain insight of the contestation between the Social Sciences Division and the 
Mathematics Division over how best the theorize about a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and 
USSR. The individuals who came to be known as America’s “wizards of Armageddon” or the 
cohort of “thermonuclear Jesuits” were able to divorce the horrors of being incinerated alive or 
dying a painful death from radiation exposure from their logically sound, deductive arguments of 
mutually assured destruction and of thermonuclear warfare. 
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The Cold War Game (CoW) was designed and implemented by the mathematics and 
economics division in an attempt to incorporate politics and economics into traditional wargaming 
with the backdrop of escalating tensions between the US and USSR. Integrating more complex 
factors traditional war games exercises was no easy task; and its creators wanted to play with a 
high degree of “political realism” to avoid simplifying the world as much as possible. The game 
took place in four iterations over the period from November 1954 and April 1956. The deep 
contextual understanding of this process and the defense intellectuals at RAND Corporation and 
the proliferation of similar to the Department of Defense offers a window into the psyche of how 
nuclear exchanges with the possibility of nuclear annihilation could be viewed as “rational”. Thus, 
the technostrategic language itself, accompanied by a more “scientific” way of warfare with 
advancing computing power the the utilization of economic and game theoretic modeling, 
reshaped the capacity of defense intellectuals to think ethically. Hence, “technostrategic discourse 
functions more as a gloss, as an ideological curtain behind which the actual reasons for these 
decisions hide. That rather than informing and shaping decisions, it far more often functions as a 
legitimation for political outcomes that have occurred for utterly different reason” (Cohn 1987: 
716). Ultimately, the archival method of this chapter allowed me to explore the intentions and 
contentions of game play between these early defense intellectuals. Such insights, often surprised 
me as many had more tempered worldviews than I would have imagined, while others remained 
blinded by their focus on the efficient organizing of warfare. 
 
The method of this chapter is borrowed from Hugh Gusterson’s (1996) ethnographic work 
at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory–central to Cold War nuclear warhead and missile 
development–where he sought to understand their practices in order to analyze politics and power 
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during the late Cold War period. Furthermore, I integrate the emerging study of micropolitics in 
International Relations, to examine the everyday of these defense intellectuals at the site of the 
RAND Corporation in order to understand how new weapons technologies may “shape our 
capacity to think ethically” (Schwarz 2016). Concurrently, the turn to micropolitics, offers IR 
scholars more fine-tuned lenses that “reveal sites that promise to reshape how we view global 
politics and our place in it” (Steele and Solomon 2017: 269). With this micropolitical turn, I 
utilized the RAND archives, to gain insight into the goals, motivations, intentions, psychology, 
and contestation of early nuclear war theorizing that made Carol Cohn’s world of the defense 
intellectual a troubling, yet seductive, hyper-masculine arena devoid of ethical consideration.  
Hence, this turn encompasses three contemporary agendas in IR theorizing: “practices, emotions 
and the everyday” (Steele and Solomon 2017: 268). What were the everyday lived realities of these 
defense intellectuals? How might we understand the space of the politico-military wargame as a 
space of contestation of ideas, values, and ethics? And how did the context of the threat of nuclear 
war affect them personally and their research?  
 
In the study that follows, I aim to examine the “production and contestation of power, 
knowledge, and belief at the local level in order to understand national and global political 
processes” (Gusterson 1996: 5). I do this within the context of a recent revival in studying Cold 
War defense intellectuals. Both Daniel Bessner (2018) Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the 
Rise of the Defense Intellectual and Ron Robin (2016) The Cold War They Made: The Strategic 
Legacy of Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter attempt to contextualize the intellectual history and 
legacy of these famous RAND analysts. Robin offers a sort of biographical process-tracing of the 
Wohlstetters’ intellectual legacy as it played out in policy of the George W. Bush administration 
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via the students of Albert in Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad and Richard Perle. In contrast,  I 
aim to understand the “production of ideology rather than the production of policy per se”, and 
thus utilize Clifford Geertz’s lens of cultural analysis of a “continual dialectal tacking between the 
most local of local details and the most global of global structure in such a way as to bring them 
into simultaneous view” (Gusterson 1996: 6). Thus, the method of “thick description” fits within 
my wider epistemological and philosophical assumptions of ethics in modernity and the turn to 
early-modern thought in Giambattista Vico that privileges the local, contextual, temporally bound, 
and rhetorical as opposed to the universal and timeless principles. According to Stephen Toulmin 
(1992, 43) Geertz’s “thick description” reintroduces ways of describing human culture implicit in 
Book VI of Aristotle’s Ethics, which I believe ultimately is one way to understand ethics in the 
technological era as discussed in previous chapters. 
 
The CoW linked political, economic, and military problems, recognizing that strategy in 
the Cold War was “neither military nor political, but as being inextricably compounded of military 
and political actions”.3 Hence, the creation of this politico-military game sought to reflect the 
dilemmas of deterrence in the Cold War setting. The predominant name of the game at RAND in 
the early 1950s was systems analysis and game theory, which sought to quantify the uncertainties 
of warfare. From issues as simple as where best to locate military bases for Air Force refueling, to 
as complex as missile trajectory and nuclear exchange. Where Bessner’s study of Hans Speier is 
most enlightening is his emphasis on social science as opposed to reducing all the complexities of 
human behavior into threat matrices for game theoreticians to explore. In the forum on Bressner’s 
book, Robert Jervis noted: “Perhaps most interesting were Speier’s efforts at RAND to 
                                               
3 Goldhamer, Herbert (1957) “Introductory Remarks For Cold War Session: Notes for a Briefing to Board 
of Trustees, May 2, 1957” RAND Corporation Archives. Goldhamer Box 006, p. 7. 
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counterbalance the strong role of the physicists and economists by insisting that analyses that 
lacked any consideration of culture, psychology, and individual decision-making were at best 
incomplete and usually misleading. He then developed games that relied more on role-playing than 
algorithms, and these became popular in Washington and still are in wide use.”4 However, Speier’s 
policy influence, according to James Davis, was limited to “U.S. psychological strategy and tactics 
against the Soviet Union (not available to the general public) and the U.S. psychological warfare 
effort against the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the first half of 1953, which helped spur 
the failed East German uprising of June.”5 This was exemplified by Speier’s essay entitled “The 
Future of Psychological Warfare” published in the academic journal Public Opinion Quarterly. In 
the end, the CoW was short-lived at RAND as it was time consuming and more algorithmic and 
computerized war games came to the forefront. 
 
The Cold War Game 
“They were rational analysts, and they would attempt to impose a rational order on something that 
many thought inherently irrational–nuclear war. They would invent a whole new language and 
vocabulary in their quest for rationality, and would thus condition an entire generation of political 
and military leaders to think about the bomb the way that the intellectual leaders of RAND thought 
about it.” (Kaplan 1991: 10-11). Four total iterations of the Cold War Game (CoW) were played 
at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA beginning with the November 29 to December 10, 
1954 game, followed by a February 1955 iteration, then transferring to RAND’s Washington DC 
                                               
4 Jervis, Robert (2018) “Roundtable 10-18 on Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the 
Defense Intellectual.” International Security Studies Forum. 26 November 2018. Available at: 
https://issforum.org/roundtables/10-18-speier. 
5 Davis, James W. (2018) “Roundtable 10-18 on Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the 
Defense Intellectual.” International Security Studies Forum. 26 November 2018. Available at: 
https://issforum.org/roundtables/10-18-speier. 
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branch commencing in May 1955 with the final game being played in April 1956. The game was 
not a traditional war-game as it sought a high level of political realism by avoiding “a variety of 
simplifying assumptions and special restrictions” of most gaming procedures.6 Although primarily 
conceptualized by Herbert Goldhamer, the CoW must be understood as a result of Hans Speier’s 
collaboration with John D. Williams. The game accomplished two things simultaneously. “On the 
books the game was a research tool intended to help the mathematicians working for Williams 
quantify and calculate emotional, or ‘non-rational,’ states. In addition, The Cold War Game was a 
natural step in furthering Speier’s interests in psychological warfare. The game was intended to 
help understand the psychological aspects of players so that the RAND Corporation, the military, 
or other sovereign interests could anticipate and react efficiently to future military conflicts. This 
dual purpose of the game was crucial, it is important to recognize the ways that propaganda and 
psychology were used as techniques of warfare alongside the quantitative and supposedly rational 
analytics of game theory.”7 
 
In order to account for the uncertainties and unpredictable consequences that normally 
inculcate war games, Goldhamer conceptualized the “committee on nature”. This committee 
would introduce “independent” elements to the game not introduced by the governments or 
players; in essence, “side events” resulting from players’ actions, setting off additional 
consequences that may be unforeseen if focusing too closely on strategy. The “Nature Committee 
thus performs a vital function since without it reality would be reduced to government initiated 
                                               
6 Goldhamer, Herbert (1954) “Toward a Cold War Game.” RAND Corporation Archives D(L)2603, p. 1. 
7 Trammel, Aaron. “The Ludic Imagination: The History of Role-Playing Games, Politics, and Simulation, 
in Cold War America 1954-1984. PhD Diss. Graduate School-New Brunswick Rutgers, The State 
University of New Jersey, 2015. 
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action.”8 The use of nature along with referees would definitely make the game more time-
consuming, but allowing players a less simplified game  would “permit the participants to learn 
something about the consequences of certain types of actions taken in conjunction with a variety 
of events.”9 The game was ultimately slow by design to allow space for debate and discussion, to 
push back against nature or the referees, to find the right questions in thinking through complex 
dilemmas of the Cold War setting. Thus, Goldhamer’s initial vision for the CoW was that “[t]he 
aim is not to move on rapidly from point to point of the game but to clarify by discussion the 
intellectual issues raised in the course of the play. It is precisely through such discussion that many 
of the most fruitful results may become available.”10 The sessions were sound recorded and filmed, 
in order to emphasize: “The need to make ‘intuitive’ decisions on many concrete political matters 
and to defend them should stimulate the formulation of more coherent and rigorous propositions 
about those aspects of political life involved in cold war activity.”11 Thus, Goldhamer envisioned 
it as an intellectual exercise and not “the development of a game useful for testing cold war 
strategies in an effective and relatively speedy manner.”12 
 
Goldhamer and Paul Kecskemeti were responsible for the cross-hybridization of games 
and social psychology at the RAND Corporation. They were chiefly affiliated with a set of 
experiments that ran under the broad moniker of political gaming, which unlike the majority of 
wargaming that occurred at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and 1960s, focused specifically 
on the intersection between games and the non-rational and social dimensions of decision-making. 
                                               
8 Goldhamer, Herbert (1954) “Toward a Cold War Game.” RAND Corporation Archives D(L)2603, p. 4. 
9 Goldhamer, Herbert (1954) “Toward a Cold War Game.” RAND Corporation Archives D(L)2603, p. 6. 
10 Goldhamer, Herbert (1954) “Toward a Cold War Game.” RAND Corporation Archives D(L)2603, p. 7. 
11 Goldhamer, Herbert (1954) “Toward a Cold War Game.” RAND Corporation Archives D(L)2603, p. 8. 
12 Goldhamer, Herbert (1954) “Toward a Cold War Game.” RAND Corporation Archives D(L)2603, p. 9. 
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Players would be analyzed not only on the logistical insights gleaned through these exercises, but 
also by their psychological outlook. Although these political games were able to help their 
participants developed knowledge, the role-playing techniques these games used failed to provide 
the scientists at RAND useful quantitative metrics. However, that was never the initial goal of this 
particular game, it was one of the crucial elements that led to its eventual downfall.  
 
The CoW quickly moved from intellectual exercise to broader applications and 
implications, even if it was met with skepticism. The game was developed by the mathematical 
analytics department (MAD) and played in the systems research laboratory (SRL) in order to 
“explore the possibilities of developing a new research tool in political science by applying war-
games techniques to international politics.”13 From an exercise to developing “model situation that 
simulated the real situation as closely as possible with various analogues, in which players would 
make strategic decisions, SRL and MAD hoped that the game could be developed to the point 
where it could be used as a testing device for real cold-war strategies.”14 Perhaps much of this 
stems from Kecskemeti’s understanding of positivist social science is indicative of the role of 
gaming in understanding the Cold War: “A human activity is ‘analyzable’ if it can be broken down 
into a limited of isolable ultimate elements or building blocks, consisting, for example, in the 
proper use of certain instruments producing foreseeable effects under circumstances that can be 
anticipated. Military activities are ‘analyzable’ in this sense.”15 Thus, the prospect of analyzing 
                                               
13 Digby Box 008–COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, The Cold War Game–A Formal Definition [DRAFT], 
RAND Corporation Archives, p. 1. 
14 Digby Box 008–COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, The Cold War Game–A Formal Definition [DRAFT], 
RAND Corporation Archives, p. 1. 
15 Kecskemeti, Paul (1955) “War Games and Political Games” RAND Corporation Archives D-2849. p. 4.  
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military activity boiled down to the understanding of elementary assumptions and their anticipated 
effects, which can then be predicted in advanced gaming exercises. 
  
The internal dynamics and contestation between mathematics and social sciences was 
present from the establishment of the social sciences division at RAND. In early 1947 Olaf Helmer 
of the RAND mathematics division, thought that RAND might be too limited in its outlook. 
“Military problems, after all, were not just engineering or mathematical or physics problems; they 
involved questions that might better be investigated by economists or political scientists as well” 
(Kaplan 1991: 62). So John Williams head of RAND’s math division set of to persuade Frank 
Collbohm that RAND needed two new divisions one in economics and the other in social science 
(Kaplan 1991: 63). By the early 1950s John Williams was quite disappointed with the newly 
created Social Sciences division. He privately referred to Hans Speier, the division director, as 
“that Prussian staff officer” and thought that Speier was running the place as a base from which 
hires could research their doctoral dissertations (Kaplan 1991: 76). With this backdrop, the CoW 
was to commence with little input from the social sciences as the mathematics and economics 
divisions incorporated political and economic factors into traditional wargaming at the exclusion 
of the actual social scientists. 
 
The opening remarks of the CoW by Olaf Helmer at RAND’s Washington DC branch 
following initial iterations at Santa Monica, framed the CoW somewhat differently, identifying the 
overall goals, purposes, and objectives of the application of war gaming to international relations. 
“The general purpose of the cold-war project is to explore the possibilities of developing a new 
research tool in the field of political science, by applying war-gaming techniques to the realm of 
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international politics.”16 “War-gaming is so intimately associated with the construction of 
mathematical models and the creation of behavioral simulation that the structure of our subject in 
fact specifically calls for the talents of a mathematical analyst and an experimental psychologist.”17 
Beyond the initial proposal by Goldhamer to be a sort of thought experiment, the game evolved 
into developing mathematical modeling for international relations. Because in the case of nuclear 
exchange, everything had to be theoretical as there had never been an actual nuclear war. Helmer 
noted: “Whenever we are war-gaming, some aspect of military warfare, we are doing so as a 
substitute for experimentation. Actual experimentation, which would involve for instance, the 
dropping of bombs on armies and factories, is of course impossible, so we set up a model situation 
which, by way of numerous analogues, simulates the real situation as closely as possible.”18 Thus, 
the epistemological assumptions of many of the mathematics and systems analysts at RAND began 
to pervade the game; namely, a belief that scientific prediction of the cold war and a nuclear war 
was desirable, and indeed, possible. 
 
 As I have discussed in previous chapters on Vico and interpretive methods, attempts to 
predict the social world generally, and warfare specifically are where chance reigns supreme and 
prediction is illusory. Nevertheless, the morphing CoW attempted to do just that believing that 
purely hypothetical simulations could model reality. “Our eventual aim, therefore, should be to 
create a cold-war game with sufficiently adequate devices of simulation, so that the game could 
                                               
16 Digby Box 008– COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, “Helmer’s Speech” [DRAFT]. RAND Corporation 
Archives, p. 1. 
17 Digby Box 008– COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, “Helmer’s Speech” [DRAFT]. RAND Corporation 
Archives, p. 1. 
18 Digby Box 008– COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, “Helmer’s Speech” [DRAFT]. RAND Corporation 
Archives, p. 1. 
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be used as a testing device for cold-war strategies.”19 What that looked like in practice throughout 
the game was something like this: “if the player responsible let us say, for the U.S. in the game 
were to follow a prescribed overall strategy and if the other players by their actions simulated as 
closely as possible the reactions of other countries, the outcome of the game should be usable to 
predict the consequences of U.S. strategy under consideration.”20 Prediction and the scientific 
study of international politics in the Cold War came to be like any other mathematical or economic 
problem, an advanced formula to be solved through deep thinking of bright minds. What role then 
did chance and contingency have in such endeavors? Helmer noted, “If chance events are likely to 
influence the outcome, the game might have to be played several times, with the appropriate use 
of a chance device, in order to predict a probability distribution for the consequences of the strategy 
in question.”21 Chance was something that could be measured, accounted for, and ultimately 
minimized with enough iterations. This logic present in early 1950s wargaming has become 
amplified today in the contemporary era of artificial intelligence. Because it is no longer a handful 
of iterations in order to determine probabilities of outcomes (explored in chapter four). Instead it 
is machine learning that can play millions of iterations and quantum computing that makes war 
more scientific and predictable, forgetting that the same mathematical assumptions that were 
written into this early systems analysis are also written into the algorithmic code today.   
 
 
 
                                               
19 Digby Box 008– COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, “Helmer’s Speech” [DRAFT]. RAND Corporation 
Archives, p. 2. 
20 Digby Box 008– COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, “Helmer’s Speech” [DRAFT]. RAND Corporation 
Archives, p. 2. 
21 Digby Box 008– COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, “Helmer’s Speech” [DRAFT]. RAND Corporation 
Archives, pp. 2-3. 
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Rules of the Game 
(Prepared by Andrew M. Marshall and Paul Kecskemeti)22 
A. General 
1. The personnel of the game consists of “governmental” players who make political moves, 
“nature” players who supply information about relevant events not under the control of 
governmental players, and referees who act as coordinators of moves and of information and 
who control the game from the of information and who control the game from the point of view 
of feasibility of moves. 
2. The play starts from the situation as it exists at the moment of playing. The participants are 
supposed to be familiar with this situation. Events happening in the world during the playing of 
the game may be incorporated in the plays they happen or disregarded at the referee’s discretion. 
3. In the cold-war, the sequence in which moves are made has a certain influence upon the 
behavior of the players, in that the player who has the first move thereby seizes the initiative, 
forcing the others to react. This gives two variants of the game from the U.S. point of view: one 
in which the U.S. at first has the initiative and the main opponent (the S.U.) “reacts,” and another 
in which the U.S. “reacts” to an initiative taken by the S.U. Either variant may be played. In the 
course of the game, the player who at first plays a reactive or defensive role may regain the 
initiative. 
4. The governmental players represent the top executive of their countries. Hence, they can do 
only those things which the executive they represent is free to do under the prevailing decision- 
making pattern. Moves that disregard the constraints (mainly legal limitations) under which an 
executive has to operate have to be considered “infeasible,” within the limits of these constraints, 
                                               
22 Goldhamer, Herbert. (1955) “Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division.” D-
2850. RAND Corporation Archives, p 23a-e. 
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moves may be optimally reasonable or fall short of optimal reasonableness. In the actual world, 
decision-makers may fail to achieve optimal reasonableness because of human failings or 
deficiencies. In the game, the governmental players may act either as they think an optimally 
intelligent executive would act, or as they think the executive is most likely to act. The first 
variant permits the players to develop and study optimal strategies; the second may serve to 
explore the most likely course that events would take under given conditions. 
5. An alternative cold-war game may be played with the first move located at some point in the 
future. The following rules can also serve for the purposes of such a more “speculative” game 
with some modifications, e.g., as regards the formulation at the initial conditions from which the 
play starts. 
 
B. Rules 
1. Moves are made in written form and submitted to the referee. They describe governmental 
decisions or actions (in the case or governmental players), or other relevant facts (in the case of 
nature players). All moves are submitted with their date specified.    
2. The player making a move may submit together with it a report giving the reasons he had for 
making the move, as well as spelling out his expectations concerning the consequences resulting 
from it. The referee may instruct any player to furnish such a report. 
3. The player will announce, in making his move, his decisions as to who will be given and 
denied information about the move and its motivation. The referee may overrule the player's 
decisions about the pattern of access to information. He may also indicate changes in this pattern 
of access as they emerge in the course of time. 
4. After each move, the referee will evaluate it for feasibility (consistency with existing 
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constraints). This point may be argued between the referee and the player. Moves involving 
details deemed infeasible will be amended accordingly, or the player may pass. Only moves 
judged feasible will be recorded. (Statements of motives and expectations are also subject to 
such critique.) 
5. Both the referee and the players may call conferences to discuss moves by the players and 
decisions by the referees. Several players may also consult informally among themselves 
regarding moves. Consultations purporting to represent intergovernmental conferences, however, 
have to be handled as moves within the game. 
6. The game starts by the referees selecting a governmental player who makes the first move.  
7. After the first move is recorded, the referee sets a period of time for a round of follow-up 
moves by the other players. 
8. After this, the other players will either pass, or indicate their desire to make a move. 
9. The referee may request the players who intend to pass to show cause for this decision, and 
discuss with them possible factors in the situation that may induce them to change their minds. 
10. The players who propose to make a move inform the referee orally about the general nature 
of the move they intend to make as well as its anticipated date. 
11. The referee decides on the basis of this preliminary information which player will make the 
second move at which date (Dates anticipated for a may be changed by the referee on grounds of 
infeasibility.) 
12. The procedure followed in designating the player who will make the third move is the same 
as under Rules 7 to 11, until all players who applied for moving within the round have done so. 
When a round of moves is ended, the referee selects the player who will open the second round 
of moves, sets the date for the opening move, and so on for the subsequent rounds. 
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13. The “nature” players participate in the move following the opening move on the same footing 
as do the governmental players. 
14. After the sequel following from a move has been played through, the referee may decide to 
revert to the time when that move was made and initiate a new sequence on the basis of a 
different move or a different set of immediate consequences. 
15. As the game proceeds, the referee will consult with the players as to the time at which they 
intend to terminate it, and he will declare the game ended if and when a consensus among the 
players is reached regarding this. In the absence of such a consensus, the referee may end the 
game at any time. 
16. After the game is terminated, the participants will discuss the various moves and evaluate the 
strategies followed by the various players. 
 
 I hope that these rules are straightforward enough to tackle the initial understanding of the 
game, but some concrete examples are in order to elucidate how play took place. Although there 
are sound recordings and films of gameplay, they have yet to be digitized and there is no 
mechanism to play such early film and sound recordings available for reference purposes. 
Attempting to incorporate political and economic aspects of warfare required expending 
resources–food, oil, trade, shipments of goods–and political moves such as sabotage, new 
distributions of political power etc. For example, one handwritten political move of a communist 
state allied toward the Soviet Union: “You are aware of my problems. I hope to remain functionally 
independent of my mistrusted former masters, the Anglo-American imperialists, but my gross 
material needs may drive me toward them. Can you aid me? I especially need food for the coming 
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year and the means of capital expansion”23 Thus, one can see how political complications and 
alliances might play out and how allocations of resources especially with the committee on nature 
that could implement something all too common like a drought or low yield crop production. 
However, the moves within particular games are more unknown as the limits of the archive are 
endless forms of moves without the audio-visual context to understand those moves. But what is 
important for this study is understanding the epistemological assumptions that went into its 
creation, the space of contestation between various disciplines, and the production of ideology that 
has family resemblances today explored in chapter four. What I do have access to however, are 
the internal reports, descriptions of the game, and most relevantly the reactions to the game itself. 
  
Reactions to the Game 
Modeling simulations of nuclear exchanges and incorporating political factors was no easy task. 
As economic and political moves within the game were highly limited in what one could do and 
did not allow for thinking outside the box. In Olaf Helmer’s letter to John D. Williams, taking 
stock of the reactions to the CoW, the Social Sciences division was particularly critical. “[C]ritics 
from the Social Sciences Division, which was in no way involved in the preparation of this game, 
were vociferous in their rejection of the underlying political model for its lack of realism.”24 
Human decision making was limited to something of that representing an analog computer: “the 
human participating in the game acts as something like an analogue computer, in the sense that he 
takes the place of a black box, into which his artificial environment feeds certain stimuli, to which 
                                               
23 Digby Box 008-- COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, The Cold War Game—a formal definition [DRAFT], 
RAND Corporation Archives, unfiled.  
24 Digby Box 008–Memorandum from Olaf Helmer to John D. Williams, M-154–(1-11-1955), RAND 
Corporation Archives, p. 2. 
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he reacts behaviorally by producing strategic decisions.”25 This presents an interesting view of the 
human subject, assuming that given constrained situations will yield certain strategic outcomes 
and can then be modeled onto the real world with some semblance of scientific precision. 
Therefore, “It is hoped – and this is the basis for any validity that may be claimed from the results 
of war-gaming – that, if the stimuli simulate the real situation reasonably well and if the 
participants, by their training and general understanding, are able to perform an intuitive 
integration of the many interacting stimuli to which they are exposed, that their actions would 
reasonably well simulate the strategic decisions apt to occur in the analogous real-life situation.26 
Hence, the accusation of a lack of realism of the sole political scientist involved in the gaming was 
a damning critique. 
 
  Olaf Helmer found the critiques unfounded and attempted to rebuff them. “The prime 
objection of unrealism, seemed to be somewhat beside the point since realism, at least in detail, 
had been neither aimed for nor claimed;”27 The criticism of the “one political scientist among the 
players” was that “the game did not allow for any real political action”, which Helmer admitted 
would be “devastating if justified.”28 In a defense of the political action in the game, Helmer noted: 
“If, as this same player pointed out, international politics is a struggle for power in the sense of 
preserving, extending and subverting governmental authority then this game was full of political 
action. The struggle for power, by negotiation of contracts and alliances, by threats and bribes and 
                                               
25 Digby Box 008-- COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, "Helmer’s Speech" [DRAFT] (1955), RAND 
Corporation Archives, p. 2. 
26 Digby Box 008-- COW Notes by J. O’Connell, 1955, "Helmer’s Speech" [DRAFT] (1955), RAND 
Corporation Archives, pp. 1-2. 
27 Digby Box 008–Memorandum from Olaf Helmer to John D. Williams, M-154–(1-11-1955) RAND 
Corporation Archives, p. 3. 
28 Digby Box 008–Memorandum from Olaf Helmer to John D. Williams, M-154–(1-11-1955) RAND 
Corporation Archives, p. 3. 
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intrigues, by psychological warfare, by internal subversion and outright military aggression, went 
on throughout the game.”29 Helmer went to strike down the most pertinent criticism by attacking 
the epistemological assumptions of the political scientist about international politics in general, 
saying that they adequately operationalized those important variables in the political moves of the 
game.  
 
Following the fourth and final round of gameplay, there remained mixed reactions as to 
the efficacy of the CoW project as it was broadly conceived. By that time, they had numerous 
iterations in various venues, with a diverse set of players they came to a simple yet important 
realization: “in order for gaming to provide a means for testing strategies it would have to be 
conducted over a long period of actual time, utilizing a sizeable bloc of manpower and requiring 
many replays in which certain variables would be held constant while others would be modified.30 
This would represent the end of the CoW as it was initially conceived, but elements and insights 
of it would continue to live on at both RAND and in the policy world. The practical problems of 
such a game that attempted to integrate the immense complexities of the social world were too 
much to bear. “From a practical standpoint we have grave doubts about the wisdom of attempting 
a program of the requisite scale involving a relatively prohibitive commitment of manpower and 
expenditure of other resources.”31 
 
                                               
29 Digby Box 008–Memorandum from Olaf Helmer to John D. Williams, M-154–(1-11-1955) RAND 
Corporation Archives, p. 3. 
30 Goldsen, Joseph M, (1956) “The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round”, D-3640-RC 
(5/30/1956) RAND Corporation Archives, pp. 31-32. 
31 Goldsen, Joseph M, (1956) “The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round”, D-3640-RC 
(5/30/1956) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 32. 
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 What then were the lessons learned from the CoW and where did it fall short? “The players 
agreed that in a strict sense no fundamentally new insight or scientific ‘breakthrough’ was 
produced by the play itself. Nor was it at all certain that the ‘knowledge’ which was generated 
could not have been yielded by the study of the same problems through conventional and less 
expensive procedures. The latter comparative evaluation might conceivably be established by 
controlled experiments in which a group comparable in composition to that of the players sets up 
a study plan using non-game procedures on the same topics.”32 Nevertheless, the participants had 
an overwhelming feeling that a great deal had been gained from the experience of playing the 
CoW. In sum, “The game puts a premium on the mobilization and reordering ot pre-existing 
knowledge in relation to a special tocus, a focus on political action, policy thinking, strategic and 
tactical inventiveness, and the analytic assessments ot the consequences of alternative courses of 
action.”33 In fact, the Washington DC branch of RAND Corporation was unique in that it integrated 
players from the Dept. of State, who were genuinely surprised at what they learned from playing 
the game. Primarily, “the explication of interconnections between military, economic, political., 
and psychological factors in an unfolding and dynamic political process. The game makes for a 
middle ground between academic and theoretical knowledge and the immediate practical conduct 
at political operations.”34 In the end, what can be most readily understood was that it was not a 
strict adherence to the ‘rules of the game’ itself, but the pre-game seminars, the timeouts taken 
                                               
32 Goldsen, Joseph M, (1956) “The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round”, D-3640-RC 
(5/30/1956) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 35. 
33 Goldsen, Joseph M, (1956) “The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round”, D-3640-RC 
(5/30/1956), RAND Corporation Archives, p. 36. 
34 Goldsen, Joseph M, (1956) “The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round”, D-3640-RC 
(5/30/1956), RAND Corporation Archives, p. 37. 
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from the game in order to ‘game out’ particular problems of relevance for practitioners such as: 
“the limitation of weapons in wartime as determined during peacetime.”35 
 
Game Proliferation 
A number of similar politico-military games took place at RAND in the decades that followed. 
Although they did not often take on the same procedures and rules in a strict lab setting like the 
CoW, the precedent of attempting to incorporate more political aspects into wargaming had 
become the norm. This was true of the 1957 Romeo-Sierra wargame where political assumptions 
and scenarios were integrated into naval, atomic, and guerilla gaming.36 The game was projected 
ten years into the future where mock declarations by Chinese foreign ministers which were shortly 
followed by blue team naval sorties.37 The RAND games sparked interest and imitation in a variety 
of environments. In the years following the CoW, Goldhamer and other RAND personnel were 
invited to lecture at institutions such as the Army War College, the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace at Princeton, the State Department, Brookings Institution, and the Harvard 
Center for International Affairs (Curry and Wilson 2014: 73). At MIT the game was improved by 
Lincoln Bloomfield, who used it to explore questions of arms control policy for the Institute of 
Defense Analyses and in 1961 it was adopted at the Pentagon by the Joint Staff (Curry and Wilson 
2014: 74). These politico-military games were adopted as “educational” and not necessarily 
utilized to “predict the success of a particular strategy or policy” (Curry and Wilson 2014: 74).  
 
                                               
35 Goldsen, Joseph M, (1956) “The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round”, D-3640-RC 
(5/30/1956), RAND Corporation Archives, p. 41. 
36 Paxson Box 002–Romeo Sierra Wargame Notebook, April 1957, RAND Corporation Archives, 
unnumbered page. 
37 Paxson Box 002–Romeo Sierra Wargame Notebook, April 1957, RAND Corporation Archives, 
unnumbered page. 
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Based upon Andrew Wilson’s interviews, the consensus of game players at the State 
Department were rather skeptical of its utility for prediction, but could were useful military thought 
exercises to better understand foreign policy problems. The military found the games more useful 
for insights into overlooked problems. They claimed that the politico-military games “extended 
the horizons” of individuals who usually worked on limited aspects of the problems and were good 
to get officials in a “questioning mood” about the bureaucratic operating playbook of their 
respective departments (Curry and Wilson 2014: 74). Thomas Schelling believed that the games 
could teach: “how little of strategy, or even war, was military; how it was less concerned with the 
application of force than with the exploitation of potential force.” (Curry and Wilson 2014: 75). 
Most importantly, it brought to light for Schelling that goals tended to change during the course of 
a situation, and when a team took bold moves, the opposing team tended to react less than the 
original team had thought, thereby making it less bold than intended. Ultimately, this appeared to 
Schelling to be due to the fact that each team would contain hawks and doves  with the hawks 
concentrated on the remote contingency and the doves on the near one, but the opposing team only 
judged what they actually saw in action which was the immediate picture (Curry and Wilson 2014: 
75). 
 
When Wilson interviewed one Air Force analyst about nuclear war games of the early 
1960s called Great Circle I and Great Circle II, he asked about how much of the gaming was done 
on computers, the analyst responded “The total nuclear exchange is very easy to computerize. We 
can, and generally do, use computers” (Curry and Wilson 2014: 122). Wilson followed up with 
the question: “Then your game model is purely military; it doesn’t allow for political 
circumstances such as the indecision of a President?” To which the Air Force analyst responded: 
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“Well, the politico-military type of game is done at the Joint War Games agency. We alway assume 
that the decision to respond is made. What we can do, in our games, is to introduce time lags; for 
example between the moment Red launches his weapons and the moment that the chief decision-
maker gives the order to respond, and between this decision and the actual retaliation. The thing 
is to examine the effects of delaying decisions. At what time do we react to the threat?...What are 
the effects if we make the decision five minutes after he’s launched? What are the effects if we 
make it five minutes after first impact?” (Curry and Wilson 2014: 122). What is key here is how 
the politico-military game proliferated and became computerized. The core assumption of Air 
Force gaming in the early 1960s was that the president would respond, the only variable that 
remained up for question was time lag. Thus, the original purpose of the early CoW to interrogate 
assumptions, became a matter of assuming political action, determining the effects at what time 
the ‘inevitable’ decision was made. Thus, the agent-centric appeal of the CoW became subservient 
to calcuable computer=based speed of the only logical decisions in a more deterministic and less 
contingent science of the Cold War. 
 
In Bessner’s (2018) book on Hans Speier, he briefly alludes to the influences of the CoW 
in the Kennedy administration at the very of chapter eight. Although he does not elaborate much, 
it is easy to hear reverberations of the political aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis in Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara who worked extensively with RAND. At the height of the crisis, 
McNamara repeatedly tried to temper the military men who wanted to launch a preemptive strike 
on Cuba pushing that “I don’t believe it’s primarily a military problem. It’s primarily a domestic 
political problem”38 In McNamara’s later reflections on the crisis he recounts his conversation 
                                               
38  “At The Brink” PBS Frontline Documentary 1992 “At The Brink” Available via YouTube: 
https://youtu.be/W4FDK7gC0Q8. 
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with Admiral Anderson how the blockade would play out and standard operating procedures for 
maintaining the blockade of Cuba. He insisted to the Admiral that “we’re not trying to start a war, 
we’re trying to convey a message, a political message. There’ll be no shot fired by anybody. Do 
you understand, is that clear?”39 Although it is not the goal of this chapter to rehash the Cuban 
Missile Crisis as it has been covered extensively, it is useful to see that instead of predicting or 
finding the solutions to complex political problems, framing such problems in political as opposed 
to military terms may have had some concrete policy impacts. 
 
Other political gaming exercises were not so hypothetical and were utilized to deal with 
real crisis situations during the Cold War. For instance during the Berlin crisis of 1961 Thomas 
Schelling wanted to game “the ‘political’ use of military force” during his summer at RAND at 
the height of the crisis.40 Schelling was precise in the benefits as well as limitations of this type of 
politico-military wargaming exercise: “This is therefore not the approach for analyzing the Berlin 
crisis, but rather a method of approach with comparative advantage toward particular types of 
decisions.”41 He went on, “I do not have in mind either finding ‘solutions’ or testing ‘strategies’ 
by use of the game”, focusing on the character of crisis decision making and having the focus be 
on the “‘bargaining’ aspect of a military crisis.”42 Thus, what Schelling understood as political in 
this process was “the use of military force to influence the enemy, and to influence the enemy’s 
expectations about what confronts him, what to expect of us, what risk he runs, [etc.]...The basic 
                                               
39 “At The Brink” PBS Frontline Documentary 1992 “At The Brink” Available via YouTube: 
https://youtu.be/W4FDK7gC0Q8. 
40 Digby Box 005–ARDC Limited War in Europe Study Memoranda 1960-1961, M-4961 (7/19/1961) 
RAND Corporation Archives, p. 1. 
41 Digby Box 005–ARDC Limited War in Europe Study Memoranda 1960-1961, M-4961 (7/19/1961) 
RAND Corporation Archives, p. 1. 
42 Digby Box 005–ARDC Limited War in Europe Study Memoranda 1960-1961, M-4961 (7/19/1961) 
RAND Corporation Archives, p. 2. 
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idea is that military activity in relation to Berlin is not simply a tactical military operation, but is 
‘strategic’ in the broadest sense.”43 One key component of his wargaming in this scenario is that 
he wanted to emphasize the contingency of the process in that “the actual decision is left to depend 
on what the enemy does.”44  
What crucially distinguishes this type of politico-military game from traditional 
wargaming and is the legacy of the initial CoW is that the purpose of the game is not to “‘game’ 
military tactics. The exercise involves military events, military decisions, military intelligence, and 
military evaluations; but it is intended to focus on critical decisions, and is not a means of tracing 
out the detailed  tactical implications of these decisions.”45 Perhaps most crucially the game 
retained the control team or referee from the CoW that controls all variable outside of U.S. or 
Soviet control. Thus, “Its function is to channel the exercise in interesting directions, maintaining 
the tempo of the crisis, provoking decisions by the playing teams, and choosing decisive points of 
time for the successive policy-planning stages.”46 It is quite easy to see the tensions here between 
some of the proponents from the mathematics division during the CoW on constructing a more 
scientific and predictable game that can be translated to actual policies and Schellings more 
reserved approach and caveats. In essence, Schelling argued that the Berlin crisis game “is not a 
way of generating solutions to [the] problem, or a way of ‘testing’ strategies...The main purpose 
of the game is its benefit to the participants...in focusing their attention on the bargaining aspects 
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of military behavior in a crisis.”47 In the end, the CoW and its politico-military incorporation 
proliferated in interesting ways that was much more tempered and nuanced than many of its 
creators had intended. Indeed, such games benefited researchers and policy-makers in thinking 
through possible consequences of military actions in the Cold War context. Nevertheless, even 
such nuanced approaches remained limited in that in such crises there are no guarantees and the 
enemy often acts in unpredictable ways. This was especially true early on in 1950s nuclear war 
gaming whereby there was a “mirror imaging” effect, in that U.S. officials acted as they would 
act, not as the Soviets would have acted in the same situation. 
 
Futurecasting: Social Sciences Vs. Mathematics 
There is indeed strong contestation at RAND between the social sciences and mathematics 
divisions, some of which has been explored above. However, it is crucial to understand these 
internal epistemological debates, while recognizing that systems analysis game theory were what 
ruled the day. The early Cold War represented a perfect storm of logical positivism, weapon and 
delivery system innovation, the rise of game theory, the introduction of computing power, and 
most importantly the quantification of international politics. Bessner’s in depth study of Hans 
Speier is insightful in that with Speier’s interest in psychological warfare, he adopted a more 
qualitative methodology for his research. Bessner stresses this point in a forum on his book: “To 
understand Speier’s importance, one must appreciate how tenuous the position of social science 
was in the early national security state. Though social scientists insisted they had contributed to 
the U.S. victory in World War II, this was hardly a widely accepted opinion. Indeed, many 
members of the postwar foreign policy establishment considered the social sciences to be a bit 
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backward. For example, John D. Williams, the chief of the RAND Corporation’s Mathematics 
Division, was convinced that the social sciences were “in the fourteenth century as compared with 
the physical sciences, with engineering, and so on.” If Williams, who was instrumental in 
recruiting social scientists to RAND, could make this claim, one can only imagine what those more 
hostile to the social sciences believed.”48 
 
 One of the critiques of political science and the study of international politics in the context 
of the CoW was that it was an inexact science that could not be quantified the way economics or 
mathematics could. Hence, “The field of political science, unlike economics or the more exact 
sciences, has not developed either an integrated theory of payoff functions or adequate indices for 
those payoff functions which might be tentatively applied to limited problems. This lack is 
particularly apparent in the study of international politics.”49 One of the biggest hurdles that was 
encountered was the idea of political judgment in assessing interjections by the referees in their 
representation of “nature”. As I have discussed in the introduction and chapter two, ethical 
practical judgment is the standpoint from which I believe ethics in the technological era should be 
discussed. Nevertheless, in the context of the CoW, judgment was viewed as a roadblock to 
quantifying the uncertainties of politico-military gaming. 
 
How was this notion of judgment accounted for? “For example, the Referees in their 
representation of ‘nature’ would rule that a move or exchange of moves produced specified 
                                               
48 Bessner, Daniel (2018) “Roundtable 10-18 on Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the 
Defense Intellectual.” International Security Studies Forum. 26 November 2018. Available at: 
https://issforum.org/tag/defense-intellectual. 
49 Goldsen, Joseph M, (1956) “The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round”, D-3640-RC 
(5/30/1956) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 49. 
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reactions in other countries among the public at large or among designated groups. These reactions 
would be brought to the attention of the relevant teams who would take them into account as best 
they could in deciding what if anything to do next. The extent to which these reactions could be 
‘taken into account’ depends on the precision with which the reactions are stated and the adequacy 
of political theory available to the players for making their own estimate of what differences such 
reactions make anyway. A detailed knowledge of political history and a good sense of political 
judgment is of course what one must call upon.”50 Leaving judgment to players in the game or 
politicians in the policy world was viewed as dangerous because it left open too many possibilities 
that could not be accounted for in a coherent theory of international or domestic politics. Therefore, 
the post-game assessment of the fourth round of the CoW gave a number of suggestions for 
“systematizing the criteria of judgment”51 What is perhaps most intriguing in this fourth round 
game assessment is the recognition that “mirror imaging” was a problem and that the solution was 
to take a more historical perspective in understanding the complexities of international politics.  
 
However limited the scope of taking a historical perspective–in that the players often had 
a caricature understanding of USSR politics–it was a more nuanced view that embraced 
uncertainty and historical contingency as discussed in chapter one. There is an interesting interplay 
here between history, temporality, and assumptions of international politics. First and foremost, 
there is a recognition that international politics is not a ‘zero-sum’ game, because it often a conflict 
of “scales which vary from country to country. And for all countries the time span in which payoffs 
                                               
50 Goldsen, Joseph M, (1956) “The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round”, D-3640-RC 
(5/30/1956) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 51 (emphasis mine). 
51 Goldsen, Joseph M, (1956) “The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round”, D-3640-RC 
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are presumed to accrue varies greatly.”52 While the assessment may have been somewhat of a 
distortion of Soviet time, the recognition that one must account for both a country’s and a leader’s 
historical perspective in assessing international politics was a large step forward. Thus, “The 
United States may tend to be impatient with delay, frustration, or tension: it wants to get things 
done, and the sooner the better. The communists may be more content to make haste more slowly 
and in addition be much more willing to sacrifice many human and other values in order to achieve 
a few choice aims.”53 Furthermore, there was a recognition of the constraints of a democracy as 
opposed to a dictatorship–i.e. the USSR. “The dictator can more easily put his aims in rank-order 
and use coercive means to suppress those internal elements in his society whose demands and 
priorities differ from his.”54  
 
In congruence with the historical perspective–which was framed in the cliché of the 
question on whose side is history–but the disparities in the number and morality of aims; all 
questions which ultimately “forestalls any precise or formal solution” that cannot be quantifiably 
measured.55 As Goldsen eloquently noted: “No government is absolutely free to impose its will 
upon the world; all operate under some constraints, all must operate with incomplete information 
about the present and the future, and all must expect the unexpected to interfere with their best- 
laid plans. World political history is replete with examples of Pyrrhic victories and conversely with 
situations thought to be defeats at the time which turned out to be ‘blessings in disguise.’ How to 
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allow for such considerations in evaluating real or game-simulated political developments is a 
formidable problem indeed.”56 What is most perplexing for my purposes in this dissertation is how 
there can be such a candid acknowledgment of the uncertainties, tensions, complexities, and 
Pyrrhic victories, in history; yet, the ultimate conclusion is: “the need still remains to develop 
procedures which would serve to measure payoffs.”57 
 
Judgment in the end was deemed too difficult to quantify and although there were some 
novel solutions to this dilemma it was never resolved. Perhaps having governments in the game 
rank their objectives and acceptable time-frames for those could be one solution. However,  such 
“indices might not be expressible in quantitative terms” and “in devising and introducing such 
measures the chances are that they would insert some added degree of unreality. A point of 
compromise would have to be reached between the values of realism and the possible advantages 
of further systematization.”58 There are resemblances between these early contestations between 
social sciences and game theory at RAND in the 1950s and the quantitative/qualitative divide in 
political science today. James W. Davis in discussing Bressner’s book noted that “Speier remained 
committed to a broader vision of social science than represented in the other divisions of RAND, 
where formal and mathematical models, systems analysis, and game theory dominated.”59 Hence, 
the divide at RAND between figures like Herman Kahn and Charles Hitch who sought formal 
solutions to national security questions and those like Brodie, Kecskemeti and Speier, who 
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regarded “any analysis that ignored politics, culture, and psychology or attempted to elide 
judgement,” to be little more than ‘Unfug’ [‘nonsense’]” bears a family resemblance to continuing 
divides in the methodology of social science today (Bessner 2018: 213-214). Indeed, Bessner 
suggests in the book that Speier’s influence in policy-making may have been limited by his 
“commitment to qualitative methods, in an environment at RAND in which a perfervid 
commitment to mathematical modeling was increasingly the dominant ethos.60 It was so intense 
that the bellicose king of RAND’s defense intellectualism, Herman Kahn, typified the “view held 
by many RAND analysts: the social sciences were not really sciences but rather were inchoate and 
unproved opinions [masquerading] as facts” (Bessner 2018: 211). In the end, this space of 
contestation was pervasive at RAND, which both typifies and complicates the notion that a science 
of war can be established and the uncertainties and chance could be tamed by advanced 
mathematical modeling. 
 
  At a place like RAND systems analysis seemed to “be the way to get the scientific–the 
right–answer” such that the social scientists were looked down upon, “considered interesting in a 
speculative sort of way at best” (Kaplan 1991: 87). Shortly thereafter the RAND social sciences 
division was moved from RAND Santa Monica to its Washington D.C. location. In sum, 
“quantitative analysis had triumphed at RAND, through the spread of systems analysis and game 
theory and–until the Wohlstetter studies, which put the economics division on top of the strategic 
business–through the domination over the rest of RAND by the mathematics division” (Kaplan 
1991: 120). Studies like Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s R-290, were 
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filled with sophisticated mathematical calculations about the best system for destroying the most 
Soviet targets with a high “kill probability” for the least money and survive a surprise attack often 
lacked a political dimension, such that it was fundamentally mechanical devoid of what the 
Kremlin leaders were actually prone to do (Kaplan 1991: 121). Most importantly, the name of the 
game was the efficient ordering of warfare, maximizing cost-benefit analyses in advanced 
mathematical systems analysis. This is exemplary of what Jacques Ellul meant in his The 
Technological Society (1964) when he said we are the heirs of Cartesian world, both in theory and 
in practice. That is, the logic behind a dehumanized world emphasizing technological progress at 
the expense of Man’s humanity. Ellul calls it the world of “efficient ordering” implying the 
transformation of all the spheres of human activity, be they productive, political, and even 
psychological, into systems of order arrived at through technology. All spheres of life are 
ultimately converted into procedures and structures. Humanistic thought rooted in imagination and 
intuition is simply excluded from this kind of efficient ordering (Ellul 1964). Thus these sorts of 
‘scientific’ studies at RAND aimed at the efficient ordering of warfare: “...there were numbers, 
calculations, rigorously checked, sometimes figured on a computer. Maybe the numbers were 
questionable, but they were tangible, unlike the theorizing, the Kremlinology, the academic 
historical research and interpretation produced by social science. Wohlstetter snootily denigrated 
all such works as being in ‘the essay tradition’” (Kaplan 1991: 121). Social Sciences were relegated 
to DC while the real science of warfare was calculated by mathematics, economics, and physics 
divisions in Santa Monica.  
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Futuristic Divides 
What role then did the ontological category of the “future” play in RAND analysis of technological 
development? There is an interesting distinction between projecting contemporary notions and 
trends into the future, and what actually occurs irrespective of this world-making. Here, I am 
persuaded by Jacques Derrida’s distinction between the future and l'avenire (the to come). “In 
general, I try and distinguish between what one calls the Future and “l’avenir” [the ‘to come]. The 
future is that which – tomorrow, later, next century – will be. There is a future which is predictable, 
programmed, scheduled, foreseeable. But there is a future, l’avenir (to come) which refers to 
someone who comes whose arrival is totally unexpected. For me, that is the real future. That which 
is totally unpredictable. The Other who comes without my being able to anticipate their arrival. So 
if there is a real future, beyond the other known future, it is l’avenir in that it is the coming of the 
Other when I am completely unable to foresee their arrival.”61 This distinction gets to the point 
that, there is a future that we believe will come based on present projections of a hypothetical point 
in time, then there is what actually happens that can only be established ex post facto. Nevertheless, 
the practicalities of military equipment procurement means that the military must prepare for the 
wars they think they are going to fight, not what they actually may end up fighting. 
 
Charles Hitch worked under Robert McNamara and founded the modern defence planning 
system at the Department of Defense called planning-programming-budgeting (PPB), for fiscal 
military planning. Hitch utilized systems analysis, which was “nothing more than economic 
analysis applied to the public sector” in order to “assist the decision-maker to choose the weapons 
systems and modes of operating them which maximize some military objective” for the given 
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resources available in order to get fiscal considerations in at the early stage (Curry and Wilson 
2014: 131). The systems analysis approach blended optimizing models and predictive models to 
aid decision-makers in hard budgetary choices where there are several (often intangible) objectives 
and multiple relevant costs. Thus, “the systems analyst must predict the important 
consequences...in assisting the decision-maker to make his own intuitive choice” (Curry and 
Wilson 2014: 132). Klaus Knorr (Professor of Economics and Director of the Princeton Centre of 
International Studies) was critical of the systems analysis method for defense spending because 
the cost-effectiveness approach could not be measured accurately due to imperfect information. 
As Knorr noted in an article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 1966, “experience shows 
abundantly, financial costs are hard to estimate; technological advance is difficult to predict; and 
the benefits hard to evaluate. After all, research and development outputs will affect military 
capabilities only after a considerable time lag and – during this time – the relevant military, 
technological and military environment undergo substantial changes that impinge on the value of 
a weapon system, or a strategy for which it was designed” (Curry and Wilson 2014: 134).  
 
Perhaps the person who was most guilty of this type of cost-benefit analysis was Ed Paxson 
of RAND’s mathematics division. He was known as a “numbers cruncher par excellence.” 
Intrigued by the most complex mathematical equations, “his dream was to quantify every single 
factor of a strategic bombing campaign”– the cost, weight and payload of each bomber, its distance 
from the target, which formation to fly in, refueling procedures, attrition rate, “the probability that 
something might go wrong in each step along the way”, the accuracy and weight of each bomb, 
the vulnerability of the target, the bomb’s “kill probability”, the routing of planes, fuel consumed, 
as well as all extraneous phenomena such as weather–and most importantly, to “put them all into 
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a single mathematical equation” (Kaplan 1991: 87). In essence Paxson attempted to quantify all of 
the uncertainties of warfare including kill probabilities, to gain an objective analysis of the efficient 
ordering of warfare. 
 
However, Paxson was dealing with future war, the unknowable l’avenir of Cold War 
calculations of possible nuclear exchanges, such that the numbers that he so vigorously and 
scientifically analyzed were purely speculative often derived out of thin air. Thus, no matter how 
advanced his mathematical skills, utilizing the cutting edge of systems theory, his foundational 
assumptions were often faulty. One example of the shortfall of such speculative endeavor came 
from months of hypothetical modeling of air duels between fighter planes and bombers with 
another RAND systems analyst Edward S. Quade. The two worked through a trove of large series 
of equations to reach the conclusion that, “with the right kind of fire-control systems, a fighter 
pilot could close in on a bomber at a certain optimal point, fire his weapon, and shoot the bomber 
out of the sky six out of every ten confrontations” (Kaplan 1991: 88). With a 60% hypothetical 
success rate, the two tested their theory against the real combat data from WWII and found that in 
the cases where the fighter and bomber were in roughly the same geometric position they had 
determined to be “optimal” the fighter pilot had downed the bomber only 2% of the time. They 
puzzled over the disparity for days on end and concluded that real pilots shooting real bullets do 
not hastily get so close to a real bomber, and opt instead to make a few quick passes with a couple 
of shots. As Kaplan concludes, “war involved a lot of uncertainties, and if the systems analyst 
failed to take at least the most important ones into account (and who knew just what those were in 
any particular case?), the conclusions and recommendations might be way off the mark” (Kaplan 
1991: 88). 
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 This type of thinking was pervasive by many systems analysts, abstract theorizing devoid 
of real-world understanding. For example, in calculating the most efficient routing for bombing 
planes based on distance traveled and expenses, the systems analysts sometimes opted for twin 
propeller planes instead of jets, neglecting the fact that the Air Force pilots wanted to fly the state 
of the art planes and not some WWII era bomber. There were debates within RAND, between 
Paxson and Wohlstetter on the dilemma of strategic air command (SAC). Paxson theorized about 
bombing campaigns against the USSR as if it were a transportation problem, “getting the airplane 
from the U.S. to the target and then destroying as many targets as possible” (Kaplan 1991: 90). 
Wohlstetter however, broadened the problem on where best to place overseas bases given Soviet 
air-defense capabilities. Hence, the heart of the dilemmas for Wohlstetter: “On the one hand, as 
bases are moved farther away from the target, costs rise considerably: aircraft must be larger and 
heavier, so that they can travel great distances” (Kaplan 1991: 90). On the other hand, “when the 
base is close to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is also close the base. In other words, SAC 
might more swiftly and easily strike the Soviets; but the Soviets might also more swiftly and easily 
strike SAC” (Kaplan 1991: 91). Yet even Wohlstetter was guilty of making similar mistakes of 
abstractions and hypotheticals that many felt were out of step with the l’avenir in their 
futurecasting. Hence Robert J. Lutz, a former MIT aerospace engineer disagreed with 
Wholstetter’s work, because he was “making the analysis too abstract. He was starting to do what 
Paxson and most other systems analysts did: come up with some amorphous, hypothetical bomber 
force that would do the ‘best’ job” (Kaplan 1991: 98).  
 
 There were exceptions to this rule of course in understanding the uncertainties of the 
l’avenir of nuclear exchange during the Cold War, namely from the young engineer James Digby 
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who would eventually become head of the Operations department at RAND. Throughout the 
archival process at RAND, I found myself inexplicably drawn to Digby’s work that I would like 
to briefly reflect on. Reflexivity is essential to interpretivist International Relations scholarship 
(Jackson 2010: 157). Understanding my positionality as a researcher, that I am always already 
conditioned by my experiences, biases, and the context in which I am undertaking research, aids 
me in the archival process. Reflexivity is central to my philosophical hook up to the world of mind-
world monism, and my distinct methodological predisposition. First and foremost, the archives at 
RAND are organized by individual names, and Digby was where I received most of my primary 
archival material. All of his papers and memos, anything he was cc’d on was preserved for the 
archive, hence Digby became my hookup to the inner workings of RAND in the 1950s. Moreover, 
Digby’s position as an engineer who was always reflecting about both the promises and limitations 
of any new technology or method appeared to be a rarity amongst most RANDites. Furthermore, 
he was instrumental in moving toward the precision guided munitions in the 1970s in an aim to 
limit the casualties of war witnessed in Vietnam. In the end, Digby stands out as someone 
profoundly reflective about his role as a cog in the military machine, producing work that was 
always nuanced and understanding that every new technology or strategy had pitfalls and 
unknowns, contrasting the bellicose certainty of many RAND analysts. 
   
In a talk given to the weapons systems evaluation group symposium in 1957, Digby 
discusses the problems of uncertainty in the advanced mathematical modeling at RAND 
exemplified by Paxson and even Wohlstetter. In asking the audience how much attention should 
one pay to the complex numerical modeling and manipulations from RAND, he states: “Most of 
us have emerged with a feeling that these complex models should be shunned for the burden of 
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our work. Their main purpose should usually be to lead us toward simpler methods, to teach us 
how to aggregate, and to expose those quantities that may be ignored.”62 He then joked that anyone 
who “designs wing structures for passenger airplanes--I hope you will ignore these remarks. You 
have a job that is much more deterministic than that of the systems studies in which, for instance, 
all of the air defense weapons might be compared.”63 Thus, unlike many of his colleagues in 
mathematics or economics divisions, Digby recognized that there are engineering problems which 
are deterministic and systems analysts focus on “broad studies” where “there are many kinds of 
uncertainties.”64 In sum, these uncertainties could never be fully accounted for and a science of 
warfare constructed because: “There are gaps in our knowledge of enemy equipment and tactics, 
there are wide variations in observed results with our own forces, there are fluctuating factors like 
weather involved, and the situations under study often have no real peacetime precedent.”65 In the 
end, “Because of all this we think it’s wrong to go into great detail on one factor only to multiply 
it by another that is so vague that the philosophers debate whether it could rightly be called a 
probability. In fact we are coming to the opinion that too much emphasis is placed on the numerical 
outputs of broad systems studies: measures like total bombers shot down, cities destroyed, total 
bombs on target, and so on.”66 Thus, Paxson seemed to be the exception to the rule at RAND, but 
was an important voice of dissent in tempering the high aspirations for a science of warfare. 
 
                                               
62 Digby Box 001– James F. Digby’s ”WSEG Symposium Talk” in “Speeches and Briefings 1957” 
(3/11/1957) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 6.  
63 Digby Box 001– James F. Digby’s ”WSEG Symposium Talk” in “Speeches and Briefings 1957” 
(3/11/1957) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 6.  
64  Digby Box 001– James F. Digby’s ”WSEG Symposium Talk” in “Speeches and Briefings 1957” 
(3/11/1957) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 6.  
65 Digby Box 001– James F. Digby’s ”WSEG Symposium Talk” in “Speeches and Briefings 1957” 
(3/11/1957) RAND Corporation Archives, pp. 6-7.  
66 Digby Box 001– James F. Digby’s ”WSEG Symposium Talk” in “Speeches and Briefings 1957” 
(3/11/1957) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 7.  
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Realism was the ultimate goal of the CoW and was the lack of realism was the critique of 
the social scientists of the game itself, and Digby cast doubt upon the entire premise of scientific 
realism at RAND. He said, at RAND “we do favor realism, [but] we cannot claim to be the nation’s 
leading practitioners thereof. Constant preoccupation with wars of the future has taken its toll.”67 
Returning briefly to Derrida’s distinction the future and l’avenir, many at RAND were preoccupied 
with a future of warfare which was scientifically and mathematically predictable, programmed, 
scheduled, foreseeable. Whereas, the l’avenir of the future, i.e. the unpredictability of the Cold 
War, was what Digby was more concerned with. To sum up this position, Digby joked that: “About 
six years ago [1951] two RANDites made a prediction of the NATO radar coverage for the year 
1954. Sometime later one of them was asked about its validity; ‘Can’t tell you,’ he said, ‘that stuff 
isn’t going to be in until 1954.’ Strangely enough, he said this in late 1955.”68 Ultimately, “Realism 
of military and technological detail is something to seek, but in analyses of uncertain future 
operations the study with the greatest detail is not always the one with the most realistic balance 
of effort. Neither can we say that the study laid down on historical principles is necessarily the one 
which is optimizing for the realistic goals of the future.”69 In the end, Digby tempers much of the 
mathematical theorizing at RAND that came to dominate analyses at the expense of a more realistic 
account of l’avenir with the demise of the social sciences division in Santa Monica. The obsession 
with calculating the unknowable future, led to sophisticated equations that claimed to be able to 
make the unknowns of nuclear warfare predictable with precise calculations of percentage success 
rates of bombers that didn’t withstand the empirical realities of warfare. 
                                               
67 Digby Box 001– James F. Digby’s ”WSEG Symposium Talk” in “Speeches and Briefings 1957” 
(3/11/1957) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 26.  
68 Digby Box 001– James F. Digby’s ”WSEG Symposium Talk” in “Speeches and Briefings 1957” 
(3/11/1957) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 26. 
69 Digby Box 001– James F. Digby’s ”WSEG Symposium Talk” in “Speeches and Briefings 1957” 
(3/11/1957) RAND Corporation Archives, p. 27. 
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What then can ultimately be said about the problems of the future in conceptualizing the 
possibilities of a nuclear exchange or limited nuclear war during the early Cold War period? The 
space of contestation at RAND offers us a ‘thick description’ of the everyday practices of 
RANDites in the early 1950s. Exploring the “production and contestation of power, knowledge, 
and belief at the local level in order to understand national and global political processes” 
(Gusterson 1996 :5). An in depth exploration of the CoW and its results, the diminishing of social 
sciences in favor of mathematical modeling, and the methodological problems of futurecasting, all 
serves to enlighten IR scholars as to how meaning was made in this particular context. Hence, 
“throughout knowledge construction, how power and ethics constitute meaning, [and] the 
implications of meaning for political and social phenomena” (Lynch 2014: 2). The Cold War Game 
itself demonstrated the limitations of attempts to quantify all aspects of warfare. Even while 
recognizing the fact that history is full of uncertainties when it comes to war, the need was to find 
more systematic ways to incorporate and account for these uncertainties. The lines between 
mathematics and social science are not as clear cut as one may expect as many of the social 
scientists were positivists, but who nonetheless felt that systems analysts offered too limited a 
vision of political actions during the CoW. However, there were RANDites like James Digby who 
strove to explore the complexities of warfare with measured nuance and without whom, much of 
my research would not have been possible. What then were the considerations of ethics in this 
rational world of defense intellectuals? How was the destructive power of nuclear weapons 
rationalized by the “thermonuclear Jesuits”?  
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 Technostrategic Discourse and The Ethics of War 
How can there be a rational world of meaning-making in which the absolute destruction of 
humanity is viewed as logical in the rationality of irrationality? As (Rosenthal 1990: 229) argued 
“logic reaches a dead end with mutually assured destruction”, yet this worldview was birthed at 
RAND and matured in in U.S. academic circles. While nuclear deterrence is premised on a 
paradoxical logic whereby the more suicidal one seems the more credible the threat of nuclear war 
and therefore makes an actual nuclear exchange less likely. As Gusterson (1996: 3) notes, “It can 
quite plausibly be argued–and equally plausibly disputed–that every technical innovation and 
change in  strategic doctrine that makes it more feasible to fight a nuclear war thereby makes a 
nuclear war less likely.”  Thus, the technostrategic discourse was such that the discussions of 
defense intellectuals were “carefully and intricately reasoned, occurring seemingly without any 
sense of horror, urgency, or moral outrage” (Cohn 1987: 690). However, in what follows, I want 
to demonstrate that early prospects of nuclear war planning and gaming at RAND were actually 
met with horror, aversion, and a profound sense of the magnitude of the situation. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to do a proper constitutive process tracing from that point of 
aversion to its normalization that Cohn discusses, my argument remains that mathematical 
modeling is the ultimate technostrategic discourse which buries the metaphors of “clean bombs” 
et al. in a “science of warfare” inherently devoid of ethical considerations due to its objectivity. 
 
 Perhaps those most guilty of this type of technostrategic discourse early on  was Herman 
Kahn and Albert Wohlstetter. Indeed as Lynn Eden notes, Wohlstetter in the late 1950s was one 
of the first to articulate “that U.S. retaliatory, or ‘second-strike,’ forces—at that time the bomber 
force—had to be ‘survivable,’ or else the bombers would be an attractive target for the Soviet 
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Union to strike in a pre-emptive attack on the United States, thus setting off catastrophic nuclear 
war. Wohlstetter’s idea, in principle, has endured and is widely accepted.”70 Herman Kahn is 
infamous for his caricature as Dr. Strangelove, and his seeming indifference to human suffering in 
nuclear war. Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi (2005) examines the multiple contexts of Herman Kahn and 
his influential 1960 book, On Thermonuclear War. While fearful citizens scanned the skies for 
incoming Soviet bombers in the 1950s, Kahn and his fellow systems analysts at the Air Force's 
think tank, RAND, dreamed up plausible future wars. Kahn incorporated a combination of gallows 
humor and mathematical calculations with an ability to ignore the worst aspects of thermonuclear 
war into his studies and presentations. This incited the fury of critics, while his advocacy of a 
robust civil defense upset the Air Force leadership. Kahn was indeed aware that his “objective 
analysis” was not callously indifferent “to the human tragedy involved” but viewed radiation risks 
as acceptable by comparing them to peacetime exposure of industrial workers. Moreover, 
professing an optimism that birth defects resulting from thermonuclear war that the science of 
genetics is progressing rapidly that, “it is quite possible and even likely that future generations will 
develop genetic or medical techniques to eliminate or alleviate this particular legacy of war” (Kahn 
1960).  
 
 While Kahn and Wohlstetter have had lasting legacies on nuclear deterrence, those who 
were more successful in the policy world were the like of Thomas Schelling discussed above. In 
Ron Robin’s book Jervis believes it might have been more fruitful to compare Albert’s 
“differences with Thomas Schelling, who became the dominant figure in strategic studies, and 
                                               
70 Eden, Lynn (2018) “Roundtable 10-17 on The Cold War They Made: The Strategic Legacy of Roberta 
and Albert Wohlstetter.” International Security Studies Forum. 19 November 2018. Available at: 
https://issforum.org/roundtables/10-17-wholstetter. 
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whose writings, unlike Albert’s, came to have great influence on scholarship in the social sciences, 
particularly the study of international politics.”71 Nevertheless, as Robin ascribes in his book, 
Albert’s legacy resided in his students that came to power in the George W. Bush administration 
with Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Richard Perle. And Robin ultimately gets his finger 
to the heart the Wohlstetters’ thought based upon his interviews: “Both Roberta and Albert were 
comfortable with variations of nuclear brinkmanship because they never feared a reckless response 
from their overly cautious, reactive, and often frazzled enemy. The Wohlstetters cavalierly spread 
a potentially destabilizing interpretation of the arms race because—as they made it amply clear to 
those who are willing to read what they actually wrote—they did indeed recognize a remote 
possibility of Soviet aggression, but they never believed in the probability of a Soviet attack. 
Always the economist, Albert fervently believed that the way to bring down this ideological 
nemesis and its threat to domestic tranquility was to intimidate its agents into a spending frenzy 
that would bring their economic superstructure crashing down, thereby exposing the specious 
nature of the socialist creed.”72  
 
The logics of Kahn and Wohlstetter with the suicidal intentions diminishing the actual 
threat of nuclear exchange proliferated into the American academy and beyond. However, by 
1968, Philip Green in Deadly Logic: A Theory of Nuclear Deterrence offered a scathing critique 
of the established theories of nuclear deterrence, escalation, flexible response, and second-strike 
capabilities, although not for the reasons one may think. Green laments the “fact that most of our 
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accepted theories on nuclear warfare are based on logic alone and not on more nearly perfect 
methods of scientific analysis” (Green 1968). The shortcoming as he sees it for a truly scientific 
analysis of nuclear deterrence would be: more data. Although at the time, his critique seemed to 
be a breath of fresh air, of policy-makers readily accepting of the logics of the experts of Kahn and 
Kissinger, his move further from the human element toward greater abstraction is troubling indeed. 
Nevertheless, beyond these individuals, how was the introduction of the hydrogen bomb first 
conceived by RANDites? What were the ethical implications for those privy to the destructive 
power of a hydrogen bomb, exponentially more powerful than the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and 
Nakasaki. 
 
The Birth of the Hydrogen Bomb 
In discussing nuclear strategy it is impossible to escape the work of Bernard Brodie, known as the 
“the original nuclear strategist”. Brodie’s work from The Influence of Mass Destruction Weapons 
on Strategy (1955), The Anatomy of Deterrence (1958), to Escalation and the Nuclear Option 
(1965) laid the groundwork for decades of deterrence theorizing in the U.S. academy. Brodie was 
handpicked to be a part of a four man team to interpret the implications of a hydrogen bomb in late 
1951. Ernst Plesset, the head of RAND’s physics division, first got word that an H-bomb was 
possible from Los Alamos from his “Q”-level clearance (a very restrictive Atomic Energy 
Commission code word for all atomic-energy data). Plesset knew from Los Alamos scientists that 
the H-Bomb could release the explosive energy of one million or five million or ten or twenty 
million tons of TNT. The Nagasaki bomb, by comparison, had released the equivalent of twenty 
thousand tons–or twenty kilotons. A new term had been invented for the grander scale of the H-
Bomb: megaton. Thus, Plesset chose three other analysts for the H-Bomb project: Charlie Hitch, 
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head of the economics division; Jim Lipp, head of the missiles division; and Bernard Brodie, a 
new employee with social science, to all work on this project in secrecy (Kaplan 1991: 76).  
 
Who were these individuals and why were they chosen? Hitch had assessed bomb damage 
in WWII and could calculate how much damage the Hydrogen bomb could do to the Soviet 
economy. Brodie had written the book on strategic implications of the atomic bomb and had done 
targeting analysis for General Vandenberg, and would be best for thinking through the weapon’s 
strategic impact. Lipp was a highly competent scientist who had directed RAND’s project on earth-
circling satellites, was assigned the task of figuring out the tactical implications of the H-Bomb in 
a European war. Plesset gave himself the job of presenting details on the bomb’s technical aspect 
with some assistance from others in the physics division who would do some calculations for him 
while being kept in the dark on this particular project as it was top secret (Kaplan 1991: 76-77). 
Initially the work for this team was a “rather mechanical task” whereby Plesset and some others 
in physics drew some ‘lay-down’ circles, indicating the radius of various types of damage––blast, 
heat, prompt radiation (nobody as of yet knew about the vast implications of nuclear fallout)––
produced by bombs of one to twenty megatons. Hitch, Brodie and Lipp took these circles and laid 
them over maps of various kinds of targets–cities, built-up industrial complexes, battlefields–
scaled to the same dimensions as the circles. Yet, suddenly the work was no longer so mechanical 
as they were faced with the magnitude of the amount of destruction that twenty megaton bombs 
could cause.  
 
 Hitch was no stranger to understanding the consequences of bombing in war as he had 
studied strategic bombing during WWII, which produced tens of thousands of casualties. However, 
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the damage circles drawn up by Plesset showed “showed that a five- or ten-megaton hydrogen 
bomb would kill people within 50 square miles of ground zero, and would severely burn people’s 
skin and topple buildings within 300 square miles...a mere fifty-five H-Bombs of twenty megatons 
each would completely wipe out the fifty largest cities of the Soviet Union, killing thirty-five 
million Russians, all in a matter of minutes. And that assumed that the urban population would 
have the protection of World War II-type shelters” (Kaplan 1991: 77).  Even an attempt by Brodie 
and Hitch to focus on Soviet industrial centers or more “legitimate targets” according to jus in 
bello ethical categories of discrimination and proportionality, ten to eleven millions deaths seemed 
unavoidable. Remember this is at a point where the harmful effects of radiation were not fully 
understood, nor the harmful effects of fire damage from nuclear weapons that Lynn Eden (2004) 
addresses because, “predicting nuclear weapons damage concluded that fire damage involved too 
many variables to allow prediction.” Although such language of mass destruction became the norm 
in later decades, at the time, no one had ever killed 35 million on a sheet of paper and the 
experience was depressing for those who undertook it. Charlie Hitch’s wife called John Williams’ 
wife one morning and asked, “What’s happening at RAND? Charlie comes home, he barely says 
hello, he’s uncivil, and after dinner he just locks himself up in his study. Something terrible is 
going on there” (Kaplan 1991: 78). For Jim Lipp, it was too much to bear. He was a gentle man, 
the sort of person who told friends that when it came to nuclear weapons, he cared about his 
grandchildren and his grandchildren’s grandchildren. Thus, when Lipp laid Plesset’s damage 
circles over a map of Western Europe to see how many soldiers and civilians would be killed if H-
bombs were used on the battlefield. He calculated that even under the best of circumstances, nearly 
two million people would be killed, which made him nearly throw up. Soon thereafter Lipp 
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dropped out of the project and was replaced by Ed Paxson of mathematics division (Kaplan 1991: 
78). 
 
 In a sort of tragic irony, although the four men were horrified by the implications of the H-
bomb and its massive destructive capabilities, “their study and their briefings helped build and 
solidify support for the approval of the H-Bomb” (Kaplan 1991: 84). Furthermore, this study aided 
in Edward Teller’s proposal to build a special laboratory to manufacture it, which became 
Livermore Laboratory where Hugh Gusterson did his influential ethnography decades later. 
Ultimately, “If, as Robert Oppenheimer had remarked, ‘the physicists have known sin,’ the social 
scientists now became active collaborators” (Kaplan 1991: 84). Although the social scientists at 
RAND were horrified at the thought and grappled with the implications of the H-bomb for decades 
to come, their work paved the way for its utilization. In September 1952 the new lab was 
established in Livermore, CA under the auspices of the University of California. By November the 
same year the first hydrogen bomb (produced at Los Alamos) was exploded. It was codenamed 
Operation Ivy, blew the island of Eniwetok in the Pacific off the map with the power of twelve 
megatons. Edward Teller ‘watched’ the explosion on the seismograph machine at Berkeley. “In a 
fit of joy, he wired a three-word telegram to Norris Bradbury, director of Los Alamos: ‘It’s a boy’” 
(Kaplan 1991: 84). The destructive power of the H-bomb did not cause those like Brodie to resign 
in protest, but rather to rethink and reevaluate their aims to integrate sensible war aims and national 
interest with the H-bomb to avoid committing national suicide. In the end, Brodie thought  that the 
hydrogen bomb “makes strategic bombing very efficient, perhaps all too efficient. We no longer 
need to argue whether the conduct of war is an art or science–it is neither” (Kaplan 1991: 79). 
 
 157 
 As the previous chapter grappled with ethics of war and the poetic wisdom of Giambattista 
Vico, now is an appropriate time to juxtapose the technostrategic discourse of defense intellectuals 
with those who lived through the only atomic bombs ever dropped. Eiko Taori was 21 when the 
atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. She was riding in a streetcar with her infant child; after being 
thrown to the ground from the blast “I held my son firmly and looked down on him. We had been 
standing by the window of the streetcar and I think fragments of glass had pierced his head. His 
face was a mess because of the blood flowing from his head. But he looked at my face and smiled. 
His smile has remained glued in my memory. He did not comprehend what had happened. And so 
he looked at me and smiled at my face which was all bloody after being thrown from the streetcar 
with him in my arms. I had plenty of milk which he drank all throughout that day. I think my child 
sucked the poison right out of my body. And soon after that he died. Yes, I think that he died for 
me.” Yamaguchi Tsutomu’s poetry attempted to tackle the loss of humanity and the horror of death 
and destruction in three short poems:  
 
Where has it gone, 
the dignity of humans as being humans? 
It lies destroyed and ruined … 
corpses in the atomic field … 
 
Intending not to step on 
half-burned corpses 
I stepped over them 
and saw boiled thoraxes. 
Their guts 
were yellow tinges . 
 
I will never forget 
the charcoaled bodies, 
the corpses sitting I met 
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on the train tracks after 
Hiroshima’s atomic death73 
  
 
Bernard Brodie grappled with Clausewitz’s famous dictum “War is a continuation of policy by 
other means.” He had thought that a war including atomic bombs would be “much too violent to 
fit into any concept of a continuation of diplomacy.” Yet, in learning of the H-bomb’s enormously 
destructive power, Brodie came to see that Clausewitz was saying something quite profound: “That 
war is violence…but it is planned violence and therefore controlled. And since the objective should 
be rational, the procedure for accomplishing that objective for accomplishing that objective should 
also be rational, which is to say that the procedure and the objective must be in some measure 
appropriate to each other” (Kaplan 1991: 79). Thus, the destruction and death of the atomic bomb 
rarely entered into the minds of practitioners as it was viewed as just to end WWII. The power of 
the H-bomb may have been too much to bear, but its development and application persisted. What 
I have aimed in this dissertation to demonstrate is that the further one abstracts away from the 
human consequences of war in the name of a science of warfare, the more their ethical intuitions 
are disengaged. Early RANDites such as Lipp and Hitch recognized the inhumanity of it all, while 
later generations of practitioners and scholars would casually throw around tens of millions of 
deaths in nuclear exchanges, all secretly hoping it was too destructive to ever occur. 
 
Abstract Ethics Divorced from Reality 
 
The overall impact of technostrategic discourse and the quantification of warfare in general is to 
divorce decision-makers from the human consequences of their “rational” policies. Moral injury 
refers to the suffering and post-traumatic stress that soldiers often have to confront with the 
                                               
73 Diehl (2017), p, 133 
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prospect of taking another life (Litz et al. 2009; Meagher 2014). Defense intellectuals and decision-
makers rarely had to look those they killed in the eye. In fact, millions of deaths were relegated to 
statistical calculations of probabilities of millions of casualties in a thermonuclear exchange. All 
of this becomes possible as human life is relegated to an expandable calculation of probabilities, 
as humans are no longer subjects, but a cog in the machine of the delicate balance of terror in the 
Cold War. As Elaine Scarry (1985) and Carol Cohn (1987) note, “metaphors the imbue humans 
with the characteristics of machines make it easier to do work that entails the risk of injuring 
humans. If instead of being ‘hurt’ they are ‘damaged,’ if instead of being ‘killed’ they are 
‘disassembled,’ then they have been changed, in the world of language at least, from sentient to 
insentient. They are no longer sites of fear, pain, and feeling” (Gusterson 1996:124). Chapter four 
explores in depth the current literature on abstraction from killing and discourses that construct 
sentient subjects and machines of metadata.  
 
 The three preceding chapters in this dissertation have explored the ways in which I argue 
that any ethical stance which abstracts away from human subjectivity is a consequence of 
modernity and should be rejected. Poetic wisdom and historical just war thinking I believe poses 
a potential antidote to a language of war ethics as abstract analytic philosophy. In this particular 
context, it is evident the ways in which a technostrategic discourse and assumptions about 
rationality and science were contested at the site of the RAND Corporation. As evidence above, it 
tended to be more pervasive in the mathematics and economics divisions, yet even social scientists 
who were initially taken aback by the horrors of the H-Bomb learned how to speak the language 
of the defense intellectual throwing around tens of millions of deaths with casual aplomb. The 
mantra of the early Cold War period as well as the quantum computing era of today (explored in 
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chapter four) seems to be the mantra of Silicon Valley: move fast and break things. Ethical 
consideration and human consequences of one’s positionality which enabled death and destruction 
was abstracted in both the language of rational calculation and Cohn’s technostrategic discourse. 
What is interesting, is that although the CoW itself attempted to quantify the uncertainties of 
politics and economics in a politico-military wargame that was quickly abandoned at RAND, it 
had an unusual ethical impact on its players 
 
In Aaron Trammell’s analysis of the CoW, he brings to light one of the most relevant 
aspects of the ethical dimensions of the performative act of playing the game. “players had a sense 
of consequence, and more importantly, pressure while playing The Cold War Game: ‘A third 
educational effect of the game was to give the players a rather unusual insight into the pressures, 
uncertainties, and moral and intellectual difficulties which have to be faced and resolved when 
foreign policy decisions are made.’ And while these were certainly factors that pertained to 
military planning in the real world, they were not necessarily the by-products of simulation or 
conventional military analysis.”74 The realities of the possibility of nuclear annihilation and the 
gravity of decision making in the backdrop of a nuclear exchange with the USSR weighed heavily 
on those who played: “But most of all, the players quickly gained a sense of the awful 
consequences that might result from an ill-advised move. In the game, as in the real world, 
international relations were conducted under the shadow of the terrible destructiveness of modern 
weapons. Participants acquired a sense of crushing responsibility, and for this reason the game was 
sometimes exhausting. As a result of this sense of responsibility, players often tended to be 
extremely cautious. Those who in the classroom, or in publications may have advocated ‘bold, 
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imaginative policies’ and criticized free-world leaders for timidity usually found themselves 
behaving with equal caution when they assumed the burden of policy-making in the game. 
Participants thus tended to judge foreign policy decisions in the real world differently after the 
game than they had done before it.”75 As Trammell analyzes, “The game had a cooling effect upon 
its participants. Instead of advocating for radical policy change, they were forced to recognize the 
tactical landscape of foreign policy as a field of eggshells, where foul policy decision would yield 
substantial (and possibly apocalyptic) effects. Perhaps this sensibility was evocative of the 
subjectivities of actual diplomats as opposed to those of nation-states—this is one consequence of 
the acting required by the game. Either way, the production of what we would now call “emotional 
intelligence” through game-like simulations is a key facet for the historical significance of 
simulations and the role-playing game. Strategic decisions are not only analytic, they are also 
emotional, and any real analysis must take into account the moods produced by war in addition its 
geographies and technologies.”76 Thus, the integration of the emotional elements of decision-
makers more accurately depicted reality, while also having a tempering effect on even the most 
bellicose players. 
 
An interesting dynamic is at play at this particular time and context within the RAND 
Corporation. On the one hand, the leading mathematicians, physicists, and engineers spent their 
days working out missile technologies and trajectories, while attempting to adapt to a new type of 
uncertain warfare in the nuclear era. The Cold War was a battle of politics and economics as much 
                                               
75 Davidson, W.P.  “A Summary of Experimental Research on ‘Political Gaming,’” 1958, RAND 
Corporation Archives, D-5695-C, p. 8. 
76  Trammel, Aaron. “The Ludic Imagination: The History of Role-Playing Games, Politics, and Simulation, 
in Cold War America 1954-1984. PhD Diss. Graduate School-New Brunswick Rutgers, The State 
University of New Jersey, 2015, p. 109. 
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as, if not more than, a military tactical and strategic game. Hence, the simulation of the CoW by 
integrating these political, and emotional elements kept players grounded in a less abstract reality 
of the consequences of making decisions with life and death effects in ways that mathematical 
formulae of those like Kahn and Paxson did not. In the end, the social sciences division was 
relegated to RAND’s D.C. branch and the game proliferated in interesting ways after being 
abandoned at RAND in favor of more scientific understandings of warfare via game theory and 
systems analysis.  
 
There was an interesting ethical push and pull that went on amongst those who worked on 
nuclear issues, which wasn’t really explored by academics until toward the end of the Cold War. 
True, it is evident that those like Hitch and Lipp when faced with the destructive power of the H-
Bomb felt sick, depressed, and had to drop out of the project, yet many became cogs in the system 
of nuclear war. How did those who participated justify their actions and balance their personal 
ethics? The best study of this was (Gusterson 1996) in his anthropological study of those working 
at Livermore Laboratories in the 1980s. How those workers grappled with the ethical issues I 
believe is insightful for the defense intellectual in general throughout the Cold War. One individual 
at Livermore (Clark) had to negotiate his internal ethical paradox of being a physics graduate 
student protesting the Vietnam War to becoming a nuclear weapons designer: “I had to wrestle 
with the differences [between the Vietnam War and nuclear weapons work] for a while, and I 
really did come to the conclusion–which I still feel–that there is quite a difference between kind 
of stalemated nuclear deterrence and an active policy of dropping a bomb on friendly or moderate 
or neutral villages. Certainly one important difference to me we: in the one people were dying, in 
the other they weren’t” (Gusterson 1996: 56). Clark found it more ethical to work on nuclear 
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weapons than conventional weapons. Precisely because conventional weapons were less 
destructive, and consequently, used to kill people frequently. Instead, nuclear weapons were so 
awful that they are not a means of killing people, but chips in a symbolic game of deterrence 
(Gusterson 1996: 56). 
 
The idea which is pervasive throughout the Cold War and how such work was viewed as 
ethical, was that nuclear warfare was so destructive that they would never be used. This was a 
“central axiom” of Livermore laboratory life. The lab workers designed nuclear weapons to ensure, 
in a world stabilized by nuclear deterrence, that nuclear weapons will never be used. As one 
scientist John Futterman wrote: “I do what I can to make waging unlimited war dangerous, and 
preparation for it expensive...I could say that if I didn’t do it, someone else would, but that 
argument was rejected at Nuremberg. I support the nuclear weapons business...to hold up an 
unmistakable caution flag to humanity demanding we make peace” Quoted in (Gusterson 1996: 
56). Moreover, it was viewed by the defense intellectual that this stable world of nuclear deterrence 
was the epitome of rationality and those that protested this delicate balance of terror were 
emotional idealists. Indeed as Cohn (1987: 717) noted, “Much of their claim to legitimacy, then, 
is a claim to objectivity born of technical expertise and to the disciplined purging of the emotional 
valences that might threaten their objectivity.” Thus, from the very beginning of systems analysts 
at RAND in the 1950s to the academic deterrence theorists of the 1980s, taking the human 
consequences of the bomb into account was emotional, feminine, and would affect the objectivity 
of their analysis.  
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Of course there were many dissenters amongst those even at RAND, and I do not want to 
portray everyone as detached defense intellectuals. There is indeed nuance and debate, even with 
the overwhelming sense of rationally detached science with a narrow notion of objectivity, or 
personal ethical justifications of the threat is so great that MAD creates a stable world where war 
is too costly. One such critic of deterrence was the RAND sociologist Nathan Leites who had a 
number of interesting insights into the moral failures of the prominent deterrence standpoint at 
RAND. After a lengthy discussion of national suicide and how retaliation in MAD was what 
everyone presumed would happen if the Soviet Union struck first, Leites explores the flaws of 
“inevitability” in this logic. Whereby defense intellectuals and practitioners inside the White 
House felt as though there was a deterministic universe of mutually assured destruction, that was 
inescapable. Leites notes, “The sense of inevitability may fill the void of reasons; instead of 
acknowledging that we have chosen to act in a certain way, we may feel that this action is dictated 
by the nature of things.77 This was particularly true in the first nuclear decade where rapid 
technological progress in munitions, missiles, and computing power, were “bound to be used in an 
‘all out’ fashion.”78 Thus, the notion of automatic retaliation was troubling as “the mysteries of the 
new technology facilitated the denial of one’s responsibility of choosing – nuclear war would bring 
annihilation”79 Leites is attempting to critique the overwhelming notion that these events are out 
of our control, somehow inevitable, and not a part of a political decision-making process; an 
essential process in ethical deliberation. 
                                               
77 Leites Box 006-- “Once More About What We Should Not Do Even in the Worst Case: The Assured 
Destruction Attack” [DRAFT], Working group on Nuclear Strategy for the Long Run: Alternatives to 
Deterrence. RAND Corporation Archives, December 1972, p. 7. 
78 Leites Box 006-- “Once More About What We Should Not Do Even in the Worst Case: The Assured 
Destruction Attack” [DRAFT], Working group on Nuclear Strategy for the Long Run: Alternatives to 
Deterrence. RAND Corporation Archives, December 1972, p. 8. 
79 Leites Box 006-- “Once More About What We Should Not Do Even in the Worst Case: The Assured 
Destruction Attack” [DRAFT], Working group on Nuclear Strategy for the Long Run: Alternatives to 
Deterrence. RAND Corporation Archives, December 1972, p. 8. 
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Leites gets to the heart of the issue of the fact/value distinction with respect to deterrence 
and mutually assured destruction. He notes the prominent adage from WWII that “the objective of 
devastating the enemy sufficiently to destroy his capability and will to wage war” is still a formula 
“still heard in the sixties.”80 The linguistic trick of the technostrategic discourse in this formula is 
that: “Both the verb ‘to devastate’ and the noun ‘the enemy’ avoid the distinction between force 
and value, one still too new to have descended into our viscera.”81 Striking an enemy all out even 
if he had struck first is puzzling in that it “does not grossly violate our sense of justice” such that 
with “an act so monstrous revenge becomes acceptable”, whereby ‘revenge’ is “merely used to 
designate our response without any case being made for the moral acceptability of revenge in this 
unusual circumstance.”82 Thus, the fact that revenge is sought, and devastating the enemy is the 
goal, needs no comment. It is the logic by which MAD operates, devoid of moral considerations, 
absolving us of our responsibility of choosing this course of action. Thus, Leites in the early 70s 
recognized how defense intellectuals often are trapped by their logical discursive formulae that 
abstracts away from the moral considerations, framing political choices as inevitably dictated by 
reason. Forgetting that such rationality devoid of ethical consideration, attempts to absolve us of 
difficult ethico-political decision-making; something that is simply an attempt to escape the human 
condition.  
 
 
                                               
80  Leites Box 006-- “Once More About What We Should Not Do Even in the Worst Case: The Assured 
Destruction Attack” [DRAFT], Working group on Nuclear Strategy for the Long Run: Alternatives to 
Deterrence. RAND Corporation Archives, December 1972, p. 12. 
81 Leites Box 006-- “Once More About What We Should Not Do Even in the Worst Case: The Assured 
Destruction Attack” [DRAFT], Working group on Nuclear Strategy for the Long Run: Alternatives to 
Deterrence. RAND Corporation Archives, December 1972, p. 12. 
82  Leites Box 006-- “Once More About What We Should Not Do Even in the Worst Case: The Assured 
Destruction Attack” [DRAFT], Working group on Nuclear Strategy for the Long Run: Alternatives to 
Deterrence. RAND Corporation Archives, December 1972, p. 13. 
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Human-Machine Integration and the Rise of Precision-Guided Munitions 
In the chapter that follows I construct an historico-genealogy of the rise of computing power in 
U.S. warfare and how it functioned to replace ethical due care in just war thinking. To close out 
this chapter, I want to focus on human-machine integration at RAND one of the earliest sites of 
computer usage for military purposes. Early on it was utilized for missile trajectory calculations at 
an enormous cost were rapidly utilized for wargaming in a human-machine integration project. 
John Williams, the head of mathematics in his semi-annual report of 1956 discussed the delivery 
of IBM’s 704 computer to RAND.83 The computer had a steep rental price of $34,000 per month 
but was “between 4 and 20 times as fast” as the IBM 701 computer, with improved quantity and 
quality of storage.84 Some of this exorbitant expense was buttressed by other organizations buying 
time on the computer, nevertheless it was an incredibly expensive, yet powerful machine. Some 
of the computations completed on this machine were fallout calculation for Albert Wohlstetter’s 
study, a strategic air command penetration study, Moon Rocket computations for missile 
trajectory, along with numerous others.85 Nevertheless, computer-based wargaming exercises were 
not high up on the priority list in the early 1950s, but as the technology progressed, so to did its 
expanded use for wargames. 
 
In 1962 following the Cuban Missile Crisis the U.S. undertook a massive computerized 
war game that “confirm[ed] the belief that the United States would prevail in total nuclear war…” 
(Curry and Wilson 2014: 9). The war game was called the Simulation of Total Atomic Global 
                                               
83 John Williams, “Mathematical Division Semiannual Status Report,” D-3736 (6/30/1956), RAND 
Corporation Archives, p. 25.  
84 John Williams, “Mathematical Division Semiannual Status Report,” D-3736 (6/30/1956), RAND 
Corporation Archives, p. 25.  
85 John Williams, “Mathematical Division Semiannual Status Report,” D-3736 (6/30/1956), RAND 
Corporation Archives, p. 21.  
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Exchange (STAGE) and took three years of preparation and five months to play. Programmers 
wrote “punch cards” with instructions fed into the computer with electronic symbols representing 
“missiles, bombers, decoys, interceptions” were recorded on magnetic tape (Curry and Wilson 
2014: 9). Over 160,000 instructions were fed into the computers and determined which strikes 
were successful and how many losses were suffered. Ultimately, the results of the game have not 
be published, but are indicative of broader trends in systems analysis and game theory of the Cold 
War period and the attempt to quantify the uncertainties of a nuclear exchange, which contained 
only speculative data. Theorizing about a nuclear exchange that never occured, uncertainty reigned 
supreme; yet, the high amount of data ran through computer simulators gave decision-makers 
confidence that the U.S. would prevail. A dangerous assumption that is given the aura of 
objectivity because of the certainty of the method utilized: advanced computerized statistical 
analysis. 
 
While reverberations of the CoW continued to circulate, even in RAND similar politico-
military games such as Romeo-Sierra or XRAY were played yielding some useful insights, the 
desire to quantify persisted. However, the prospect of a communist threat in Vietnam quickly made 
the U.S. recognize that intangibles such as ideology, to defeat communism with indigenous 
fighting forces. There was and ARPA (today’s DARPA) project funded in rand known as Project 
AGILE which was “an attempt to build up indigenous capabilities for political, para-military, 
guerilla, and small-scale limited war combat in Southeast Asia.”86 Specifically RAND would have 
to send a team to Bangkok in order to assist with testing new weapons in combat including air 
delivered chemicals, and tactics that may be used in a variety of theaters. Nevertheless, this 
                                               
86 Digby Box 005 – T.E. Greene, “Memorandum: ARPA Request for RAND Assistance on Project Agile,” 
M-6760 (9/24/1951), Project Agile Conflict Studies Correspondence, RAND Corporation Archives, p. 1.  
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research and development field group would be working closely with it Saigon counterparts, both 
of which would focus on “a wide variety of problems such as the use of airpower against 
guerillas...the study of motivations, taboos, etc. among tribes that heretofore have been practically 
unexamined from the anthropological point of view; the content and appropriate dissemination of 
propaganda, etc.”87 Given the limitations of quantitative systems analysis in issues such as 
psychological warfare, propaganda etc. military social scientists searched for more qualitative 
models to quantify these variables. By 1968 were already playing “computer games which 
purportedly enable them to manipulate intangibles such as the morale and loyalty of embattled 
communities, the economic and political health of nations, the growth of technology, and the 
magnetism of ideologies” (Curry and Wilson 2014: 135-136). Such a use of computer gaming for 
previously un-quantifiable aspects of warfare led orthodox systems analysts of RAND to refer to 
such game models as “games to solve the universe” (Curry and Wilson 2014: 136 emphasis added).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the space of contestation at RAND Corporation of the science of warfare 
during the early Cold War period. Debates between the social sciences division and 
mathematics/economics divisions came to fundamental philosophical disagreements on the degree 
to which the social world could be simplified and quantified, while maintaining realism. In 
expanding and elaborating the current trend of examining the lives of Cold War defense 
intellectuals, I sought to demonstrate three important takeaways. First, in addition to Cohn’s 
technostrategic language thesis of defense intellectuals, I argued that quantification abstracts away 
from the human consequences of war making it easier to kill tens of millions without blinking. 
                                               
87  Digby Box 005 – T.E. Greene, “Memorandum: ARPA Request for RAND Assistance on Project Agile,” 
M-6760 (9/24/1951), Project Agile Conflict Studies Correspondence, RAND Corporation Archives, p. 2.  
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Second, I offered a more nuanced insight into the role of early RAND defense intellectuals and 
the rise of politico-military gaming, demonstrating that it was a space of vigorous contestation, 
that ultimately succumbed to the quest for a science of warfare up until the Vietnam War. Third, I 
argued that predicting the future of warfare is impossible. New technologies, ways of theorizing, 
and ethical or political decision-making impact how we think through warfare. Whether AI and 
computing power will change the nature of warfare, the H-Bomb made it such that war was neither 
art nor science. In the wars of tomorrow, war may become so ‘scientific’ that we no longer have 
to kill, only robots will have to. However, no matter what the future may hold, a deep contextual 
understanding of how the defense intellectuals of the 1950s and 60s thought through the dilemmas 
of paradigm shifts ought to highlight how often we are wrong in our assumptions. In the end, this 
chapter has been a thick description of the contestation of power, rather than policy impact per se; 
demonstrating how the power to kill efficiently affects our ethical decision-making. 
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Chapter 4: Probabilities Toward Death: Algorithmic Warfare,  
Machine-Learning Assassinations, and Techno-Ethics 
  
  
 “He learned how to sleep in the mud, tie a knot, kill a man. He learned the ache of loneliness, the 
ache of exhaustion, the kinship of misery. From the beginning he wanted to go home… He 
learned… that every man is alike and that each man is different, [but] if he was on the line it didn’t 
make much difference.” 
 
–Debs Myers “The GI” 
 
“Modern technology has become a total phenomenon for civilization, the defining force of a new 
social order in which efficiency is no longer an option but a necessity imposed on all human 
activity.” 
 
–Jacques Ellul The Technological Society 
 
“U.S. decision making processes need to be streamlined and accelerated, because the problems 
[of tomorrow] are not going to wait for traditional discussions.” 
 
–John O. Brennan, former CIA Director 
  
 
“We are learning lessons every day for the first time about how do you actually integrate AI into 
Department of Defense operationally fielded programs, not research and development, not test 
beds, but capabilities that are being used by warfighters day in and day out.” 
 
– Air Force Lt. Gen. John N.T. “Jack” Shanahan, Project Maven 
 
 
“At its best, computing in warfare allows us to achieve just objectives to protect the nation and 
our vital national interests, while minimizing unnecessary destruction and risk to our military and 
innocent civilians. I would argue that, to this point in history, computing in warfare has allowed 
us to make better decisions as combatants. War is a horrible thing, and it remains imprecise, but 
the jus in bello effect of computers has been generally a movement toward greater precision and 
more narrow applications of force.” 
 
–Heather Wilson, Secretary of U.S. Air Force 
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Introduction 
During the initial ‘shock and awe’ campaign of the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. military ran a statistical 
program called the collateral damage estimation tool (CDET) or ‘bugsplat,’[i] which estimated the 
number of civilians that would likely be killed in a given kinetic strike. On opening day, the 
estimations presented to Gen. Tommy Franks “indicated that 22 of the [30] projected bombing 
attacks on Iraq would produce what they defined as heavy bugsplat – that is, more than 30 civilian 
deaths per raid. Franks said, ‘Go ahead, we’re doing all 30’” (Chamayou 2014, 216). From ‘smart 
bombs’ coupled with CDET to the CIA generating drone strike targets based upon SIM card 
metadata processed by machine-learning algorithms, and Artificial Intelligence (AI), technologies 
of war are increasingly moving beyond meaningful human control. Although such innovations in 
death and destruction bring to mind the culmination of the idea of an “ethical war” that falls in line 
with Western ideals of warfare (Zehfuss 2018; Carvin & Williams 2015; Mabee 2016), such an 
overreliance on technology enables what it seeks to constrain. Technology does not inherently 
make war a more ethical space; instead, algorithmic technologies from smart bombs to killer robots 
function to replace difficult ethico-political decision making with a fantasy of control over the 
uncertainties of conflict, while absolving decision-makers of responsibility for killing by removing 
them one causal step further from the act of killing. 
  
 This chapter represents the culmination of the consequences of Cartesian logic in the realm 
the technological impact on discourses of the ethics of war. What has been established thus far, 
are the Vichian alternatives to moral thinking in an age of advanced computing and artificial 
intelligence. According to Vico, society goes “mad” when the human mind believes that it has 
found Truth and can encompass God’s mind; thus, such hubristic thinking leads us into a historical 
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ricorso to save ourselves by preserving our humanity. As the techno-logics of algorithms in war 
claim to absolve us of ethico-political decision-making in warfare, Vico reminds us that we can 
never escape the human condition by narrow techno-scientific questions that neglect the 
intersubjective human experience. Thus, any foray into technology and the ethics of war, must 
take into account the poetic wisdom of the essence of war: uncertainty, contingency, and the 
horrors of war–as explored in chapter two. While the previous chapter three was a deep dive into 
the contextual understanding and space of contestation in the early Cold War world of The RAND 
Corporation, this chapter presents a broad overview of the evolution of algorithms in U.S. war-
making from Vietnam to today. What follows then, is a discussion of how an ethics of due care 
and practical judgment in just war has been replaced by a narrow computational ethics that claims 
to solve the ethical problems of killing in war. Hence, with the quantification of the global 
battlefield we are no longer killing individual subjects, only shadows of subjectivity based upon 
metadata constructions of risk. The allure of scientific and numerical objectivity cloaks the ethico-
political dilemmas in war as a technical problem to be solved, with the ultimate problem-solver 
being lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) or killer robots. In the end, this chapter 
explores how this logic undermines the foundational principles of one’s symmetrical right to 
kill/be killed in war–the mutual recognition of subjectivity of the Other–the foundations upon 
which the laws and ethics of war are built. 
 
With the abundance of human error and bias that leads to atrocities in warfare, the idea of 
a neutral machine that is free of emotion and can analyze any situation objectively, is indeed 
seductive for policymakers. However, such logic is illusory as humans, along with their biases and 
flaws, are always already involved in the programming of machines from writing the code, refining 
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the algorithms, and updating the software; but all of this takes place out of our purview. I view 
contemporary techno-practices of US war-making as one piece of a larger historico-genealogical 
development of algorithmic logic that has quietly shifted an ethics of due care in war to a techno-
ethics of killing. The evolution of technology, so the argument goes, strives to render the 
uncertainties of war calculable, measurable, predictable, and ultimately make war humane 
endeavor, but in the process, also hides biases out of the practitioner’s purview deep within the 
mirage of the code. Thus, in an era where we have reached a crisis in the laws of war (Clark et al. 
2018) and the practice of ethics has become a technical problem to be solved, the question remains: 
what are the logics and tools of this technological (r)evolution for military practitioners, and what 
techno-ethics are enabled or excluded from these logics? 
  
Many view such technological innovations as novel solutions to the dilemmas of warfare 
because they remove human bias, emotion, error, and subjectivity by providing a more scientific, 
objective, and neutral means of waging war (Strawser 2010; Plaw 2013; Sullins 2010). Others 
view war technology as more problematic and have begun campaigns to “ban killer robots” to keep 
individuals accountable by giving them “meaningful human control” over targeting decisions 
(Sharkey 2010; Zehfuss 2012; Roff 2014).[ii] A more in-depth take on this area of contestation can 
be found in Beier (2017), yet as Mabee (2016) argues that a historical sociological approach of 
understanding U.S. ‘militarism’ as opposed to ‘war’ “broadens out the critical analysis of present-
day military practices, by focusing on their long-term institutionalization” (256). The for and 
against debate of war technology indeed misses something important about what the historico-
genealogical arc of these military algorithmic evolutions tells us about the quest for the ‘ethical 
war’ – whether for realist (strategically to win hearts/minds) or more liberalist (protection of 
 175 
innocents) concerns – that has come to dominate American discourse. Despite the rhetoric of ‘just 
war’ that often accompanies praise of technological advances in targeting, virtue ethics and 
practical judgment has been abandoned and replaced by a predetermined utilitarian calculation 
conceived as objective and neutral techno-innovation in the eyes of practitioners. Such a 
(r)evolution in understanding war ethics speaks to a wider epistemological drive of quantifying the 
uncertainties of war into a numerically calculable risk assessments that ultimately reshapes the 
capacity of humans to make ethical decisions (Hagmann & Dunn Cavelty 2012). What is at stake 
in these techno-practices of war is the erosion of effective constraints on the use of lethal force 
because this techno-rationalization of risk assessment has supplanted genuine ethical deliberation 
about the consequences of contemporary conflict. While International Relations scholars have 
increasingly turned toward the “body” and “emotions” in the study of war, violence, and ethics 
(see: Gregory 2016; Solomon & Steele 2017; Campbell & Steele 2017), the question remains as 
to what these technologies of war tell us about the desire to eliminate the body and emotion from 
the battlefield. 
  
Genealogy helps us understand that a high-tech battlefield does not equate to a teleological 
avenue toward the “ethical war.” Instead, genealogy brings to light buried practices and discourses 
of violence while historicizing novel techno-innovations within the wider epistemological trend of 
the quantification of society more generally and specifically in the illusion of taming chance in 
war. Taking into account historical genealogy of drones has brought them out of their sci-fi allure 
and into broader narrative of US war practices. Gregory (2013) did this with geographies of war; 
Chamayou (2012; 2014) with asymmetrical combat and manhunting; and Kindervater (2016) with 
her genealogical history of the rise of drones since the early 20th century. In a similar vein, I 
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construct a historico-genealogical narrative of how algorithmic calculation and technology is 
believed to make war an inherently more ethical space in US practices of warfare – of which drones 
are a piece of the puzzle. Building from Schwarz’s (2016) question of how drone technology as 
biopolitical assemblages might shape our capacity to think ethically, this paper examines how 
various technologies of war and their techno-logics function to replace ethico-political decision-
making with objective, neutral, and quantifiable risk assessments. Thus, the genealogy that follows 
traces how we got to this point of ethics relegated to the algorithmic realm, and given this 
trajectory, the logical next step is autonomous weaponry that codifies the errors of today for the 
foreseeable future. The argument unfolds in the following manner. 
  
First, I elucidate an historical genealogy of the evolution of smart bombs and collateral 
damage algorithms seeking to unearth the superficial layer of logic in which techno-innovation 
has been constructed as a replacement for an ethics of due care in warfare. Such technologies have 
enabled practitioners – like Gen. Franks above – to tick the ethical box of exercising due care in 
war, without actually practicing due care. This vision of jus in bello ethics runs counter to virtue 
ethics and practical judgment that ultimately masks the dilemmas of killing in war in a false sense 
of numerical objectivity. Second, a further excavation unveils that targeted killing in non-declared 
warzones based on metadata and machine-learning algorithms that produce a risk assessment of 
‘terroristness’ destabilizes the legal and ethical justifications for targeted killing in the first instance 
– eroding ones subjectivity as a combatant. The quantification of war has moved from ticking the 
ethical box of killing innocent subjects, to killing heterogeneous correlations of data. Here I 
elucidate the paradox of a more ‘precise weaponry’ that can target individuals, but has eroded the 
very notion of an individual by killing the shadow of their metadata. Third, looking to the present 
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and near future, this genealogy unveils how the human assumptions that are always already written 
into the code of AI and machine learning algorithms. Mistaking these innovations as objective and 
neutral is thought to eliminate negative human biases, but with it also eliminates the positives of 
humanity, crucial to any understanding of a virtue ethics of practical judgment. In the end, this 
chapter probes the ethical quandaries that algorithmic technologies and AI on the global battlefield 
and proffers that such trends cannot make war inherently ethical; it can only remove humans one 
step further from the act of killing – an ultimately futile attempt to escape the human condition. 
  
Techno-Ethics: From Practical Judgment to Computation in Western Warfare 
Technology is portrayed as the solution to the dilemmas of Western warfare by killing within the 
parameters of the jus in bello laws of war – i.e. killing more discriminately and proportionally. In 
essence, the pervasive notion is that a ‘clean war’ is now technologically possible, and the US can 
target those who pose a threat to the US and others globally before they have an opportunity to 
carry out deadly attacks with no risk to US soldiers. Such war practices are depoliticized within 
life-affirming and humanitarian discourses, such that the “matrix of war invokes life as the ultimate 
purpose of its operations” (Jabri 2006, 60). Perhaps this notion is best summarized by Obama’s 
2013 justification of civilian casualties of covert CIA drone strikes outside of declared warzones: 
  
  It is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in 
every war…But as Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the 
alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties 
— not just in our cities at home and our facilities abroad, but also in the very places like Sana’a 
and Kabul and Mogadishu where terrorists seek a foothold.  Remember that the terrorists we are 
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after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any 
estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes. So doing nothing is not an option.[iii] 
  
The act of killing itself is depoliticized because doing nothing in the face of terrorism is 
perceived not to be a viable option. In the post 9/11 era and the psychological vulnerability of 
Western populations have demonstrated the old way of terrorism as crime through criminal 
indictments and prosecution is perceived as ‘doing nothing’ in the face of a constructed ‘existential 
threat.’ Furthermore, Obama invokes his justification of killing civilians that are not in active 
combat zones in humanitarian terms of saving them from terrorists in their own land. Ultimately, 
technology is imperfect, but it is viewed as ethically superior means of war that can square the 
circle having to kill innocents cloaked in the humanitarian discourse of ‘saving strangers.’ Hence, 
the “logics at work here are such that faith in the ethical conduct of war has increasingly become 
coterminous with faith in the weapons” (Beier 2017, 10).  Patricia Owens (2003) offers an 
insightful critique of how noncombatant deaths by Western militaries are only ever “accidents” 
because they never “intentionally” target civilians. The question of intention is brought to light by 
an over-reliance on a techno-logic that not only rationalizes civilian deaths as a priori accidental, 
but also raises the deeper question that these acts may be “beyond intention” (Owens 2003). There 
is indeed a legitimate critique of the principle of noncombatant immunity that relies on an 
assessment of the intentionality of the actors, as “it works to enable what it seeks to prevent, 
namely making the killing of civilians acceptable” (Zehfuss 2012, 423). Furthermore, the 
production of “us” as ethical because we “bomb precisely” depends upon “a curious fusion of 
intent and outcome a fantasy of control”, which is exacerbated by the development of smart bombs 
and collateral damage algorithms explored below (Zehfuss 2011, 561 emphasis added). 
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Ultimately, what I strive to demonstrate throughout this chapter is how the evolution of military 
technologies have systematically replaced an ethics of due care and practical judgment of human 
decision-making with algorithmic and AI logics that masks human bias deep within the algorithm, 
portrayed as objective, neutral, and scientific technologies of war. 
  
The Evolution of Smart Bombs and Collateral Damage Algorithms 
As the use of Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) or “smart bombs” has increased in the post-
Cold War era, as has the use of software that calculates the probability of civilian casualties. 
According to Crawford (2013) the operationalization and institutionalization of statistical 
algorithms in US military engagements really evolved in an ad hoc manner gradually after the 
Vietnam War. Both PGMs and collateral damage estimation software advanced from the belief 
that technologies such as these make it “easier to be good” in modern war, as opposed to the awful 
moral choices presented during WWII and the Vietnam War (Zehfuss 2011). The Vietnam War 
saw the first use of laser-guided bombs (LGBs), and although they were only one percent of the 
munitions dropped in the war, Gen. William W. Momyer was impressed with their accuracy: “If 
the target could be seen and the target was vulnerable to the explosive power of the weapon, the 
probability of damage with a single weapon was 80 to 90 percent” (Correll 2010, 64). However 
these LGBs were dependent on good weather, the target not being obscured by smoke or 
camouflage – a tall order during the fog of war. But the Gulf War in 1991 marked the first extensive 
use of PGMs in Western warfare at eight percent of all bombs dropped leading the Gulf War 
Airpower Survey to declare: “Desert Storm reconfirmed that LGBs possessed a near single-bomb 
target-destruction capability, an unprecedented if not revolutionary development in aerial warfare” 
(Correll 2010, 64). Later during the 1999 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo the first GPS-guided 
 180 
bomb was introduced – the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) – and it was not dependent on 
weather conditions or visibility of the target and was used to the tune of 35 percent of all bombs 
dropped. With this ad hoc evolution alongside a growing use of collateral damage software that 
was slow and unreliable, PGMs became the techno-solution to the moral dilemmas of warfare; yet, 
the term ‘precision’ itself is a misleading one. 
  
         The idea that the LGBs and JDAMs are “precise” is deceptive on two accounts. First, even 
if these munitions are only as precise as the intelligence that goes into where they ought to strike. 
Second, there is a major misperception of what “precision” means in common parlance versus the 
military conception of the term. The first was exemplified on February 13, 1991 when two 2,000 
pound LGBs were dropped on the Amiriyah shelter, better known as the Al Firdos C3 bunker in 
Iraq, killing roughly 400 Iraqi civilians and severely injuring 200 others (Washington Post 1998). 
It was believed to be an Iraqi command center as daytime satellite photographs displayed trucks 
and limousines parked outside, suggesting “leadership activity” (Ibid). After international outcry 
from the incident, the US sought to protect its image and improve its collateral damage estimating 
capabilities, which at this time were computed using “engineering estimates developed 
independently for each appropriate target in a very lengthy process” (Crawford 2013, 242). Yet, 
improving the collateral damage estimates was a solution that this particular problem did not call 
for, as the intelligence was poor from the outset mistaking a civilian shelter for military leadership. 
Eight years later the failure of intelligence persisted when on May 7, 1999 by when NATO dropped 
five JDAM bombs onto the Chinese embassy in Belgrade mistaking it for the Yugoslav Federal 
Supply and Procurement HQ. The second deception exists in the linguistic trick of the term 
precision itself. Precision does not mean that the JDAM will hit the specific building it is aimed at 
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(assuming the intel is accurate), but that precision is “put[ting] 90 percent of their JDAMs within 
10 meters—or about 33 feet—of the target” (Correll 2010, 64). Derek Gregory (2013) illustrates 
the linguistic trick of precision and accuracy in ‘smart bombs’ noting that there is large disconnect 
between the military and colloquial understanding of the term. Ultimately, in densely populated 
urban areas, 10 meters can be the difference between an enemy target and a hospital or school and 
therefore enables a public illusory discourse of precise bombing as more ethical than ‘carpet 
bombing’, when the reality is far from the ideal case espoused by the language itself. 
  
         Smart bombs or PGMs is only one piece of the puzzle in this historical unfolding of liberal 
militarism in search of the ‘ethical war’. Bieir (2017) makes the compelling case that smart bombs 
has been fundamental to the blurring of the agent and subjecthood; nevertheless these weapons 
systems were simultaneously accompanied with the rise of computer algorithms that claimed to be 
able to predict probabilities of civilian casualties for any given kinetic strike. Bieir then identifies 
three intertwined and mutually reinforcing moves whereby the rhetorical moves surrounding the 
advent of PGMs and the shift away from indiscriminate bombing of which he misses the 
algorithmic collateral damage component: 
          
the denial of a viable oppositional subject position; the mystification of sites of subjecthood 
that is affected by discursive and semiotic construction of weapons averring varying 
degrees of autonomy; and the apparent predilection to impute agency to weapons 
themselves such that they may even be read to be occupying some measure of a subject 
position in the ethical practice of war (Bieir 2017, 11). 
  
 
Hence, this piece expands Bieir’s analysis by deepening the understanding of technologies of 
militarism where “faith in the ethical conduct of war has increasingly become coterminous with 
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faith in the weapons” via the algorithmic mechanisms that further enabled the ethical PGMs 
discourse (10). During the Kosovo campaign NATO had begun utilizing the statistical package 
known as the Conventional Casualty Estimation Tool and the Collateral Damage Estimation Tool 
(CDET). CDET was run on over 400 targets in Kosovo and it used three-dimensional modeling 
for a “high fidelity assessment” of probable collateral damage, but this process was tedious and 
took several hours to run. By the early combat days of Afghanistan 2001 CDET was still used, but 
new software had also been developed, known as the Fast Assessment Strike Tool – Collateral 
Damage (FAST-CD), which was previously known as “Bugsplat” (Crawford 2013, 242). CDET 
was considered too slow because it required analysis of both manmade and natural features of the 
target area, whereas the renamed FAST-CD was much faster and according to Captain Mary Cohen 
“one of Bugsplat's benefits is that it's far simpler to use” (Graham 2003). Moreover, FAST-CD 
was ideal for time-sensitive targets, as it could take “as little as five minutes to run the program” 
(Crawford 2013, 242). Speed, ease of use, and the strategic and normative push to minimize 
civilian casualties in modern warfare were essential drivers in the development and evolution of 
these statistical software packages. 
  
This evolution in computing, PGMs, and more capable intelligence gathering aircraft – i.e. 
drones – resulted in an increased assumption that civilian casualties could be reigned in and the 
uncertainty of warfare could be tamed. Thus, Brigadier General Kelvin Coppock, director of 
intelligence for the Air Combat Command, stated that bugsplat was a “significant advance” as “it 
will allow us to target those facilities that we want to target with confidence that we’re not going 
to cause collateral damage” (Graham 2003, emphasis added). Both programs have since been 
improved and are now known as Advanced CDET and FAST-CD 2.0. These stats programs offer 
 183 
a fantasy of control to mitigate the unknown circumstances that paradoxically increase 
probabilities of civilian casualties as it decreases the liability and accountability of war-makers for 
foreseeable and preventable civilian casualties. Hence, the idea that precision munitions and 
collateral damage software make war less destructive or inherently more ethical, gives 
practitioners a false sense that the killing of innocents is always already beyond intention. The 
techno-logic is thus: the ‘ethical war’ is only a few software updates away, when FAST-CD fails 
to accurately predict the level of collateral damage in a timely manner we get FAST-CD 2.0. 
  
Jus in Bello War Ethics and Due Care 
The evolution of PGMs and CDET above fundamentally calls into question the belief that the 
ethical box of due care can be ticked by decision-makers by simply deploying “smarter” bombs 
alongside more advanced collateral damage algorithms. This begs the question: What does it mean 
to exercise ethical due care in war? Michael Walzer in his now classic book Just and Unjust Wars, 
illustrates what practical judgment and due care may look like. In order to demonstrate this Walzer 
utilizes the WWI memoir, Old Soldiers Never Die, of Private Frank Richards of the Royal Welsh 
Fusiliers. During his time in France, he and his fellow soldiers faced a dilemma, that the laws of 
war say to exercise “due care” not to harm civilians, but how did that play out in the reality of the 
battlefield? Richards wrote: 
  
         When bombing dug-outs or cellars, it was always wise to throw the bombs into them first 
and have a look around them after. But we had to be very careful in this village as there 
were civilians in some of the cellars. We shouted down to them to make sure. Another man 
and I shouted down one cellar twice and receiving no reply were just about to pull the pins 
out of our bombs when we heard a woman’s voice and a young lady came up the cellar 
steps...She and the members of her family...had not left [the cellar] for some days. They 
guessed an attack was being made and when we first shouted down had been too frightened 
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to answer. If the young lady had not cried out when she did, we would have innocently 
murdered them all (Walzer 2006, 154 emphasis added). 
  
  
Walzer utilizes this case to illustrate that due care calls for the soldiers put themselves at some risk 
in order to protect civilians. If there had been German soldiers in the cellar they might have 
scrambled out firing and it would have been far more prudent to simply throw the bombs in the 
cellar without shouting down, which military necessity would have justified him doing so. 
However, Richards was “surely doing the right thing when he shouted his warning. He was acting 
as a moral man ought to act; this is not an example of fighting heroically, but simply of fighting 
well. It is what we expect of soldiers” (Walzer 2006, 154). 
  
One can see how an ethics of due care is intuitive to us in inter-state symmetric warfare. 
While military necessity and the laws of war might dictate one course of action, practical judgment 
and simply acting how one ought to act in war presents an alternative course of action. This is not 
to say that soldiers act ethically most of the time. For example, US soldiers in Fallujah, Iraq 
sometimes would not exercise due care in clearing the city house by house because it was too time 
consuming. Instead, they would break windows and throw grenades, justifying it by stating that a 
warning was given to leave the city, so anyone that remained was liable to be killed as a combatant. 
This is indeed a misunderstanding of due care, whereby the ethical box was believed to be ticked 
by issuing an evacuation order or dropping leaflets to leave etc. How then can due care apply to 
asymmetrical war like that of drones? Schwenkenbecher (2014, 95) argues persuasively that the 
jus in bello “criterion of discrimination should be more closely linked to a principle of due care 
than to considerations of proportionality”, making due care necessary for any understanding of 
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war ethics today. For her, due care in the modern era where troops are not on the ground means 
setting a high bar of a positive commitment civilians and avoiding foreseeable harm which the 
principle of proportionality and doctrine of double effect may permit (Schwenkenbecher 2014, 
100). Furthermore, Enemark (2017) explores this issue more in depth in his analysis of drone 
operators, and ethics where there is “no mutual physical risk…For only a killing that is warlike is 
supposed therefore to be morally better than mere slaughter” (10). Ultimately, with a 
conceptualization of ethical due care that is reliant on putting our soldiers bodies at some 
reasonable risk to protect civilian lives, how does the drone and an accelerated global battlefield 
that removes Western bodies from risk of violence impact war ethics today? 
  
In contrast to an ethics of due care in the modern era, there a couple of alarming trends in 
justifications for killing civilians while systematically transferring risk from our soldiers to their 
civilians.[iv] First, is the belief by those such as Strawser (2010) that it is ethically imperative for 
us to remove our troops from the battlefield with the use of drones, countering Walzer’s claim that 
soldiers must put themselves at some reasonable risk to protect civilians. Second, as discussed 
above, is the confidence of Brig. Gen. Coppock that technology can “eliminate collateral damage” 
and of Gen. Franks to “go ahead” even when the algorithm predicts high probability of civilian 
casualties. Ultimately, the pervasive logic that when we (the US) kill civilians in war it is always 
already beyond intention, has found its technological justification removing decision-makers one 
step further from accountability for the killing of innocents. These trends of deference to 
technological solutions to the ‘problem’ of killing innocents arises from an accelerated War on 
Terror whereby ethical dilemmas are no longer interrogated and debated and due care is relegated 
to an idealized warfare of the past, that practitioners believe has passed. Former CIA director John 
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Brennan summed it up best when he said, “U.S. decision making processes need to be streamlined 
and accelerated…Because the problems [of today] are not going to wait for traditional 
discussions.” [v] 
  
Quantifying the Global Battlefield: From Judgment to Computation 
War is an inherently unknowable arena of human activity, where uncertainty in the fog of war 
reigns supreme. The attempt to bring contemporary technological innovation into war necessitated 
a quantification of the battlefield that required a presumption of how an enemy will fight, which 
is an educated guess at best. The infamous 2002 war-game exercise “Millennium Challenge” (MC) 
exemplified the technological hubris that the revolution in military affairs (RMA) brought about. 
Technology makes individuals one causal step removed from both killing and accountability for 
mistakes, we tend to defer to technology giving us a psychological sense of security in an uncertain 
venue like war (Burke 2006). This $250-million war game pitted the US military (with 
technological capabilities predicted five years into the future) against Gen. Paul Van Riper’s red-
team enemy forces. But Riper did not want to play by the rules–aka show off the RMA to defeat 
an inferior enemy–and decided to “preempt the preemptors” and strike the US forces first (Zenko 
2015). Zenko recounts the event as such: 
  
Once U.S. forces were within range, Van Riper’s forces unleashed a barrage of missiles 
from ground-based launchers, commercial ships, and planes flying low and without radio 
communications to reduce their radar signature. Simultaneously, swarms of speedboats 
loaded with explosives launched kamikaze attacks. The carrier battle group’s Aegis radar 
system — which tracks and attempts to intercept incoming missiles — was quickly 
overwhelmed, and 19 U.S. ships were sunk, including the carrier, several cruisers, and five 
amphibious ships. ‘The whole thing was over in five, maybe ten minutes,’ Van Riper said 
(Zenko 2015). 
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However, a ten-minute end to the most expensive military exercise to date was not what the 
military had anticipated, so they simply refloated the virtual naval fleet and continued the exercise 
to Van Riper’s protest. He believed that misplaced faith in then-nonexistent technologies were 
dangerous and ought not to be assumed in the upcoming Iraq War, such that he set out to destroy 
the US fleet to demonstrate the limitations of this kind of technology and its logic (Zenko 2015). 
And he did so in extraordinary fashion. MC 2002 exemplifies how assumptions of a collectively 
held strategic imaginary and its assumptions of the nature of war will find their way into the 
algorithms and issues that arise from that given the evolving nature of war type and enemies faced. 
  
         Although those in command claimed to have learned from the lessons of MC 2002, Iraq 
and Afghanistan have since demonstrated that technological reliance without political and strategic 
imagination, that goes hand-in-hand with ethical practical judgment, is doomed. Nevertheless, 
since 2002 computation power and artificial intelligence has reached levels that few could have 
predicted, and once again the essence of future wars would be data-driven. With machine-learning 
algorithms, AI, and the loitering capabilities of drones, human judgment has dramatically ceded 
decision-making power in contemporary conflicts as will be demonstrated below. As the US 
moves to quantify the global battlefield and render “knowable” the uncertainties of war by simply 
disguising them as numerical probabilistic outcomes, greater strategic errors will dominate as the 
ends of war are neglected in favor of perfecting the means. Probabilities cannot dictate values, 
strategies, political dilemmas of war, or ethical criteria such as due care or responsibility; 
nevertheless, “it now lies at the basis of all reasonable choice made by officials” (Hacking 1990, 
4). By briefly tracing the historical genealogy of smart bombs and Bugsplat, I hope to have 
demonstrated how the quantifiable battlefield constructs an illusion of certainty by burying the 
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process of decision-making in the algorithms themselves such that judgment has been replaced by 
computation. There is an underlying determinism within the statistical logic, ethico-political 
decision-making is reduced to software updates; when FAST-CD fails to predict Bugsplat in a 
timely manner, we get FAST-CD 2.0. 
  
Machine-Learning Assassination and the Erosion of the Subject 
There is a central paradox that this genealogy takes the next step in shifting from calculating 
‘bugsplat’ with ‘smart bombs’ targeting buildings, to targeting individuals in drone strikes. While 
the US has the capability to target individuals globally, they are no longer individual subjects, 
combatants, or criminals being targeted. Human beings have become shadows of subjectivity, 
constructed by their metadata, that predicts a probability of ‘terroristness’ now or at some unknown 
point in the future. The use of US drones in undeclared warzones has launched a generation of 
research in all fields of study; however, the drone itself is not as interesting as the machine-learning 
process in which targets are determined. Schwarz (2016, 64) explored in her article on drones and 
bio-politics “that which might pose a risk is identified and selected as a justified target merely on 
the basis of identifiable markers, patterns and algorithmic calculations, and in most cases the exact 
factors that contribute to the algorithmic determination of targets remain opaque.” However, 
subsequent revelations about the SKYNET program via a leaked NSA PowerPoint allows us to 
gaze deeper into the practices and logics of US targeting practices. SKYNET was the joint NSA 
and CIA operation over Yemen and Pakistan where the NSA swept up a dragnet SIM card metadata 
upon which drone strikes were based. SKYNET works like a typical modern Big Data business 
application. The program collects metadata and stores it on NSA cloud servers, extracts relevant 
information, and then applies machine learning to identify leads for a targeted campaign (Grothoff 
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& Porup 2016). Except, instead of trying to sell the targets something like the business 
applications, this campaign executes their “Find-Fix-Finish” strategy using Hellfire missiles to 
take out their target (Greenwald & Scahill 2015).  In addition to processing logged cellular phone 
call data (so-called “DNR” or Dialled Number Recognition data, such as time, duration, who called 
whom, etc.), SKYNET also collects user location, allowing for the creation of detailed travel 
profiles. Turning off a mobile phone gets flagged as an attempt to evade mass surveillance. Users 
who swap SIM cards, naively believing this will prevent tracking, also get flagged (the 
ESN/MEID/IMEI burned into the handset makes the phone trackable across multiple SIM cards). 
Given the complete set of metadata, SKYNET pieces together people's typical daily routines—
who travels together, have shared contacts, stay overnight with friends, visit other countries, or 
move permanently. Overall, the slides indicate, the NSA machine-learning algorithm uses more 
than 80 different properties to rate people on their “terroristiness” (Grothoff & Porup 2016). 
  
The paradox then is that while the targeting can become more individualized – by a 
loitering drone striking a car in the desert – the shadow of subjectivity is all that is targeted, hence 
the individualization of killing has eroded the subjectivity of the individual. These techno-practices 
of war are a concrete illustration of how the who targeted is no longer an individual subject, but a 
what of statistical correlations of probabilities of ‘terroristness,’ whereby radical homogeneity is 
constructed from heterogeneous data upon which life and death decisions are based. Hence, the 
idea of who qualifies as a combatant and becomes a legitimate target – in line with jus in bello 
ethics – has been eroded. The ethical implications are staggering as the subjectivity of the 
combatant has been replaced by the process of data construction, which undercuts the rationale for 
why it is ethically permissible to kill a combatant in war-—one’s subjectivity. Nordin and Öberg 
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(2015) discuss the erosion of subjectivity of those operating drones (i.e. the chain of command, 
the drone pilot, the military lawyers, the removal of the soldier from combat, etc.) as opposed to 
those targeted in drone strikes as I wish to discuss. The laws and ethics of war assume some level 
of reciprocity in the right to kill and be killed strict guidelines for who is a legitimate target. Yet, 
while technology allows the US to target not an individual, but an object, a shadow of subjectivity 
based solely on metadata collected and calculated out of thin air with the SKYNET. 
  
N=All: Statistical Death Sentencing 
At this juncture of the historical genealogy, algorithmic war has moved from ticking the ethical 
box of killing innocent subjects, to killing constructions of data in an attempt to quantify the 
uncertainties of war. This section explores the quantification of the battlefield into calculable “risk-
analysis formula, which assigns a numerical value to a risk theme by multiplying the probability 
of occurrence by a figure for the potential impact” presenting a “rationalization of the future based 
on engineering risk-assessment methodology” that is nothing more than “a glorified form of 
guesstimates” (Hagmann & Dunn Cavelty 2012, 81). Risk-assessments in US warfare and counter-
terrorism practices cloak their guesstimates of an inherently uncertain venue and attempt to 
produce a predictable future outcome from the chaos of war. Contemporary security practices 
silence questions of a “malleability of future trajectories” of warfare (Hagmann & Dunn Cavelty 
2012, 81), while simultaneously propping mathematical science that is “already enfolded the 
intuitive and inferential in its very objectivity” (Amoore 2014, 425) as a scientifically objective 
solution to the problem of terrorism. Ian Hacking in his book The Taming of Chance traces the 
intellectual and historical processes that led to the birth of modern statistics and the 
institutionalization of the “probabilization” of Western intellectual thought. Here he discusses the 
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avalanche of data that early statisticians of the 19th century that explored everything from suicide 
rates and crime rates, to jury sizes and birth rates, or whatever was of statistical interest. However, 
Big Data of today, according to Amoore and Piotukh (2015), makes a crucial epistemic break with 
early statisticians whereby everything can be quantified and analyzed with massive computing 
analytics. Thus, the advent of Big Data and the necessary computing power to analyze it has 
significant practical and ethical implications for counter-terrorism operations that seek to prevent 
future attacks before they can come to fruition. 
  
         What are the implications then of breaking statistics from subsets to n=all datasets? 
Statisticians consistently argue that even within subsets, the bell curve cannot tell you anything 
about a particular individual in that group; yet that error is amplified when everything and everyone 
becomes quantifiable. Chamayou sums it up best:  “But the whole problem–at once 
epistemological and political–lies in this claimed ability to be able to correctly convert an assembly 
of probable indices into a legitimate target” (2014, 49). The first implication is an epistemology of 
population where n=all, where Pakistani or Yemeni residents are reduced to a numerical object of 
interest, detached from the population as such, and relegated to a “chain of analysis” in which the 
person of interest emerges from the links of “activities funded;” “members of;” “listed;” 
“acquainted with;” “traveled to;” etc. (Amoore and Piotukh 2015, 359). What is ontologically 
problematic for SKYNET and targeted killings based upon these statistical correlations is far more 
pronounced in errors than a poorly targeted ad for business marketing. These algorithmic 
technologies tends to reduce difference in kind to differences in degree; a reduction and flattening 
that “patterns of life” emerge where interventions are made on that basis (Amoore and Piotukh 
2015, 361). Hence, the NSA’s cloud-based behavior analytics system constructs a “pattern of life” 
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where the “highest scoring selector” based on social network and travel behavior metadata—that 
is, the target most likely to exhibit ‘terroristness’—turned out to be Ahmad Muaffaq Zaidan, Al 
Jazeera’s longtime Islamabad bureau chief.[vi] Since it was a covert CIA program, the inner 
workings of the algorithm remain classified; nevertheless, it should give us all pause when General 
Michael Hayden (former director of the NSA and CIA) bluntly states: “We kill people based on 
metadata” knowing the process of data construction.[vii] The rise of big analytics has rendered all 
data tractable, which “carves out radical heterogeneity into flat difference of degree, such that it 
appears as though everything is calculable, everything about the uncertain future is nonetheless 
decidable” (Amoore and Piotukh 2015, 361, emphasis added). Ultimately, the turn to Big Data and 
machine learning functions to replace judgment with computation under the guise of a calculation 
of risk of a knowable future yet to come. Such probabilities cannot dictate values, such as due 
process in law or due care in war, but “it now lies at the basis of all reasonable choice made by 
officials” (Hacking 1990, 4). 
  
         The paradoxes of a more precise technology accompanied by a misunderstanding of 
statistics in big data are amplified in a War on Terror that blurs the lines between war and law 
enforcement. Contestation over which bodies of law apply – International Humanitarian Law or 
International Human Rights Law – in these in-between spaces of Pakistan and Somalia highlight 
the dilemmas of counter-terrorism with global reach in an era of contested and fragmented (Fisk 
and Ramos 2016; Brunstetter and Holeindre 2017). Nevertheless, the genealogy thus far has 
demonstrated the rise of techno warfare: smart bombs, collateral damage algorithms, quantification 
of war, and SKYNET targeting shadows of subjectivity as a piece of the larger historical tension 
to meld liberal values with war-making. The paradox of targeting individuals that are a shadow of 
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subjectivity is that the aim is not to confront a concrete dangerous situation that those ‘terrorists’ 
pose “but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger. ‘Prevention’ in effect promotes 
suspicion to the dignified scientific rank of a calculus of probabilities” (Castel 1991, 288, emphasis 
original). Hence, quantification of the battlefield does not make war an inherently more ethical 
space; it simply cloaks suspicion and ontological insecurity in scientific language and numerical 
objectivity. Ultimately, these paradoxes are amplified as one moves further away algorithmic-
based decision-making toward Artificial Intelligence. 
  
Artificial Intelligence: The False Promises of Perfect Rationality 
The final stage of this genealogical narrative seeks to highlight the present and near-future military 
applications of AI. Arguing first that human assumptions that are always already written into the 
code of AI and machine learning algorithms. Second, that mistaking these innovations as objective 
and neutral is thought to eliminate negative human biases, but with it also eliminates the positives 
of humanity crucial to any understanding of a virtue ethics of practical judgment and due care. The 
debate as it currently stands for proponents and opponents of AI in warfare can be boiled down to 
this: AI will bring us closer to the “ethical war” by dramatically reducing civilian casualties 
through the elimination of human bias. Or AI will bring us closer to destruction by opening 
Pandora’s box through the violation of the first of Isaac Asimov’s three laws of robotics: a robot 
may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. Finally 
there is the middle ground that simply calls for varying degrees of “meaningful human control” 
over autonomous weapons systems (Human Rights Watch 2016). I argue however that the framing 
of this debate is misguided, on the premise that it fundamentally misunderstands how AI functions. 
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Programmers themselves do not know why AI makes the decisions that it does, because of the 
nature of AI. Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo that defeated the world champion in what is arguable 
the most difficult game in the world, Go, best demonstrates how AI works. First the AI had the 
rules of the game programmed, and played a number of Go players to where it became a decent 
Go player. What happened next was that AlphaGo played against itself in millions of games, until 
it learned the best of all possible strategies. Thus, when it played the world champion, it was 
making moves no human had ever made in the game, and DeepMind could not explain why it 
would do that because no human could track all the millions of iterations it played; hence, the 
essence of AI is it is always already beyond meaningful human control in the first instance. What 
is important for AI in warfare, is that there are not strict “rules of the game” like in Go or chess, 
as Millennium Challenge above demonstrated, when the enemy doesn’t play by the rules, you 
cannot just refloat the Naval fleet and try again. The world is complex; war is an experiment in 
catastrophe where the complexities of the social world are amplified exponentially. My hesitation 
about AI rests in the fact that once Pandora’s box is opened, we cannot know why it makes the 
decisions it does, which has enormous consequences when we give AI the power to take human 
life. Ultimately, AI is the next step in the genealogical narrative toward the goal of the ‘ethical 
war’, even if it is not quite ‘killer robots’ yet, it will be soon. 
  
Project Maven 
First and foremost, before discussing the problems associated with AI and ‘killer robots’ I want to 
address what AI has already been deployed on the battle against ISIS by the US. Much like speed 
and ease of use were issues for collateral damage software, the proliferation of drones on the global 
battlefield has led to a crisis in an over-abundance of video “data”, a technical problem to be 
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solved. Project Maven launched in April 2017 and it created an Algorithmic Warfare Cross-
Functional Team that sought to “accelerate DoD’s integration of big data and machine 
learning.”[viii] The accelerated battle tempo of the text seeks integrate this AI into smaller 
ScanEagle drones in “90-day sprints” of analyzing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) (see Kindervater 2016 for a history of ISR and dynamic targeting with drone technology). 
Followed by a subsequent sprint to “consolidate existing algorithm-based technology initiatives 
related to mission areas of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, including all initiatives that 
develop, employ, or field artificial intelligence, automation, machine learning, deep learning, and 
computer vision algorithms” including Reaper drones.[ix] The accelerated temporality of the text 
itself should give us caution in that they are sprinting to incorporate this technology without 
pausing to question the unintended consequences of doing it. As of April 2018, Lt. Col. Garry 
Floyd stated that Maven has moved beyond the Middle East into Africa: “We’re in five or six 
locations in AFRICOM and CENTCOM,” (McLeary 2018). Within a year of launching, Maven 
has greatly expanded, and more troubling is that it is only one of hundreds of AI projects currently 
at the DOD. 
  
There are two key fears present with Project Maven: how will these biases built into the 
system without critical reflection be amplified in the future when the AI can target independent of 
human control and how will it adapt to vastly different geographical, urban, and war 
environments? While bias in Project Maven’s AI may be subtle in its first deployments thus far 
that have been limited to identifying objects, yet “[w]hile the algorithm is trained to identify 
people, vehicles and installations, it occasionally mischaracterizes an object. It’s then up to the 
intel analyst to correct the machine, thus helping it learning” (Weisgerber 2017). Such problems 
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as different geographies than the AI was trained on, presented initially a 60% accuracy rate, 
nevertheless, “Just over a week on the job — and a handful of on-the-fly software updates later — 
the machine’s accuracy improved to around 80 percent. Next month, when its creators send the 
technology back to war with more software and hardware updates, they believe it will become 
even more accurate” (Weisgerber 2017). Thus, the problem is presented simply as software 
updates and bugs in the system that will become the foundations for AI – that will likely have the 
ability to execute and generate targeting decisions – will be compounding these initial biases in 
the system in the “sprint” to deploy the technology. The DOD is currently soliciting private 
companies, like Google, to develop targeting software for drones “to automatically Detect, 
Recognize, Classify, Identify (DRCI) and target personnel and ground platforms or other targets 
of interest. The system should implement learning algorithms that provide operational flexibility 
by allowing the target set and DRCI taxonomy to be quickly adjusted and to operate in different 
environments.”[x] The idea that the taxonomy for targeting people and objects with “operational 
flexibility” remains wedded to the idea that war is a timeless and unchanging facet of international 
politics, and that the immense strategic, tactical, and cultural complexities that we experienced in 
Afghanistan and Iraq could somehow be programmed away. Such a technological hubris offers an 
easy fix, to immense complexities. For instance, how could AI distinguish between our on-the-
ground allies and foes that change within months within a single conflict, let alone across conflicts? 
Even if the technology were able to get there someday, the intrinsic argument against surrendering 
that control to the algorithm holds strong, in that killer robots lack agency – the ability to do 
otherwise (Leveringhaus 2016). 
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AI, Agency, and the Positives of Humanity 
Even if we have not yet reached the point of ‘killer robots’ the above explication should show how 
we are closer than many of us may have been aware and that there is very little discussion about 
the ethico-political consequences of such as that interferes with the “sprint” to adopt this 
technology. This accompanied by the lure of the ‘ethical war’ where our troops can be removed 
from the battlefield while simultaneously eliminating human errors that result in civilian casualties, 
has a compelling argument to introduce killer robots onto the battlefield as soon as possible. In 
this section I discuss the dual issues that arise from the prospect of killer robots making ethical 
choices in warfare via computation and the impossibility of programming practical judgment. 
First, although AI may someday be better at selecting the legitimate targets than a trigger-happy 
20-something, robots lack agency – or the ability to do otherwise – an inherently moral decision 
that cannot be reduced to an objective mathematical calculation. Second, in the search for the ideal 
Cartesian ‘rational man’ by eliminating bias, error, panic, dehumanization, etc. from the practical 
judgment of soldiers to the computations of the ‘killer robot,’ one also removes the positives of 
humanity – pity, compassion, and empathy – or the moral ‘calculations’ that go in the decision not 
to pull the trigger even when you may be legally justified in doing so. 
  
         There are both contingent –i.e. the technology is not good enough yet – and intrinsic 
arguments against killer robots that Leveringhaus (2016) addresses in a useful and accessible 
typology for assessing how killer robots convert human agency to artificial agency. Furthermore, 
there are two types of targeting decisions that killer robots can make, executing and generating 
targeting decisions. Executing a targeting decision is simply an artificially intelligent drone 
deciding between targets already deemed legitimate by the programmer by applying the jus in 
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bello criteria before deployment. This unto itself is highly problematic as it assumes that the 
algorithm is somehow objective and neutral – not contextually bound by programmer bias – a kind 
of “god-trick,” which I will explore in the following section. Generating a targeting decision, on 
the other hand, differs in that the robot must apply the criteria and assess whether a human is a 
legitimate target or not (discrimination) and a calculation of whether a particular course of action 
is likely to cause excessive harm to those who cannot be intentionally targeted (proportionality). 
The problem is such that killer robots will find it hard to determine “what constitutes proportionate 
and necessary harm,” as the application of the jus in bello criteria are highly context dependent 
(Leveringhaus 2016, 5). Furthermore, “the real problem is that the ways in which lives are 
‘weighted’ and ‘balanced’ in proportionality calculations is not fixed, but subject to a much 
broader change in circumstances on the ground” (Leveringhaus 2016, 6). Hence, the intrinsic 
arguments against killer robots as outlined by Leveringhaus, involve a lack of agency, the context 
dependence of decision-making in war, and I would add a problem with rule-based moral 
reasoning more generally. 
  
          Killer robots lack agency, or the ability to do otherwise, an essential feature of exercising 
ethical practical judgment and due care on the battlefield. Soldiers in Iraq were frequently told to 
abide by the 51% rule: being if you feel as though your life is 51% in danger, you can take the 
shot. What is clear here in speaking to US Marines who served in the war is that this is a general 
rule, but ultimately comes down to one’s judgment and assessment of the on-the-ground context 
of what that 51% means. This number 51% gives the illusion of objectivity and a calculable risk 
to a soldier’s life, when the reality is purely subjective interpretations and judgments of concrete 
circumstances. These are dilemmas explored in Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars when he deals with 
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the ethics of killing a soldier while bathing in the river and how he is hors de combat even if he 
may be a legitimate target once he puts on his uniform and picks up his gun later. Recognizing that 
recent conflicts have not been against soldiers in uniform, this practical judgment becomes ever 
more necessary. This ability to otherwise and choose not to pull the trigger even if one is legally 
justified in doing so gets at the heart of the intrinsic argument against killer robots as they lack this 
agency. 
  
Programmer Bias and Tin Men Ethics 
Beyond lacking agency, the belief that killer robots represent an ideal Cartesian rationality devoid 
of social, political, and cultural context, presents an elimination of the positives of humanity in an 
attempt to minimize the negatives of human emotion. This represents the possibility of the 
culmination of the ‘god-trick’, which feminist scholars have been discussing for decades. Donna 
Haraway (1988, 581) famously describes the ‘god-trick’ of Western scientific epistemologies: the 
illusion of being able to see everywhere from a disembodied position of ‘nowhere’ as an integral 
component of histories of militarism, capitalism, colonialism, and male supremacy. Wilcox (2017, 
13) takes Haraway’s ‘god-trick’ one-step further in their discussion of the weaponized drone, with 
its global surveillance capacities and purported efficiency and accuracy in targeting weapons. “The 
‘god-trick’ is not only visual, but more broadly epistemological: artificial intelligence, especially 
in an age of ‘big data’, can also appear to have omniscient power that appears everywhere and 
nowhere at once The work of posthuman feminists provides a necessary check on tendencies to 
theorize the drone as ‘other than human’ in ways that reinforce the separation of humans from 
techno-scientific practices, including the use of visual technologies, algorithms, and artificial 
intelligence in various configurations to enable ‘drone warfare’” (Wilcox 2017, 13). While the 
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weaponized drone is indeed a perfect symbol of this culmination, the hidden symbol of the god-
trick lies in the algorithmic code of AI itself. It is truly god-like technology as code is everywhere 
and nowhere simultaneously and it is inherently trusted as a higher form of rationality, divorced 
from the human judgment that went into writing the code in the first instance. 
  
         The god-trick and the removal of humans from the act of killing, brings forth the old trope 
that breaks down humans into reason (which is a positive masculine attribute) and emotion (that 
is a negative feminine burden) to be eliminated in warfare via techno-innovation. Valerie 
Morkevicius traces the argument for the importance of emotions in ethics in her  “Tin Men Ethics” 
article highlighting the practical significance of emotions in the decision-making process. She 
argues that, “emotions can help us to act morally in four ways that are particularly relevant for the 
ethics of war. By informing our moral intuition, generating empathy and holding us accountable 
for our choices, our emotions – as expressions of our inner soul or conscience – actually guide us 
toward more ethical behavior” (Morkevicius 2014, 9). By cultivating an in depth understanding of 
how reason and emotion are linked in ethical behavior, the notion of a “sprint” toward battlefield 
AI and programming ethics into the algorithm becomes quite a fruitless and dangerous endeavor. 
Thus the goal of AI in the battlefield ‘solves’ the problem emotions in war in favor an idealized 
rational robot, while eliminating an inseparable aspect of moral reasoning, being emotion. Where 
would we be in warfare without pity, conscience, empathy, and forgiveness? In my view, war 
ethics are inseparable from practical judgment, as exemplified from the WWI and Iraq examples 
above, and the notion that ethics can become the application of an algorithm has wider Western 
scientific epistemological and societal rationales than the “ethical war.” Nevertheless, these 
attempts to absolve and distance us from the act of killing in war, represents the culmination of the 
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clash of liberal values of human rights, with its propensity to commit violence on an industrial 
scale against the Other. An attempt to escape the consequences of this killing via military 
technological innovation, will lead to a greater ease in taking lives as the ethical box has always 
already been ticked, and the door will completely shut accountability for killing of innocents by 
Western actors. 
  
Conclusion 
In the technological era, the allure of the ‘ethical war’ seems within reach building on the decades-
long trajectory from smart bombs and collateral damage software, to machine learning drone 
strikes, to the killer robots of tomorrow. This historico-genealogical narrative – following Beier 
(2017) – has sought to raise important questions about the necessity of practical judgment in war 
ethics, and the inability to provide an algorithmic answer these ethico-political dilemmas, 
especially when blinded by the uncertainties of warfare. Attempts to quantify the world and the 
global battlefield of the US War on Terror raise new ethical dilemmas as the transformation of 
judgment to computation attempts to absolve decision-makers from accountability for killing. 
While this genealogy demonstrated the road taken in abrogating our ethical responsibilities to a 
coded morality, the future trajectory of killer robots is by no means inevitable, as it remains a space 
of contestation. The lessons of Haraway (1988) on the impossibility of the god-trick updated by 
Wilcox (2017) for the drone era provides a cautionary tale for future military development in the 
field of AI and a simulated ethics. While IR scholars who study war and violence are increasingly 
returning to the site of the ‘body’ and the ‘scars of violence’ (Steele, 2012) while simultaneously 
refocusing on emotions, how does the advent of AI and the prospect of a purely “rational” decision-
making machine in war impact this recent trend in IR scholarship? 
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These military applications are symptoms of wider issues of late modernity to quantify the 
unquantifiable and tame chance. Yet such a futile endeavor remains “a grandiose technocratic 
rationalizing dream of absolute control of the accidental understood as the irruption of the 
unpredictable. In the name of this myth of absolute eradication of risk, they construct a mass of 
new risks which constitute so many new targets for preventive intervention” (Castel 1991, 289). 
Drew Gilpin Faust has noted that those of us who study war are fascinated by the collision between 
the superhuman, inhuman, and immensely human experiences that are brought forth in warfare. 
For every case of inhumanity, one often finds a case of selflessness and ethical behavior to be 
emulated. In the end, AI cannot answer these essential questions of ethics, humanity, and the 
human condition. We have forgotten in modernity that rule-based moral reasoning or coded 
morality that can be quantified is a relatively recent way of understanding ethics, and one that 
should ultimately be challenged. These techno-practices of war-making program an optimistic 
ideal future of war that fit the predetermined hopeful outcome, that cannot be tweaked with 
software updates based on the nature of how AI functions. In the end, proffering this historico-
genealogy of the technological pursuit of the ‘ethical war’ demonstrates how a probable future 
with killer robots, are a symptom of a data-driven world that transforms complex social 
interactions into quantifiable terminology, erasing the essence of humanity in the process. 
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has explored how meaning is constructed via a technostrategic discourse to make 
killing in war palatable to Western liberal conscience by techno-logical problem-solving. By 
looking back to the philosophy of Giambattista Vico, I argued that we can begin to reconceptualize 
what it means to be human in an era of artificial intelligence and algorithmic ethics. Thinking 
through first order principles of epistemology, ontology, the nature of language, and insights of 
poetic wisdom on moral intuition, re-contextualizes the techno-logical era within a broader 
discourse of ethical theorizing. Tracing the rise of computing power in war and how meaning is 
constituted quantitatively and algorithmically in war, we can see how abstraction from the human 
consequences of killing seeks to construct technological war as inherently more ethical than the 
barbarism of past conflicts. Nevertheless, as I have demonstrated throughout, compressing the 
strategic, political, and ethical uncertainties and contingencies of war into neat quantifiable and 
measurable boxes functions to replace an ethics of practical judgment with computational ethics. 
As technologies of war and lethal autonomous weapons systems are being developed to 
improbable depths, we must fundamentally reassess our assumptions of ethics in the technological 
era. On this journey I argue that Giambattista Vico may prove our Virgil. 
 
 This dissertation explored a number of concrete elements of the computerization of killing 
in war. Chapter one examined the philosophy of Giambattista Vico and how a turn to his study of 
language and history can offer insight for constructivist IR, just war, and critical security studies 
in the technological era. There are three avenues which I view promising for a future of IR and 
war ethics with a Vichian epistemology. First, Vico provides us a language of critique of rule-
based moral reasoning based upon abstraction and the false objectivity of mathematics in moral 
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theorizing. Such an understanding of ethics divorces it from constitutive elements of what it means 
to be human, namely the context, time, and place in which rhetorical arguments were made for 
particular audiences and circumstances. This emphasis on the particular and contextual instead of 
the universal and de-contextualized pushes back against positivism that continues to dominate IR 
today and has seeped into ethical thought in just war revisionism. Second, Vichian thought paved 
the way for early studies of anthropology and hermeneutics, both of which are integral to the 
interpretivist turn in constructivist IR today. Thus, if we are to take the reflexive turn seriously, we 
ought to interrogate the earliest articulation of inter-subjective humans as historical, proffered by 
Vico in his New Science. Third, Vico proffers a philosophy of history through which we can 
interpret the development of AI as a problem-solving tool. Thus, when man reaches the last stage 
of history where he falsely believes that his mind can encompass God’s mind, a historical ricorso 
occurs returning man to poetic wisdom. This poetic wisdom man saves himself by preserving his 
humanity.  
 
 In chapter two, I take Vico’s notion of poetic wisdom and invert it from a poetic wisdom 
of heroic (Homeric) poems and focus on the everyday lived experiences of soldiers and civilians 
in warfare. This poetic wisdom saves our ethical theorizing from abstraction and quantification, 
by re-engaging our moral intutions by connecting us to the human suffering of another in war and 
conflict. Thus, my drive in the turn to the poetic throughout is threefold. First, it emphasizes the 
contingent, paradoxical, and uncertainties of warfare as opposed to the pursuit of a science of 
warfare proffered by techno-optimists. Second, it reconnects us to war as an immensely human 
experience, which appeals to our moral intuitions of practical judgment as opposed to a 
computational ethics that attempts to render all human experience into mathematical theorizing. 
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This divorces us from the complex ethico-political dilemmas of war and makes killing a more 
mechanistic process. Finally, this chapter sought to highlight the divide between just war 
revisionists and traditionalists and how just war thinking ought to incorporate Vichian 
assumptions. Vico posited that the foundations of just war and international law today via Grotius 
failed to take into account the variety of concrete human history in the formation of the law of 
nations. Thus, understanding the humanist critique of early international law may aid us going 
forward in understanding ethics in an era of AI and how law will look in the future world order. 
 
 Chapter three takes a micropolitical look at the space of contestation at the RAND 
Corporation in the 1950s and the advent of computer-based wargaming. Looking into the logics 
of mutually assured destruction, quantification of political psychology, and the infighting between 
social sciences and mathematics over the nature of the social world, I highlight the tensions 
inherent in understanding war. This is both a foil for the quantitative/qualitative divide in social 
science, as well as addressing how early nuclear strategy employed a technostrategic discourse 
that enable the casual discussion of tens of millions of dead. Early on, many at RAND met with 
horror the discovery of the H-Bomb and its destructive capabilities. While others continued on in 
work looking to find the maximum efficiency in money spent, bombs dropped, and targets 
destroyed. Although these were not coated in ethical terminology, there were clear ethical 
dilemmas that were being swept away in favor of notions of objectivity and scientific rationality. 
This is exemplified in the short-lived Cold War Game, whereby even the most bellicose proponents 
of nuclear threat posturing tempered their play faced with the real-world consequences of having 
to make the decision themselves. This however, slowly faded away as computer simulated war 
games began to predict with confidence that the U.S. would prevail in a nuclear exchange with the 
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Soviet Union. Ultimately, this ethical investigation into the advent of computer-based war gaming 
exemplifies the effects of abstraction and divorcing war-making from its human consequences at 
the micropolitical site of RAND Corporation in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
 The fourth and final chapter continues the discussion from chapter three with broader brush 
strokes, by exploring the perfection of algorithmic warfare from smart bombs, to collateral damage 
estimation algorithms, and metadata drone assassinations. I argue that this trend represents a shift 
from an ethics of practical judgment to a computational ethics, that eliminates due care for civilians 
from the equation. Proponents argue that war becomes an inherently more ethical space by virtue 
of utilizing advanced battlefield technologies. However, as this chapter argues, a different kind of 
computational ethics is prioritized that necessarily eliminates that which is unquantifiable. 
However, the constructions of ‘terroristness’ via SIM card metadata calculations of probability 
obscures the basis from which life and death decisions are made in the U.S. Global War on Terror. 
Hence, there is a false belief that these technologies of war and computational algorithms are 
somehow better suited to accurately predict who is a legitimate target in war and who is 
illegitimate. However, as the empirical record has shown, this is not the case. More importantly, 
is that it undermines the legitimacy of the mutual right to kill and be killed in combat, which 
underpins the legal and ethical justifications that distinguish war from murder. Ultimately, 
algorithmic warfare raises essential epistemological questions of knowledge construction that Vico 
offer guiding questions for in the years to come. As AI is being developed to improbable depths, 
we must ask ourselves what it means for a machine to take a human life, and how it eases our 
liberal conscience of killing in war in an attempt to escape the human condition. 
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 In sum, this dissertation explores the complexities of modernity through the process of 
algorithmic warfare from 1950s nuclear wargaming to killer robots of tomorrow. By probing our 
ethical, epistemological, and ontological assumptions in attempts to construct a science of warfare, 
I examined a number of key cases in the recent history of U.S. practices of war. Although such an 
exploration is an ongoing project and these cases were meant to be illustrative of wider social 
trends, the goal is to re-contextualize these purportedly objective and timeless truths into their 
embedded social, discursive, and temporal contexts. War is an experiment in catastrophe; believing 
that we have created a science of war risks neglecting the uncertainty and contingency of war, its 
only timeless essence. While the ethics of war, critical security and constructivist IR have much to 
interrogate for years to come, I believe that Giambattista Vico may aid us in our endeavors to make 
sense of late modern warfare. “Today we glory in science and in cybernetic instruments, entrusting 
our future to them, forgetting that we still have the problem of finding ‘data,’ of ‘inventing them,’ 
since the cybernetic process can only elaborate them and draw consequences from them. The 
problem of the essence of the human genius and of its creativity cannot be reduced to that of 
rational deduction, which modern technology is developing to improbable depths.” –Ernesto 
Grassi, Vico and Humanism (1990). 
  
  
